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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Development planning as a means of accelerating economic 
progress in less-developed countries has become a sine qua 
non. Deliberate and rapid industrialization was often advo­
cated as a primary goal for speedier growth in the economy. 
It is only in recent years that, as a result of experience,, 
progress in the agricultural sector has been recognized as a 
strategic element in the development process, and it is also 
accepted that the agricultural sector must not be allowed to 
remain stagnant if growth momentum throughout the economy is 
to be attained. The question of agricultural development 
versus industrial development has become a false issue. In­
stead the emphasis is on the inter-relationships between in­
dustry and agriculture and the contributions that one sector 
can make to the other. The intimate and complex relationship 
between agriculture and the rest of the economy, which goes 
on changing along with economic growth, has been recognized 
as an important factor In the development process. 
It is also recognized that a favorable situation in 
terms of resources and planning expertise alone is not suffi­
cient to promote rapid economic development.^ If planning 
Ï 
Waterston's (112) survey of efforts at development plan­
ning and Baldwin's (2) case study of development planning in 
Iran provide an insight into the problems in development plan^ 
nlng. 
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Is to be effective, it must take into account the realities 
of rural life in a particular country and the institutional 
(structural) arrangements that are necessary to accelerate 
the process of development. Within agriculture itself, sub­
stantial and rapid changes in agrarian structures are consid­
ered inevitable in less-developed countries in their quest for 
development. A prime requisite to bring about these changes 
lies in national commitment and the leadership willing and 
able to provide a strong and continuing thrust to the planning 
efforts to ensure its continuity. 
Nepal is a late-comer in adapting to the process of mod­
ern development. It remained a closed and remote society for 
over a century with the history of planned economic develop­
ment beginning only in 1951* Although the country had a glo­
rious, prosperous, and creative past, it stands now among the 
lowest per capita income countries of the world. Referring to 
the history of Nepal, Bhola Chatterji, an Indian Socialist 
leader and historian, writes: "Way back in time when Europe 
was struggling to be Itself, when America was patiently wait­
ing to be discovered, when Galileo had yet to say E pur si 
muove. Nepal had a culture that left its imprint on man's civ­
ilization through its philosophy and religion, literature and 
art. The country had the freedom to think for itself; it had 
the liberty to act the way it thought best" (4, p. 1). 
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This was brought to an abrupt end in 184^, by no foreign 
power - Nepal has never been under foreign rule - but by a 
Nepali, Jung Bahadur Rana, who was the main architect in es­
tablishing an autocratic regime with a unique hereditary prime 
ministership. 
Prom 1846, Nepal was sealed in the cocoon of the petri­
fied thoughts and ideas and despotic politics of the Ranas. 
For 104 years - through 1950 - they ruled the country this 
way, rendering the king of the country a mere figurehead and 
plunging the people into the darkest era of their history. 
In 1951I a drastic change took place. The old order gave 
way to the new. Nepal began the task of economic development 
and of creating a modern system of government. Suddenly Nepal 
was also faced with the realities of the need to choose between 
the relentlessly demanding world of modern social order and 
technology and the simple and native traditional world. The 
Nepalese ware confronted with the challenge of transforming 
an ancient society into a modern one. It demanded of their 
leaders a total commitment to lift the country up, politically, 
economically and socially, from the century-old feudal and 
autocratic regime. 
An effort will be made to examine - emphasizing economic 
problems - how far and how seriously this challenge has been 
accepted. Current efforts at economic development will be 
studied with emphasis on the agricultural sector. The 
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successes and failures of economic development will be ana­
lyzed with the aim of improving the future role of agriculture. 
General Nature of the Economy 
The general economy of Nepal is influenced by its physi­
cal features. Nepal, with a population of 10.82 million and 
with an area of l40,800 square kilometers, is largely a moun­
tainous country. Nearly 3^ percent of its area lies in the 
mountains, about 39 percent in the hills and valleys, and the 
remaining 2? percent in the plains, commonly known as the 
1 
Tarai. 
The mountain area, lying between the hills (2,440 meters) 
of the South and the world's highest mountains on the North, 
is generally not suitable for crop husbandry and difficult to 
harness economically due mainly to the lack of transport and 
communication facilities. This area is sparsely populated and 
has remained economically inactive except for a few yak and 
sheep raisers. The Hills and Valley regions (6lO to 2,135 me­
ters) are densely populated and are mostly engaged in terrace 
farming. 
The most fertile land, the Tarai, is a 48-kilometer wide 
strip of the Gangetic Plain on Nepal's southern border. Eco­
nomically the Tarai is a very important area. This region 
contributes most of the farm product surplus, supplies food 
^The sources of data given in this introductory part are 
HMG/Nepal publications (32,35,^5 ). 
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for the deficit areas of the Hills and earns 65 percent of 
the total export earnings of the country. Until recently much 
of the land was uncultivated because of malaria. The man-
land ratio is still relatively low and during the peak seasons 
of planting and harvesting crops, immigrant labor from the 
Hills and neighboring India is used. 
In the land-use pattern, about 13 percent of the total 
area of the country is under cultivation, nearly 31 percent is 
under forest, 15 percent is under perpetual snow, 21 percent 
is waste land but partly reclaimable, and the remaining 20 
percent is under rivers, villages, cities and roads. 
Presently there are about 77 people per square kilometer. 
The annual rate of population growth is estimated at 2,2. 
Nearly 86 percent of the total households are engaged in agri­
culture, about 7 percent are in manufacturing and the remain­
ing 7 percent are in services. Agriculture and forestry gen­
erate nearly 65 percent of the gross domestic products and 85 
percent of the nation's export earnings. Nepal is a net ex­
porter of food, although certain Hill areas are chronically 
deficit. Direct land taxes provide about 25 percent of the to 
tal revenue of the Government. 
There'is a marked imbalance between the Hills and the 
Tarai in regard to population density, agricultural produc­
tion and other economic activities. Two-thirds of the total 
people live in the Hills, where only one-third of the food is 
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produced. The Tarai produce nearly two-thirds of the total 
food, but only one-third of the total people live in this 
area. Of the total cultivated area in the country, nearly 70 
percent is in the Tarai and only 30 percent lies in the Hills 
and Valleys. Though the Hills and the Tarai both are predomi­
nantly agricultural, the general economies of these areas dif­
fer inasmuch as the agriculture in the Tarai is relatively 
market-oriented, with its easy access to the Indian border 
markets, whereas the Hills are subsistence farming and are 
deficit areas with no modern transport facilities. The dualis-
tic structure is also manifested in the existence of small in­
dustrial towns in the Tarai, which are a small modern part of 
the economy; and an essentially traditional rural economy in 
the Hills, which cover the largest part of the country. 
Problems Faced in Economic Development 
By definition, Nepal is an underdeveloped country and it 
ranks among the lowest per capita income countries of the 
1 
world. In 1968, per capita income of Nepal was estimated at 
94 United States dollars. 
Most of the "universal" characteristics of underdevelop­
ment discussed in the theoretical literature (59, 72) on eco­
nomic development are readily visible in Nepal, too. For 
Ï 
A country is said to be underdeveloped if it has a per 
capita real income of less than $900 a year (21 p. 6). 
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instance, per capita income is low; per unit productivity of 
land and labor is low; the majority of the people (about 86 
percent) are engaged in the traditional agriculture; absentee 
landlords dominate the economy; the internal market is small; 
only part of the economic system is monetized. These are the 
apparent formidable obstacles in the economic development of 
Nepal, 
Along with these, there are a few inherent and important 
additional factors that are particular to Nepalese economic de­
velopment problems. Nepal's economy is partly based on 
export-oriented agriculture and forest products. Since the 
internal market is small, apart from its underdeveloped and 
unintegrated nature, even the modest scale of production in 
the country would require external markets. This makes the 
country increasingly more prone to the risks of price fluctua­
tions in external markets especially since Nepal's exports are 
mainly primary goods. At the same time, because of its land­
locked nature and its traditional trade pattern based on In­
dian markets, Nepal has, at the moment, limited scope to take 
the advantage of "best-price-offer" in the world market. 
Traditionally, the economy of Nepal has not been an Inte­
grated whole. The lack of modern transport and communication 
systems, and the difficulty and high initial costs involved 
in linking the two broad regions, the plains and the moun­
tains - passing through formidable chains of hills and 
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mountains, starting from as low as 150 meters to the highest 
point on earth - have made the problem of economic develop­
ment all the more difficult. The regional disparities, eco­
nomic and social, between the mountain regions and the plains 
(Tarai), therefore, add another set of problems of ethnolog­
ical, sociological and economic nature. 
There is also the geo-political problem. Nepal, a small 
Hindu Kingdom, is flanked on either side by two giants of Asia 
- the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India, 
which follow ideologically opposed political systems and eco­
nomic approaches, 
Given the nature of these specific problems coupled with 
the general characteristics of underdevelopment, Nepal's so­
lutions to problems of development, in broad generalities, are 
based upon developing: 
1. A system of government suited to its own geographic 
situation and at the same time competent enough to handle the 
modern process of structural transformation and economic de­
velopment ; 
2. A transformation of the society from its traditional 
state to a modern one while maintaining the traits of its own 
cultural heritage; 
3. An economic system and institutional structure that 
can transform a traditional, depressed rural economy into a 
viable growth economy in a small landlocked nation. 
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It would be therefore hardly possible for Nepal to draw 
on ready-made solutions to the problems of development. In­
stead, it must tailor carefully its development policy and 
strategy to suit its unique economic, social, physical and po­
litical character. 
Problems of Agriculture in National Development 
Agriculture is the largest sector in Nepal in terms of 
employment, gross domestic products, export earnings and raw 
material supply to the existing manufacturing industries, and 
plays a vital role in the national development. Notwithstand­
ing the role of this sector in the national economy, the aver­
age product per year per worker engaged in agriculture is esti 
mated as low as one-fourth of the per worker product of those 
engaged in the non-agricultural sector. It is evident that 
the low productivity in agriculture is mainly responsible for 
the low level per capita income, and the growth of Nepalese 
economy is intimately related to the growth in the agricultur­
al sector. 
These factors underline the basic importance of agricul­
ture in Nepalese economy. It is therefore essential that the 
relationships of agricultural activity to the national devel­
opment (growth and prosperity of the nation) be treated as a 
subject of vital concern. 
Agricultural development means a positive Increase in ag­
gregate agricultural production accompanied with an increase 
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in per capita real income for the agricultural family. In 
other words, the solution for agricultural development prob­
lems lies in increasing the per unit productivity of land and 
labor. 
The low productivity in agriculture is not due to the in­
herent inferiority of land and labor. No doubt, the pattern 
of agricultural production in Nepal is affected by the moun­
tainous topography that ranges from 6l meters to 8,896 meters 
above sea level. Because of varying altitudes, though Nepal 
is in the tropical to sub-tropical belt, it has different cli­
matic regions starting from the north with alpine and continu­
ing south with temperate, sub-temperate to sub-tropical cli­
mates (58 pp. 20-26), Nevertheless, there are other factors 
that have contributed to low productivity in agriculture in 
Nepal, which are introduced in the remainder of this section. 
The present institutional framework of agricultural pro­
duction is based on the system of absentee landlordism that 
has existed for over a century. Nearly 60 percent of the to­
tal agricultural households work as tenants on a crop-sharing 
basis. The tenants are required to pay 50 percent of the 
principal crop to the landlord, while bearing all the costs of 
cultivation except the land tax. In spite of the provision 
for permanent tenancy rights in the Lands Act of 1964, there 
can be no guarantee that tenants will not be evicted from the 
land in the absence of proper land records. 
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Under this kind of land-tenure structure, there will be 
little incentive to the tenants to increase the productivity 
of land and labor through technological and managerial inno­
vations. There will be little scope for capital formation 
through increased productivity in agriculture or through ac­
cess to outside capital. 
The population density compared to arable land is high. 
Per capita cultivated land comes to about 0.18 hectares. The 
net cultivated land per agricultural labor is about 0.4$ hec-
1 
tares, where over 86 percent of the total labor force is en­
gaged in agriculture. 
The size of farm holding is too small and there is exces­
sive subdivision and fragmentation of holdings. The present 
average size of holding for a family of 5.3 members comes to 
about 1.24 hectares. The parcels of land cultivated or owned 
by a family vary from 2 to 30 parcels, with an average size of 
plot from 0.09 to 0,068 hectares in different regions. 
Modern credit, marketing and supply systems are yet to be 
developed to meet the needs of farmers. The use of modern ag­
ricultural inputs like chemical fertilizers and improved seeds, 
are just now beginning to reach the farmers. The average use 
of chemical fertilizers in Nepal, in terms of nutrients, comes 
Ï 
"Labor force" includes the economically active population 
between the ages of 15 to 59» excluding household workers, stu­
dents, and the handicapped. In Nepal within this group (15 to 
59)» about 78 percent are considered at present economically 
active. 
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to about 2.5 kg. per hectare, whereas the average for Asia is 
about 8.0 kg. per hectare (80 p. 17). Only about 3 percent of 
the total cultivated area is brought under the use of improved 
seeds. There is one extension worker for about 3,600 farm 
families. 
These defects have essentially hindered the process of 
transforming the low productive agriculture into modern ex­
panded economy by restricting investment opportunities in ag­
riculture. Agricultural development in Nepal, as is the case 
in many of the underdeveloped countries, depends on institu­
tional and structural changes as much as it does on technolog­
ical changes. 
If structural and institutional defects, such as are preva­
lent in Nepal - large numbers of tenants, high rent, hard 
credit, defective markets - distort the distribution of agri­
cultural income among the factor contributors, it will have 
serious implications for productivity, the level of living and 
the purchasing power. A low level of per capita income of 
the large majority of the people lessens the expansion of the 
domestic market and consequently retards the cumulative eco­
nomic development. 
Objectives of the Study 
This study represents an effort to help fill the need 
for an analytical appraisal of planning processes in Nepal. 
There were mainly two reasons that motivated conducting this 
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study. First, Nepal has adopted planninp: as its development 
strategy and has accepted it as an essential means of guidinp-
and accelerating the economic development of the country. 
Over a period of fifteen years, two Plans were executed; the 
Third Plan is near completion of its execution; and the Fourth 
Plan (1970-75) is in preparation. It is time now to look back 
and examine what have been the achievements and where lie the 
areas of failures and what may have been the possible reasons 
for success or failure. This kind of assessment of the Plan 
performance may help in the forimilation of subsequent Plans, 
and especially the Fourth Plan. 
Second, there are few studies of the Nepalese economy 
that present a coherent picture of the economy as a whole in a 
systematic and objective manner. The present study, too, may 
not be able to meet the need entirely, because large gaps 
still exist in the data. Nevertheless, this study as a step 
toward that direction, may facilitate future studies as a ba­
sis for further research and analysis. 
The primary purpose of the study is, therefore, to obtain 
some understanding about the macro-economic characteristics of 
the Nepalese economy and to examine the policy implications of 
economic objectives in Nepal. The first concern will be then 
to provide relevant facts pertaining to the economic problems 
in Nepal and to explain the course of modernization, focusing 
the attention on analyzing the process of economic change in 
essentially a traditional and economically backward society. 
ih 
The social objective of planning; in Nepal, as enunciated 
In the first Five Year Plan in 1955» were directed to "raise 
production, employment, standard of living and general well-
being throughout the country, thus opening out to the people 
for a richer and satisfying life" (24 p. 2). It will not be 
attempted to go Into details of what these objectives mean in 
terms of achievements until a later discussion. However, it 
may suffice to say that attainment of "well-being" for the so­
ciety as a whole and for the Individual, as a member of the 
society, in particular, has been the declared policy objec­
tive of planning in Nepal, 
In analyzing the development policy and proc:rams, most of 
the attention will be devoted to the agricultural sector. 
This emphasis appears warranted as most of the people are em­
ployed in the agricultural sector and this is the sector in 
which change must be made in the process of national economic 
development as implied in the National Plans. The achievement 
made so far will be examined in relation to the goals and tar­
gets set forth in the Plans and efforts will be made to ar­
ticulate a future policy of development for Nepal in the 
light of experiences gained In the past. 
The specific objectives of the study are: 
1. To analyze and examine the progress or change In 
terms of targets and objectives of the Plans; 
2. To Identify and appraise the policies and programs 
that have proved successful; 
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3. To Identify and appraise the failure elements which 
have hindered the development; 
4. To suggest remedial actions to strengthen the suc­
cess elements and to lessen the failure elements in improving 
the future development efforts. 
Hypotheses and Procedures 
In pursuing these objectives, this study will be guided 
broadly by two sets of hypotheses. One will be a general 
working hypothesis and the other will refer particularly to 
the agricultural sector. 
The general working hypothesis is that the current tempo 
of economic activity in Nepal is insufficient to meet the eco­
nomic development objectives of bringing about significant 
improvements in the living standards of the people. Trans­
lated into targets, the general hypothesis is that the Third 
Plan long-term target of doubling the national income in fif­
teen years and increasing the national income at an annual 
1 
rate of 3,8 percent ( 31 p, l4) will not be possible to 
achieve unless some major changes are made in development pol­
icies and strategies, 
_ 
"National income" mentioned in the Plan document prob­
ably refers to GDP.GNP estimates for Nepal are not yet brought 
out. The annual rate of 3,8 percent national income should 
also refer to GDP. The growth rate of 3.8 percent was esti­
mated for the period, 1965-7O. Subsequent Plans will have to 
have higher rates of growth. 
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It is recognized that, while dealing with economic de­
velopment, it is not always possible to restrict one's analy­
sis to quantitative economic parameters only. The process of 
economic development is complex and depends on political, so­
ciological and Institutional factors as much as it does, say, 
on availability of capital for increasingly higher rates of 
investments. 
The approach, therefore, will be to explain the economic 
events in the nature of a general descriptive hypothesis de­
rived from relevant data for Nepal. This will include an em­
pirical assessment of Nepalese economic development efforts 
insofar as the available data permit. 
In coming to the agricultural sector, Professor Tlmraons* 
(104) analytical framework will be followed in identifying and 
analyzing the problems of agricultural development in relation 
to the national development. It will begin with the pattern 
of delimiting the segments of the problematic situations. 
This is what is in Objective 1. Having delimited the 
specific problems or the problematic gap in an ex post sense, 
hypotheses will be postulated as to why such situations exist. 
Possible reasons and explanations will be advanced for the per 
slstence of these problems. From this type of diagnostic hy­
pothesis (which is suggested in Objectives 2 and 3)» remedial 
hypotheses. Implied under Objective 4, will be developed. 
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In line with the nature of the general hypotheses given 
above, the delimiting hypothesis for the agricultural sector 
is that the annual increase in national income in agriculture 
(as given in the Third Plan) is falling short of the target 
as will be shown by analysis. 
In diagnosing the reasons why the agricultural sector 
lags behind the target growth rates, the hypothesis is that 
the incentive factors associated with increasing the produc­
tivity of land and labor in agriculture are not fully taken 
into account in the formulation and implementations of devel­
opment plans. The diagnostic hypothesis is related to struc­
tural factors such as tenancy, rental system, technological 
improvements, credit and marketing institutions, and invest­
ment opportunity. These may be referred to as "structural 
traps" and are broadly grouped as: 1) the incentive trap, 
2) the technical or knowledge trap, and 3) the capital trap. 
Following the diagnostic hypothesis, the remedial hypoth­
esis is introduced to serve as a basis for suggesting possible 
alternative modifications in the "structural traps" consistent 
with the growth rate. In the search for structural forms 
that are adaptable to the conditions in Nepal, the criteria of 
incentives, technical and managerial innovations and capital 
are considered as essential elements for success. In this 
sense, the remedial hypothesis may be called the "success" 
hypothesis. Specifically, the remedial hypothesis is that 
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the agrarian structures that are characterized by success ele­
ments, if identified and extended, will contribute to in­
creased economic growth in Nepal. 
To test these hypotheses the data collected from Nepal 
will be used. . The main source of data is the Government pub­
lications. Next are studies made by international organiza­
tions such as the International Monetary Fund, the Internation­
al Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the United Na­
tions' agencies. Data are also collected from field studies 
performed in Nepal to fill in the information gap and also to 
use as a "correction factor." In the field study, two Dis­
tricts (Bhaktpur and Bara) were selected from "developed" re­
gions for a detail case study in testing the hypotheses, es­
pecially the diagnostic hypothesis. Information has also been 
collected from other Districts (Jhapa, Parsa, Gorkha and Kai-
lali) which are in "intermediate to preliminary phase" of de­
velopment . 
A conceptual framework will be formulated to examine the 
existing situation, the goals of development expected vis-a-
vis the consequences realized. Certain failure and success 
elements in the existing agrarian structures will be identi­
fied through a study of the overall performance in the economy 
(with emphasis on agriculture) and also through the case study 
performed in the Districts mentioned earlier. Finally, sugges­
tions will be made in regard to the alternative modifications 
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in agrarian structures, from which conclusions concerning spe­
cific changes in agrarian structures can be drawn to make the 
agricultural sector a viable core component in the process of 
the economic development of Nepal. 
Plan of the Report 
In view of the emphasis given to the agricultural sector 
as a focal point of economic development in Nepal, the con­
tribution of this study is to construct a framework of develop 
ment for the Nepalese economy. This study is made up of seven 
chapters. 
Chapter I is an introductory one. It introduces the 
structure of the economy and some of the problems in the eco­
nomic development of Nepal to provide a background and setting 
for the study; specifies the objectives of the study and pre­
sents hypotheses to be tested and the procedures followed. 
Chapter II presents a brief summary and review of the 
first three Development Plans of Nepal, Emphasis is on poli­
cies,programs, implementation and achievements in the Plans. 
Chapter III deals with the conceptual framework of de­
velopment and describes the analytical model for appraising 
the performance of the agricultural sector. In the first sec­
tion of this chapter the general problem of economic develop­
ment is reviewed from a conceptual point of view. The review 
is relevant to Nepalese problems. The Second Section 
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describes the conceptual analytical model to be applied in ex­
amining the performance of the agricultural sector in Nepal by 
defining the delimiting, diagnostic and remedial phases of the 
analysis - following the construct of a "means-ends-centinuum. " 
Chapter IV contains a treatment of the relation between 
goals, means, and consequences dealing with the agricultural 
sector. Economic Implications of development objectives with 
reference to the agricultural sector are discussed. The con­
tribution of agriculture to the national growth in terms of 
annual growth rate, supply of factor and products, market in­
terrelations and infrastructure development are examined. The 
last part specifies the problematic gap in the development 
goals. 
In Chapter V, in view of the problems or gaps specified 
in preceding chapter, the specific concern is to Identify the 
relevant factors that provide a basis for improving the agri­
culture in Nepal. This will carry out the diagnosis of the 
problematic situations and will attempt to identify the suc­
cess and failure elements in the development processes in ag­
riculture in Nepal. 
Chapter VI deals with the developing of an outline frame­
work for the Fourth Plan of Nepal on the basis of the analyses 
performed in preceding chapters. It will suggest possible al­
ternative forms of agrarian structures and policies for re­
medial action in light of the success and failure elements 
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identified in terms of incentives, knowledge and capital -
the three necessary conditions developed in the earlier phase 
of the study. 
Chapter VII concludes the study and presents recommenda­
tions derived from the study. 
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CHAPTER II. THE NATIONAL PLANS FOR DEVELOPMENT 
The necessity of a national plan for economic develop­
ment in Nepal was felt for the first time in the 1930's. Nev­
ertheless, in the pre-195i Nepal, the basic policy of the 
erstwhile Rana Government had been to ensure the perpetuation 
of the system that would assure the continuation of the Ràna 
rule in Nepal rather than enhance the welfare of the people. 
The continuation of their rule, they thought, was possible on­
ly by persistent suppression of the people to forestall any 
desire for changing the status quo. They relegated Nepal, 
therefore, to a position of deliberate isolation and obscurity 
as a means for providing effective check upon the infiltration 
into Nepal of modern ideas and attitudes from the fast-changing 
outside world. 
However, it was not possible to seal the country entirely 
from the wave of dissatisfaction with the status quo and to 
suppress the rising desire for change that was sweeping Asia 
in the 1930's (57 PP. 23-29). To keep the situation in Nepal 
from becoming volatile, the Ranas moved with some of the devel­
opment activities. The depression of the 1930's also had its 
impact. In 1935, with the objectives of initiating improve­
ments in agriculture and industries, some specialized agencies 
- the Agricultural Board, Bureau of Mines, Forest Office, and 
Cottage Industries Promotion Office - were created. It was 
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announced in 1939i just before the outbreak of the World War 
II, that a 20-year development plan was prepared. Except for 
the announcement, the people saw nothing and knew nothing about 
"the plan." Similarly, in 19^9» a "National Planning Commit­
tee" was set up to prepare a 15-year Plan for Nepal. This 
"Plan" too was neither brought before the people, nor ever im­
plemented (97 pp. 247-248). 
The creation of agencies and announcements of "plans" 
were more for political reasons than a real desire for econom-
1 
ic development. In the absence of effective implementation, 
a list of activities, by itself, would not constitute progress. 
With the political change in 1951» interest in economic 
development began to take shape. The new Government tried to 
re-orient development activities toward a planned approach. 
In the initial few years, however, the urgency of maintaining 
political stability and establishing a workable system of gov­
ernment oriented toward the new political system, pushed the 
1 
Notwithstanding the policy of suppression during the 
Rana regime, some development activities took place, although 
they had very limited scope and were mainly to satisfy their 
own needs and, to some extent, to present themselves as "de­
velopment oriented." Kathmandu, the capital city, had a 
drinking water facility established in 1808 (26 p. 35) » Nepal's 
first hydro-electric power station, with a capacity of $00 kw., 
was commissioned in Kathmandu in 1911, followed by a second 
one with 800 kw. capacity in 1935 (^0 p. 8?); the first col­
lege, Tri-Chandra College, was opened in Kathmandu in 1924 
(26 p. 35)f the first joint stock industrial enterprise, a 
Jute mill, was established in Eastern Nepal in 1936; in 1939-
45, a group of l4 joint stock companies (jute, matches, cotton 
textiles, hydro-electric power supply, rice and oil, paper, 
soap, ceramics, furniture) was set up (97 P. 108). 
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problem of economic development into the background. The po­
litical situation and the mood of the leaders at that time is 
reflected in what a Nepalese scholar, historian and one-time 
political leader, Dr. D. R. Regmi said: 
"We are not so much concerned with economic issues 
as such as with the question of laying a founda­
tion of the democratic institutions. All schemes 
of economic development can wait for the duration 
of interim administration" (23 p. 175). 
No doubt, for a new government with a new approach, the 
issue of establishing new institutions would be more over­
whelming than economic issues. At the same time, the Govern­
ment was faced with financial difficulties, as the current 
revenue was not enough to meet the current expenditure re­
quired for the day-to-day functioning of the administration. 
Neither had the Government enough reserve balances remaining 
1 
from the Rana period. Nepal had to look for external assist­
ance. 
The Ranas had concluded the Point Four agreement with the 
United States in the beginning of 1951» about one month before 
the overthrow of the Rana Government, In 1952, the New Govern­
ment made a request to the Government of India for a loan. If 
external assistance were to come, it would also need a pro­
gram to ask for such assistance. In the meanwhile the rising 
expectations of the people were turning toward rising 
_ 
The total balance left by the Ranas in the Government 
treasury amounted to about Rs. 95 million in gold, silver and 
coins (23). Exchange rate in 1952: $1 = Rs. 6.24. 
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restlessness. The people expected the Government to show what 
it wanted to do for their well-being. It was no longer pos­
sible to postpone the economic issue. 
The Government felt the serious urgency of formulating a 
plan for development. Consequently, a Planning Board was con­
stituted in 1955. The first national plan for development, 
the Five Year Plan, was announced and put into execution in 
1956. This was the beginning of planned economic development 
in Nepal. 
The First Five Year Plan 
(1956-57 - 1960-61)^ 
The First Five Year Plan (hereinafter referred to as the 
First Plan) was an effort to re-orient developing the economy 
through a planned approach. The immediate driving force for 
the preparation of the First Plan was, among other things 
(some of which are mentioned in the previous pages), the ac­
ceptance by the Government that "planning has essentially an 
important role to play in the economic development of the coun­
try" ( 24 p. 3). 
Although the need for development planning was felt, the 
prerequisites to formulate such a plan, and the machinery re­
quired to implement such plan were not there, Nepal had no 
experience in planning, nor were there enough technicians, 
Ï ~ 
The Plan years are in fiscal years 15 July to l4 July of 
the following year. 
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All the Information that was available about the economy was 
1 
that "it was a poor economy." 
With the lack of basic knowledge and statistical informa­
tion about the economy it would have been hardly possible to 
formulate a comprehensive plan of any type (10 pp. 1-2), de­
fining objectives in terms of aggregate targets for employment, 
output, income, investment criteria, qnantifiable policy meas­
ures, etc. The First Plan was essentially a departmental in­
vestment program based on a list of project activities pre­
pared by various departments. In regard to a theoretical plan­
ning model, it was based, to the extent possible, on the "proj-
2 
ect approach." 
Having provided a sort of frame of reference, the First 
Plan (subsequently the Second Plan and the Third Plan) will 
Ï 
The data available during the formulation of the First 
Plan were only about a) population, b) current revenues and 
expenditures of the Government, and c) rough estimates of ex­
ports and imports. 
2 
The project approach, or "from bottom up," was used to 
the extent of drawing up the list of projects on the basis of 
departmental recommendations regarding the feasibility of the 
project. Priorities were allocated as per the broad objec­
tives already specified in the Plan. 
The "project approach" to planning was used in the initial 
stage of planning in other developing countries, too, e.g. 
Ghana Five Year Plan (1959-64), Cambodia (1960-64), Jamaica 
Ten Year Plan (1957-6?). The Indian and Pakistani First Five 
Year Plans also had followed to some extent a similar approach 
(110 pp. 7-15). 
However, in the case of Nepal, there was no analytical 
framework to assume any rate of income growth, nor was there 
any way to estimate market demand, productivity, etc., and 
hence no way to examine the consistency in the Plan. The First 
Plan was. therefore, in many respects, Incomplete and without 
a sound base in a conceptual sense. 
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be briefly reviewed in terms of 1) objectives and priorities, 
2) propjrams and targets, 3) financing and resource allocation, 
4) implementation and achievements, and 5) policy implica­
tions. 
1, The main purpose of the First Plan, as stated by the 
Government, was to establish an institutional base for devel­
opment and to provide a base for information about the economy 
to help formulate the subsequent development plans. The broad 
objectives of the First Plan were ( 24 pp. 1-6): 
a. To increase production and provide more employ­
ment opportunity; 
b. To provide opportunity for all the people to 
raise their standard of living; 
c. To establish institutions necessary for the suc­
cessful execution of development activities; 
d. To carry out necessary economic surveys to estab­
lish a base for future planning. 
To achieve these objectives, programs were formulated by 
giving priority to such projects that would 1) increase produc­
tion by using local materials to the extent possible and gen­
erate income in a shorter period of time, 2) provide useful 
information into the methods of increasing production, 3) help 
improve and strengthen institutional and administrative struc­
tures, and 4) help develop infrastructures. 
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Transport, communication and construction had the highest 
financial priority followed "by village development, and agri­
culture and forestry. It was realized that, although Nepal 
depended very much on agriculture, transport was the main bot­
tleneck for any development activity. In village development 
programs, along with some essential programs like drinking wa­
ter facilities, the rest of the resources were meant to be 
utilized in the promotion of agricultural programs in the ru­
ral communities. 
2, The programs of projects proposed to be implemented 
during the Plan period were not mentioned in a specific manner. 
They were in general terms. In broad groupings, they were di­
vided into the following activities: 
a. Transport and communication 
b. Village development and cooperation 
c. Agricultural development 
d. Land survey and land reforms 
e. Forestry 
f. Irrigation development 
g. Power development 
h. Industrial development and mining 
i. Commerce and tourism 
j. Administrative reforms, training and survey 
k. Social services - health and education 
1. Area development and resettlement 
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The targets of these activities were specified, in most 
of the cases, in terms of the number of projects or centers to 
be established or completed. There was no mention of physical 
targets for the growth of the economy as a whole, nor were 
there sectoral targets of agricultural production or indus­
trial production. (See Table 3.) 
3. Resources were allocated on the basis of project 
priorities. Nevertheless, it was an arbitrary choice rather 
than one based on economic criteria. The difficulty in making 
such a choice, in the absence of relevant information, and the 
guesswork involved in making the allocation are obvious. As 
mentioned in the First Plan, "One of the most difficult and 
crucial tasks In planning is that of making a wise allocation 
of resources available" ( 24 p. 12). 
The difficulty faced in the allocation of resources not­
withstanding, financing the Plan was also not easy in the be­
ginning. The annual regular expenditures of the Government 
were running to Rs. $0 million, whereas the revenues received 
were about Rs. 35 million. The Government was running a defi­
cit budget by about Rs. 15 million annually. 
The total outlay for the First Plan was estimated at Hs, 
330 million; on an average, annually Rs, 66 million. It was 
estimated that from the regular sources of revenue only an ad­
ditional sum of Rs. 170 million could be raised in five years. 
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a 
Table 1. Sources of additional revenue 
Income Rs. Million 
Land tax 8.2 
Customs duties 67.6 
Development bonds 26.0 
Utility services 
68.2 and forest 
Total 170.0 
a 
(24 p.11). 
Of this amount Rs. 75 million had to be earmarked for stabiliz­
ing the regular budget. Only the remaining Rs, 95 million 
would be available for financing the Plan, The balance of Rs. 
235 million to meet the Plan total outlay of Rs. 330 million, 
was proposed to be financed from external resources and some, 
if necessary, from the treasury reserves. It shows that as 
much as 71.2 percent of the total development outlay was ex­
pected to be financed from external resources, either in the 
form of outright grants or loans. 
The First Plan included only the activities of the public 
sector. Private sector programs were left out because of the 
lack of information on the activities of this sector. 
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Resource allocations for the public sector were made as fol­
lows : 
Table 2. Allocation of resources in the First Plan^ 
SN Items of Expenditure Plan Proportion of 
outlay total outlay 
(Rs. in million) (percent) 
1 Transport and communication 124.0 37.6 
2 Agriculture forestry 32.0 9.7 
3 Social services 44.0 13.3 
4 Industry and commerce 25.0 7.6 
5 Power 30.0 9.1 
6 Irrigation 20.0 6.0 
7 Organization and methods and 
village development 55.0 16.7 
Total 330.0 100.0 
a 
(2 9). 
The First Plan placed highest priority on transport and 
communication, allocated 37.6 percent of the total planned out­
lay. It was proposed to construct 1,444 kilometers of road. 
Next priority was given to the village development pro­
gram (a detailed breakdown is given in Table 4 of the total 
proposed outlay of the Plan); 12. 9 percent was allocated for 
Table 3. The First Plan targets and achievements 
at) 
during Plan period 
Projects Unit 
Situation 
before 
Plan 
Plan 
target 
Achieve­
ment 
Percentage 
of target 
achieved 
Roads Km 624 1,440 902 42.2 
Railway Km 74 86 Only survey -
Ropeway- Km 26 45 3/4 done 75.0 
Airfields Number 5 - 7 -
Telephone Number 350 1,500 700 46.6 
Post Office Number 124 100 292 292.0 
Power Kwts 7,700 20,000 750 3.7 
Irrigation Hectare 2,620 119,000 2,630 23.7 
Village Devel. Center Number - 48 55 114.6 
Agri. Devel. Center Number 3 18 8 44.4 
Livestock Devel. Center Number 1 7 4 57.1 
Dairy Develop. Center Number 2 - 5 -
Cottage Devel. Center Number na - 21 -
CoopérâtIves Number 1 4,500 378 8.4 
a 
The Three Year Plan. 
^Departmental Reports, HMG/Nepal (26). 
Table 3 (Continued) 
Situation Percentage 
Projects Unit before Plan Achieve- of target 
Plan target ment achieved 
Industrial Estates Number - - 3 -
Primary Schools Number 1,200 630 2,000 317.6 
Secondary and High School Number 385 136 165 121.3 
Colleges Number 13 - 15 -
University Number - 1 1 100.0 
Hospital beds Number 649 423 148 34.8 
Health Centers Number 15 54 94 170.0 
Health Centers (Ayurvedic) Number 43 43 57 132.5 
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this program. The village development program, was designed 
to provide an integrated approach toward the rural development. 
To achieve this, a total of 48 development centers were planned 
to be opened in rural areas. 
The agricultural sector, including forestry, received 9.7 
percent of the total outlay. It was proposed to set up 25 ag­
ricultural centers, representing different climatic regions 
of the country, to carry out experimental work on agronomic 
crops, livestock, horticulture and fisheries. 
Industries, mining, and commerce were given relatively 
less priority in the First Plan. The existing industries were 
all in the private sector. The absence of required infrastruc­
tures may have been the reason for relatively less outlay in 
this sector. The main activity in the industrial sector in­
cluded the establishment of an Industrial Development Corpora­
tion to provide institutional facilities for encouraging pri­
vate investments. 
In the Social Services, health and education together had 
13.3 percent of the planned outlay. Out of this, education 
had 5.7 percent and the remaining 7.6 percent was allocated 
to health services. In the field of education, the First Plan 
target was to establish 63O primary schools, 136 middle and 
high schools, and one university during the Plan period. In 
health services activities, it was proposed to provide 423 ad­
ditional beds in hospitals and to set up 54 health centers 
and 43 Ayurvedic Ausadhalaya (Hindu discipline in medical 
treatment). 
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Among the structural and institutional reform programs, 
apçrarian reform was considered an area that needed topmost at­
tention. "Land reform has been one of the basic problems in 
our development to raise the living standards of the people as 
the fate of nearly 95 percent of our people is tied with agri­
culture" ( Zk-p. 3^4-), The programs in agrarian reform included 
enactment of laws to protect the tenancy rights, to fix the 
rent, to regulate hours of work, fix minimum wages for agricul­
tural labor, and to improve the existing land-tenure systems. 
As to the problem of subdivided and fragmented holdings, it was 
proposed that consolidation of holdings would be carried out 
gradually through cooperatives. 
It was also proposed to develop modern agricultural credit 
institutions through cooperatives so as to regulate the rate of 
Interest and to find out ways and means to reduce the burden of 
old debts on farmers. As a first step in implementing the pro­
grams of agrarian reform, a high power Land Reform Commission 
with representation both from the tenants and landlords was to 
be constituted. 
The implementation of the programs seems, on the whole 
to have moved in line with the proposed activities in the First 
Plan. Since the main aim of the First Plan was to provide an 
institutional and structural base for the growth of the econo­
my, it will not be possible to evaluate the achievements in 
terms of quantifiable economic progress. Wherever possible the 
targets and achievements are presented in Table 3. 
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It was estimated that to implement the above-mentioned 
programs a sura of Rs. 215 million was spent during the Plan 
1 
period. The breakdown of expenditures is provided in Table 4. 
Table 4. The Plan outlay and actual expenditures during First 
Plan by major activities ^  
Plan Actual Percentage Percentage of 
Project/Sector outlay expendi- to actual actual to 
ture expenditure planned 
(Rs.in million) 
1 Transport, 
communication 124.0 94.9 44.22 76.5 
2 Power 30.0 13.3 6.22 44.3 
3 Irrigation 20.0 13.1 6.12 65.5 
4 Village development 42.5 26.7 12.44 62.8 
5 Agriculture, 
forestry 32.0 6.9 3.24 21.6 
6 Industries, mine, 
tourism 25.0 10.4 4.83 41.6 
7 Health 25.0 16.0 7.46 64.0 
R Education 19.0 21.3 9.93 112.1 
9 Miscellaneous 12.5 11.8 5.49 94.4 
Total 330.0 214.4 100.00 65.0 
a 
( 2 ? ) .  
1 
There was no separate accounting system for regular and 
development expenditures. It is all possible that the the re­
sources allocated for development activities may have been 
spent for regular activities of the Government. 
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Prom the aspect of resource use, it appears that the 
programs were implemented - in the same general manner as out­
lined in the Plan. Performance in education and transport 
and communications were quite satisfactory both from the 
achievement of targets and resource use. Performance in other 
sectors, except in agriculture and forest, was on the whole 
satisfactory. Agriculture and forestry were given high prior­
ity in the Plan. In resource allocation this sector had re­
ceived the third highest priority with 9.7 percent of the to­
tal outlay. In actual performance they could use only 3.24 
percent of the total actual expenditures in the Plan, the 
smallest amount used by any sector. 
In a resettlement program in the Rapti Valley, in the 
Southern plain of Nepal, 5»000 families from the Hills were 
resettled and about 12,000 hectares of new land were brought 
under cultivation during the Plan period. 
In the area of structural and institutional reforms, 
some foundations were laid down. Six technical training Insti­
tutes and one teachers' training institute were established 
in the Plan period. These are listed in Table 5. Approximate­
ly 5,000 people were given training in these institutes, with 
training periods ranging from three months to two years. In 
addition, in the same period 1,400 people were sent abroad 
for higher training in various technical and general adminis­
tration branches under the Colombo Plan, Participant Program, 
the United Nations and other agencies' fellowships programs. 
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Table 5. Technical training institutes established during 
the First Plan^ 
Name Year 
1 Agricultural school 1957 
2 Health assistant training school 1957 
3 Home science training center 1957 
4 Cadastal survey training center 1957 
5 Engineering school 1957 
6 College of education 1956 
7 Cottage industries training center 1956 
a 
( 2 6 ) .  
The first industrial finance corporation of the country, 
the Nepal Industrial Development Corporation, was established 
in 1959 with a total capital of Rs. 10 million, to promote 
private industrial enterprises by providing credit facilities, 
financial advice and by conducting feasibility surveys. The 
first airlines, the Royal Nepal Airlines Corporation, was com­
missioned in 1958. 
In the field of agrarian reform, legislations were en­
acted to regulate rent and to protect tenants from eviction. 
The Land Reform Act of 1956 fixed the maximum rate of rent at 
50 percent of the produce. Those tenants who had cultivated 
the land for more than one year were declared as protected 
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tenants and could not be evicted so long as they paid the 
rent. Maximum rate of Interest was fixed at 10 percent. Land 
lords were also forbidden to exact anything from the tenants 
in cash or kind over and above the legitimate rent. 
1 
The Birta Abolition Act, 1959i was enacted with an ob­
jective of eliminating the feudal system. Under this act, all 
rights and authority relating to ownership of Birta land were 
taken away from the Birta owners and were made taxable by the 
state. 
5. The First Plan, as noted earlier, was basically a 
document of piecemeal programs. And these programs were 
drawn by collecting the list of discrete projects from vari­
ous Departments and Ministries with very little interdepend­
ence, essentially following the traditional government bud­
getary practice of presenting a program of government expendi­
tures. There was, as such, no way to meet the balancing of 
goals and economic coherence in the Plan, nor in its implemen­
tation. 
From a policy point of view, an examination of the First 
Plan and its performance in terms of the fulfillment of physi­
cal targets alone may not, therefore, be meaningful. The 
foremost reason for this is that the annual programs prepared 
Ï 
Birta, a system of tenure in Nepal, was a specific grant 
given by the State to an individual. The Birta owners, in 
most of the cases, were exempted from the land tax. The ten­
ants would pay the land tax to the Birta owner. For various 
land tenure systems in Nepal see (91). 
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by the Governments were not drawn adhering to the Plan out­
line, From the inception of the Plan to the last year of Plan 
implementation, a period of six years, the Government was 
changed six times - Direct Rule by His Majesty, the King, to 
single-party governments, a coalition government, an elected 
parliamentary government, and back to the Direct Rule (57 PP. 
17P-3^7). "Criticism of the plan . , . ^therefore/is academic 
, , . decisions on expenditure were usually made without ref­
erence to it (Plan) . , . but were rather the product of . . . 
momentary enthusiasms of the various ministries which competed 
with each other to come up with the most attractive projects -
on paper. The Plan never played the role marked out for it, 
mainly to give a sense of direction and coherence to the 
multi-faceted development efforts" (69 p. 67). 
The First Plan was implemented during the most critical 
period of experimentation in establishing democratic institu­
tions in Nepal. The Plan was treated by various Governments 
as no more than an illegitimate child. Half-way through its 
execution, in mid-1957» the newly-appointed Prime Minister diS' 
carded the Plan and asked the Cabinate to formulate a modi­
fied Two Year Plan, Meanwhile, a new Government came in, dis­
missed the idea of the Two Year Plan and revived the First 
Plan. The political and administrative environment was very 
uncongenial and less than favorable for carrying out develop­
ment plans. 
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In spite of all these bewildering situations, the Plan 
was executed and the pain, if nothing more, was the experience 
Nepal had in planning. One of the striking experiences was 
learning - much against the prevailing belief - that for Nepal 
it was not really the limited investment fund that was a crit­
ical factor in getting a "big push" in development as much as 
it was the elementary capacity to utilize such funds. Al­
though there were some initial difficulties in financing the 
Plan, money was always available. 
The total Plan outlay was estimated as Rs. 330 million. 
But at the end of the Plan, the total of the annual budgets 
1 
earmarked for development amounted to Rs. 600 million. Out 
of this, the Government was able to spend only Rs. 2l4 million, 
which comes to only 35.6 percent of the total annual budgets. 
The extra money came from external assistance. The external 
assistance during the Plan period amounted to Rs. 382.8 mil-
2 
lion. 
The huge gap in the actual expenditures and the annual 
budgets outlay also shows that little attention was paid to 
1 
However, in the annual budget estimates, there may have 
been some double counting of carry-over amounts from previous 
year. There was no information available to check. In any 
case, more funds were available to spend than the Government 
could spend, 
2 
How much of the total foreign assistance was disbursed 
on development projects and how much went for technical assist­
ance, fellowships, or commodity assistance is difficult to as­
certain, as some of the foreign assistance funds were dis­
bursed outside the Government budget. 
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the Plan outlay and the capacity to spend in preparing the 
subsequent annual budgets. 
Although Nepal was successful in receiving foreign aid 
more than it expected, the success of mobilizing domestic re­
sources was disappointing. Notwithstanding the caution warned 
in the First Plan that "to rely wholly upon external aid would 
not only be damaging to our national self-interest and our ca­
pacity to manage our own affairs; it would also be futile, for 
in the absence of a strong effort on our part, that aid would 
soon dry up" (24 p. 1) if the Government depended heavily on 
foreign aid. 
The contributions from internal resources to the develop­
ment fund could not go beyond Rs, 60 million, only about 28 
percent of the total expenditures during the Plan period. The 
Government could not raise internal resources, as envisaged in 
the Plan, through increased taxation and sales of bonds, etc. 
This failure made Nepal rely more on external aid and this 
went on increasing during the Plan period. In the fourth year 
of the Plan the contribution from external assistance was 71 
percent of the total development budget; in the fifth year it 
went up to 88 percent; and in the following year after the 
First Plan it rose further to 9^ percent. Obviously Injection 
of outside capital did little to spur the economy in terras of 
Internal capital mobilization. 
Thus, given due consideration to the political, adminis­
trative and social upheaval during the period, the First Plan 
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has been more of an adventurous experiment in planning than a 
real development plan, partial or comprehensive. To this ex­
tent it was successful, provided such experience bears fruits 
in the subsequent Plans. This will be examined in the Second 
and Third Plans. 
The Three Year Plan 
(1962-63 - 1964-65) 
The Three Year Plan (referred hereinafter as the Second 
Plan) did not follow immediately after the First Plan, A 
number of significant changes took place in the meanwhile. 
The parliamentary system of Government was disbanded, A new 
Government was sworn in under the Chairmanship of His Majesty, 
the King, in the last year of the First Plan, A new political 
1 
system, called Panchayat Democracy was being evolved. 
The Planning Board established in 1959» which had already 
prepared a draft outline for the Second Five Year Plan, was 
dissolved. A new planning organization under the name "Na­
tional Planning Council" with His Majesty as the Chairman was 
constituted. The Council started working on a new Second Five 
Year Plan to follow immediately the First Plan. The outline 
was prepared (06). On second thought, the Council considered 
Ï 
Panchayat Democracy is a partyless political system 
adopted by Nepal, designed to suit its own political and so­
cial conditions, as a viable alternative to the various sys­
tems of political institutions of the West and the East such 
as practiced in India and China, Nepal's neighbors. 
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it wise to go for one year with annual programs extended from 
the First Plan and take some time for the collection of neces­
sary information to prepare a better plan, rather than pro­
duce a hastily drawn one. 
Subsequently, it was also decided to launch a Three Year 
Plan instead of a Five Year Plan, "recognizing that a general 
plan for development over a period of years would require 
larger internal resources of money and organizational and tech­
nical skills than are available . , . His Majesty's Government, 
^therefore^/proposed over the next three years to devise and 
implement a program of specific projects with the object of 
providing at the end the basic infrastructures which will then 
support a wider and more comprehensive plan" (85 p. 13). The 
Second Plan was termed, therefore, a preparatory plan as was 
the First Plan. 
The objectives of the Second Plan were as general as those 
of the previous Plan: 1) expansion of production and improve­
ment in the standards of living; 2) expansion of employment op­
portunities; 3) maintaining economic stability and social jus­
tice .... The priorities in the Two Plans did not differ 
much except that, In terms of resource allocation, more empha­
sis was given to industries in the Second Plan, "because of the 
need of completion of projects already underway." The Second 
Plan gave more emphasis to the collection of data on economic 
conditions and organizational reforms and improvements. 
il 5 
It was more explicit about the role of the private sector 
in economic development. The Plan stated, "In an underdevel­
oped country like ours, the responsibility of planned economic 
development lies ultimately in the Government , , , , But this 
does not necessarily mean that all the development works should 
be under government management. The private sector also must 
make reasonable contribution in the development" (26 p. 10). 
The First Plan had directed its economic policy toward what is 
called a "mixed-economy" approach and advised following a prag­
matic approach rather than following any set pattern in decid­
ing the nature of industries or programs to be run under the 
private or public sector. "The Government would initiate only 
such programs as are necessary in the larger interest of the 
society and where private initiative is not forthcoming" (24 
p. 6). 
The total outlay for the Second Plan was estimated at fis. 
600 million. As in the First Plan, there were no estimates for 
the private sector. However, Rs. 70 million were set aside, in 
addition to Rs. 600 million, for providing loans to support pri­
vate initiative in development. Because of the lack of infor­
mation on existing economic conditions, there were no quanti­
fied overall targets and goals. The sectoral and project tar­
gets were fixed in more or less a similar manner as in the First 
Plan. 
The allocation of resources in the Second Plan was made 
as shown in Table 6. 
k6 
a 
Table 6. Allocation of resources in the Second Plan 
Planned Percentage Loans to 
Sector/Project outlay to total institutions 
(Rs. in millions) outlay (Rs, in millions) 
Transport and b 
communications 1^3.5 23.9 (37.6) 
Agriculture, minor c 
irrigation, forestry k l . 6  6.9 ( 9.7) 10.0 
Industry and 
tourism 102.0 17.O ( 7-6) 50.0 
Power 91.0 15.2 ( 9.1) 
Irrigation (major) 
and drinking water 40.0 6.7 ( 6.0) 
Education 40.0 6.7 ( 5.7) 
Health and recre­
ation 62.7 10.4 ( 7.6) 
Reforms, survey, & 
training 79.2 13.2 (l6.7) 10.0 
Total 600.0 100.0(100.0) 70.0 
a 
(26 PP. 33-34). 
b 
Figures in parentheses are those of the First Plan. 
c 
Loan for resettlement. 
d 
Agricultural credit through land reform program. 
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There are some noticeable differences in the pattern of 
resource allocation in the Second Plan as compared to those 
of the First Plan. The allocation for transport and communi­
cations in the First Plan was 37.6 percent (this included con­
struction of buildings); in the Second Plan it was 23.9 per­
cent. Agriculture and forestry, excluding minor irrigation, 
had received 9.7 percent in the First Plan; this came down to 
6.9 percent including minor irrigation. Industry and power to­
gether were allocated as much as 32.2 percent in the Second 
Plan as against I6.7 percent in the First Plan. 
In the sources of finance, of the total outlay of fis. 67O 
million (includes Rs. 70 million for loans) Rs. 300 million 
were expected to be contributed from external aid, Rs. 100 mil­
lion from revenue sources, Rs. 60 million from external loan 
and Rs. 10 million from internal loans. Excluding loans, the 
share of foreign grants to the development program was expect­
ed to be as high as 83 percent. 
The achievements of the Second Plan, when viewed from the 
expenditure side, seem quite satisfactory. The development 
expenditures during the Second Plan period were disbursed 
through the Government budget as well as directly through aid­
ing agencies. Table 7 shows the planned expenditures and ac­
tual expenditures within the Government budget, 
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Table 7. Planned and actual expenditures in Second Plan 
within HMG budget 
Planned Actual 
expenditure expenditure 
(Rs. in million) 
Percentage 
of actual 
to the 
planned 
Transport and 
communication 
Agriculture, 
forestry-
Industry and 
tourism 
Power 
c 
Irriscat ion 
Education 
Health and 
recreation 
Reforms, survey 
d 
Miscellaneous 
133.19 
44.40 
79.88 
31.50 
29.08  
51.07 
61.21 
90.76 
33.98 
66.82 
33.01 
64.87 
41.53 
36.10 
38.43 
39.63 
48.17 
26.54 
50.16 
72,54 
81.20 
131.84 
124,14 
75.25 
64.90 
53.07 
78.10 
Total 555.07 395.10 71.17 
a 
Compiled from Three Year Plan - Progress Report 
(29, Appendix), 
b 
Does not include supplementary budget. 
c 
Includes drinking water. 
d 
Includes planning, loan payments, constructions, con­
tingency, re-balloting. 
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The expenditures on projects carried directly by aiding 
agencies, which were not included in the original programs, 
and the expenditures on commodity aids during the Plan period 
amounted to Rs, 220,46 million as shown in Table 8. 
Table 8. Other expenditures during the Plan period'®' 
Activity Expenditure 
(Rs. in million) 
Transport, communication and power 115.^7 
Agriculture, forestry, irrigation 29,21 
Industries 44.19 
Education and health 18,83 
Reforms, survey, training 12.76 
Total 220.46 
a 
(29). 
This amount when added to the expenditures shown in 
Table 7, the total development expenditures in the Sec­
ond Plan ,comes to Rs. 615.56 million,^ 
1 
Although this indicates considerable progress in the de­
velopment expenditures, it may be misleading, to some extent, 
in the absence of a clear definition of the development pro­
gram to put all under the development budget. It was not pos­
sible to ascertain the exact amount of development expendi­
tures from the information available. 
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On the loan side to the private sector, out of the to­
tal amount of Rs, 70 million for loans, only Rs, 22.78 mil­
lion were spent. The distribution was; fis. 19•62 million 
disbursed through the Nepal Industrial Development Corpora­
tion primarily to larger industries; Rs. 1.78 million in cot­
tage industries; Rs. 1.17 million through the Cooperative 
Bank to village cooperatives and Rs, 0.21 million for reset­
tlement programs. 
In the sources of finance, the Government received Rs, 
488 million as grants from external sources as shown in Table 
9 below. 
Table 9. Grants received from external sources®" 
Agency 
Amount received 
(Rs. in million) 
Amount expected 
Rs. in million) 
USA 194.5 210.0 
India 123.2 140.0 
China 46.2 40.0 
US8L 87.5 80.0 
UK 14.0 15.0 
Others 22.5 15.0 
Total 487.9 500.0 
* (2 9 ) .  
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As against the expected contribution from internal sources of 
Rs. 100 million (Rs. 40 million by deficit financing and the 
rest through increased taxation and other receipts), the ac­
tual contribution from internal savings came to Rs, 107 mil­
lion without recourse to deficit financing. The Government 
was able to increase its revenue and savings from the regular 
budget'' to contribute funds to development programs (3^)« The 
increase came from savings and bond issues (Rs. 20.6 million) 
and increased taxes and other receipts. (See Appendix.) 
Thus the share of internal contribution in the develop­
ment budget reached 22.4 percent as against the planned esti­
mate of about 17 percent. Foreign loans contributed 5.1 per­
cent and the share of external grants was 72.5 percent, where­
as in the year before the Second Plan it was as high as 94 
percent. On the whole, the performance in the Second Plan 
was relatively satisfactory in increasing the relative ab­
sorptive capacity of the economy, as far as spending was con­
cerned. 
The achievement of the Second Plan in terras of physical 
targets is summarized in Table 10. 
1 
Regular budget expenditures are distinguished from de­
velopment budget expenditures in that the regular budget encom' 
passes established government activities, whereas the develop­
ment budget is concerned with,the outlay for new or develop­
ment projects and activities (31 p. 35). 
a 
Table 10. Some of the main targets and achievements of Second Plan 
Sector/Project 
Situation Targets 
Unit before of 
Plan Plan 
Achieve­
ments 
Percent 
of 
target 
A. Transport and communications 
1. Roads 
a. All-weather Km. 701 320 72 
b. Fair-weather Km. 1,010 1,158 848 
2. Airfields 
a. DC-3 Num. 12 3 -
b. Stol Num. - 20 4 
3. Postal branch Num. 376 26 26 
4. Telephone lines Num. 1,120 900 
5. Wireless stations Num. 57 57 
B. Power Kwt. 8,982 22,000 4,430 
I 
C. Irrigation Hectare 51,598 57,287 40,628 
22.5 
73.2 
nil 
20.0  
100.0 
nil 
100.0 
20.1 
70.9 
M 
a 
Compiled from Departmental Progress reports (29) . 
'includes minor irrigation. 
Table 10 (Continued) 
Sector/Project Unit 
D, Education and health 
1. Primary schools Num. 
2. Secondary and high Num. 
3. Students (primary 
secondary, high) '000 
4. Hospitals '000 
5. Hospital beds '000 
6. Health centers '000 
7. Malaria eradication ooo 
people 
E. Agriculture, forestry 
Agriculture extension center Num. 
1. Agronomy farms Num. 
2. Horticulture farms Num. 
3. Livestock farms Num. 
Situation Targets ^ Percent 
before of Achieve-
Plan Plan ments target 
4,165 1,200 1,200 100.0 
585 50 163 326.0 
302 77 199 258.5 
39 3 3 100.0 
930 290 230 79.3 
94 10 12 120.0 
2,000 4,500 4,100 91.0 
5 9 6 66.6 
10 8 - nil 
11 14 5 35.7 
4 7 -  n i l  
Table 10 (Continued) 
Sector/Project Unit 
Situation 
before 
Plan 
Targets 
of 
Plan 
Achieve­
ments 
Percent 
of 
target 
4. Fish farms Num. 5 3 1 33.3 
5. Veterans hospitals Num. 11 21 21 100.0 
6. Pasture centers Num. - 5 5 nil 
Forestry 
1. Forest demarcation Km. 1,272 7.910 3,940 49.8 
2. Fire lines Km. 224 630 425 67.6 
3. Forest roads Km. 122 610 567 93.0 
Afforestation Ha. 392 4,500 2 ,445 54.2 
F. Cooperatives Num. 581 2,214 542 24.0 
G. Technical training 6,351 7.976 5,662 72.2 
H. Cadastal survey 000 Ha. 462 1,930 719 37.2 
c 
Includes training of junior level technicians in agriculture, forestry, coop­
eratives, overseers, health assistants, nurses, teachers. 
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Among the measures taken in the areas of institutional 
and structural reforms and economic surveys, the one in agrar­
ian reforms bears significance. Two legislative measures were 
taken to bring changes in the existing size of holdings and 
tenancy pattern. The Agricultural Reorganization Act and, 
with some amendment, The Lands Acts were promulgated in I963 
and 1964, respectively. The main provisions of these Acts are 
(33): 
1, Fixation of ceilings on land holdings - as owner 
(for each adult member in the family - in case of male, above 
16 years of age; for female, if unmarried and 36 years old); 
17 hectares if it is in the Tarai; 4,11 hectares for the Hills; 
2.67 hectares in Kathmandu Valley plus a homestead of about 2 
hectares. As tenant (for each adult member as in the case of 
owner); 2,67 hectares in Tarai; 1,02 hectares in the Hills; 
and 0,51 hectares in Kathmandu Valley without mentioning home­
stead, 
2, Provision of inheritable tenancy rights by one of 
the heirs, whomsoever landowner assigns without subdivision. 
3, Interception of all agricultural loans repayments to 
private lenders by the Government and provision for reassess­
ment of old loans, 
4, Provisions of collecting from owners and tenants a 
certain amount of the product (about 6-9 percent) in cash or 
kind as compulsory savings. 
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The rate of rent to be paid by the tenant was maintained 
the same as in previous Acts, to the maximum 50 percent of the 
total gross produce of the land. During the Plan period the 
provisions of this Act were applied in l6 out of 75 districts. 
In other areas of structural reforms, especially in pub­
lic administration, nothing substantial was achieved except 
some basic surveys in the decentralization of administration. 
The area in the country was divided into l4 zones and 75 dis­
tricts for the purpose of development activities. 
The census of population and the first agricultural cen­
sus initiated during the First Plan were compiled and for the 
first time preliminary estimates for Gross Domestic Products 
and foreign trade statistics were released. 
Summing up the performance of the Second Plan indicates 
that there were improvements in the fiscal side, and the in­
stitutions established during the First Plan were strengthened. 
However, the achievements in terms of physical progress do not 
seem to have moved in line with the actual expenditures vis-a-
vis the targets. From the expenditure side, if the expendi­
tures were added up -incurred within the budget and outside 
the budget- all the projects seem to have spent all the 
planned outlay, except for transport and communications (65 
percent) and reforms and organizations (65 percent). But in 
comparing the achievements with the targets, all seem to have 
come below the targets, except in education where achievement 
was more than 200 percent of the target and actual expenditure 
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was about 92 percent of the total educational budget. (See 
Table 10.) 
Further analysis of the annual budget and expenditure 
would show that none of the sectors was near the mark of spend­
ing what it had asked for or had had allocated. (See Table 7.) 
Power and irrigation spent more than they were allocated; oth­
er projects could spend, on an average, only two-thirds of the 
budget allocated to them. Apparently, there were shortcom­
ings in estimations and in technical assessments of the proj­
ects . 
The Government's inability to incorporate all the devel­
opment expenditures within the annual budget and need to make 
provisions for some projects to be implemented from outside 
the Government machinery, would indicate either the incompe­
tency of the regular administrative machinery to carry out the 
projects and the Government's inability to improve upon them 
or that the aiding agencies had considerable influence in the 
selection of projects and in the manner of their implementa­
tion. 
Some of the aid programs were already tied to specific 
projects, which the Government apparently was not in a posi­
tion to alter. For Instance, some of the industries such as 
a sugar factory, tobacco factory, and leather factory were 
already committed to Russian and Chinese aid programs. So 
were some of the US and Indian aid programs, 
5B 
The targets for establishing veterinary hospitals, sup­
ported under Indian aid, were fully achieved, whereas the 
achievements in establishing livestock improvement and breed­
ing farms and pasture development centers were nil. Without 
question, veterinary hospitals were needed ; but it is doubtful 
if it was justified to open such a large number of hospitals 
in such a short period of time, amidst so many other needs in 
livestock improvement. The choice was between treating the 
sick animals of local stocks which in a majority of the cases 
were uneconomic to maintain, except for perhaps psychic satis­
faction, on a itiassive scale and providing, in the meantime, 
certain facilities for improved breeding and feeding along 
with improved management. The former attitude prevailed. 
This review closes with the observation made by the Na­
tional Planning Council: "Our increasing dependence upon for­
eign assistance has affected the nature of our development 
programmes. . , the all-round development of the country is 
1 
not possible only by means of foreign aid." 
The Third Plan 
(1965-66 - 1969-70) 
The Third Plan was launched in July, I965, immediately 
after the termination of the Second Plan, Experience gained 
in the last two Plans helped considerably to make the Third 
Î 
Quoted in ( 9 7  p, 266), 
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Plan more comprehensive. At the same time, some of the basic 
information was available such as agricultural census data, 
gross domestic products estimate and trade statistics. Some 
measures like agrarian reform and the process for decentrali­
zation of public administration were already initiated. The 
political stability that prevailed in the country after the 
political change in I96I provided relative continuity in the 
administration. 
Financial institutions were improved and strengthened. 
A Cooperative Bank was established in 1963 to finance the agri­
cultural sector. The Nepal Industrial Development Corporation 
was able to expand its activities in financing the industrial 
sector. The establishment of the National Commercial Bank was 
initiated. The chronic problem of exchange rate fluctuation 
that had troubled the economy since 1950 was stabilized. The 
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act was enforced in most parts of 
the country, making illegal circulation of currencies other 
1 
than Nepalese currency. Tax receipts were improving. (See 
Appendix.) The convertible currency reserve position was bet­
ter, with a balance surplus increased from Rs. 26.24 million 
in 1962-63 to Rs. to 30.44 million in 1964-65 (76 pp. 59-60.) 
Nepal had a dual currency system allowing Nepalese and 
Indian currencies to circulate as local currencies in many 
parts of the country. In 1966, all the area in the country 
was brought under a single currency system - making the circu­
lation of Indian currency in Nepal illegal. 
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Consequent to these developments, the planners of the 
Third Plan were in a better position to deal with more specif­
ic targets and more explicit operating plans derived from the 
better factual information than in the previous Plans. The 
main distinguishing features of the Third Plan as compared to 
the previous Plans are: 
1. The long-run perspective view of development and 
growth was taken into account. The target set was to double 
the national income in fifteen years, by I9BO. To achieve 
this, the Third Plan was formulated with the primary objective 
of increasing the national income by 19 percent in the Third 
Plan period, i.e., in five years and, considering the estimat­
ed 2 percent population increase per annum, per capita income 
by 9 percent. Accordingly, sectoral targets, specifically in 
agriculture, were fixed to raise food grain production by 15 
percent. 
2. Investment estimates for the private sector were in­
cluded in the Plan in addition to Central Government outlays 
for the first time. Similarly, investment from the "panchayat" 
sector, consisting of the district, village and town units of 
the government created after the political change in 196I, 
were also presented in the Plan. 
3. The Plan envisaged making the panehayat system a me­
dium for development. The Plan adopted the constitutional ob­
jectives of the panchayat system (promulgated in 1962) as its 
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social objective: promoting welfare and social justice in 
the nation; providing equal opportunity for all for the "bet­
terment of life and access to resources; stimulating equita­
ble distribution of income, and raising the standard of liv­
ing; (25). As stated in the Third Plan; 
" . . .  t h e  p a n c h a y a t  s t r u c t u r e  i s  d e s i g n e d  t o  c r e a t e  
the institutional arrangements necessary for the po­
litical, social and economic growth of the nation. 
It will involve the people at all levels of adminis­
tration and executive action within the country. In 
view of the basic objectives, all important activ­
ities must be undertaken within the framework of the 
panchayat system " (31 p. 13). 
The mode of political thinking in the preparation of the 
Third Plan notwithstanding, the general objectives were about 
the same as those of the previous Plans. In the areas of pri­
ority, more emphasis was placed on those sectors that would 
contribute most to the national production. The agricultural 
sector had a major role to play in fulfilling the targeted 
rate of growth in the economy. Accordingly, this sector re­
ceived high priority in the Third Plan. 
The total outlay of the Plan was estimated at Rs. 2,500 
million: Rs. 1,740 million in the public sector, Rs. 520 mil­
lion in the private sector and Rs, 240 million in the pancha­
yat sector. The planners were presumably encouraged by the 
rising absorptive capacity of the economy, the increasing abil­
ity of the Government to provide funds, and the growing number 
of trained persons available to make a considerably large out­
lay in the Third Plan, The annual total Government 
62 
expenditures in the Third Plan became, on an average, five 
times more than that of the First Plan, As against the average 
annual Government expenditures of Rs. 74 million and Rs. 200 
million in the First and Second Plans respectively, Rs. 348 
million were budgeted in the Third Plan. 
The Government's greater optimism was also reflected in 
raising the internal revenue. It was estimated that the Gov­
ernment would be able to contribute Rs. 550 million from its 
revenue ; Rs. 1,050 million was expected to come from foreign 
aid; Rs. 200 million from external loans; Rs, 50 million from 
Internal loans; Rs, 350 million from private savings; Rs. 200 
million from panchayat; and the balance of Rs, 100 million ei­
ther from deficit financing or from other internal and external 
sources. Domestic contributions were thus estimated to cover 
46 percent of the total envisaged development expenditures, in­
cluding the private investment, whereas foreign assistance, 
grants and loans, would cover 50 percent. The remaining 4 per­
cent would be met by drawing on reserves or other sources (31 
pp. 34-38). 
However, when analyzed in comparable terms with the pre­
vious Plans, the share of external assistance would be higher 
than 50 percent. The total outlay for the Government expendi­
tures in the Third Plan was estimated at Rs, 1,740 million, as 
mentioned earlier. In addition to this amount, the Plan also 
envisaged provisions for loans by ths Government of Rs. 170 
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million and Rs. 40 million to the private and panchayat sec­
tors through financial institutions to make up the deficit in 
the planned investments from these sectors. Adding these loan 
provisions to the public sector investment, the actual invest­
ment expenditures of the Government sector would come to Hs. 
1,950 million instead of Rs, 1,7^0 million. Comparing foreign 
assistance with the total government expenditures, as in the 
previous Plans, the share of foreign assistance would amount 
to 64 percent of the total development expenditures from the 
public sector. 
In the allocation of funds, Governmental resources were 
concentrated on expanding the economic overhead in the form of 
transport, power and communication. The allocation of re­
sources per sector is presented in Table 11. 
The largest portion of resources was allocated to the de­
velopment of transport, communication and power which received 
about half of the total Government expenditures, and agricul­
ture and forestry which received about 16 percent of the pub­
lic sector expenditures. If power combined with industry and 
irrigation with agriculture (see Table 12), the priorities in 
terms of resource allocation would be transport and communica­
tion 35.^ percent, industry and power 22.1 percent, agricul­
ture 21.6 percent and others 20.9 percent of the total public 
sector investment. 
Table 11. Planned outlay in Third Plan by sector (Rs. in million) 
Public Panchayat Private Total 
expenditure expenditure expenditure expenditure 
(amount) (amount) (amount) (amount) 
Transport, communi­
cation, power 875. 0 (50. 
b 
3) 36. 0 
o
 
H
 20 .0 ( 4. 0) 931. 0 (37.2) 
Agriculture, forestry^ 277. 5 (15. 9) 105. 0 (43.8) 130 .0 (25. 0) 512. 5 (20.5) 
Industry, commerce 125. 0 ( 7. 2) 12. 0 ( 5.0) 300 .0 (57. 8) 437. 0 (17.5) 
Irrigation 100. 0 ( 5. 8) 15. 0 ( 6.2) 20 .0 ( 3. 6) 135. 0 ( 5.4) 
ON 
Education, information 145. 0 ( 8. 3) 25. 0 (10.4) 15 .0 ( 2. 9) 185. 0 ( 7.4) 
Health 147. 5 ( 8. 5) 25. 0 (10.4) 15 .0 ( 2. 9) 187. 5 ( 7.5) 
Miscellaneous^ 70. 0 ( 4. 0) 22. 0 ( 9.2) 20 .0 ( 3. 8) 112. 0 ( 4.5) 
Total 1740. 0(100. 0) 240. 0(100.0) 520 
o
 
o
 
H
 
O
 0) 2500. 0(100.0) 
a 
The Third Plan (31). 
b 
The figures in parentheses are percentages of the respective totals. 
c 
Includes agrarian reform, cooperatives, Cadastal survey, food program, pancha­
yat (village development) and medical herbs. 
d 
Includes public administration, statistics, economic surveys, building con­
struction and others. 
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A comparison of the public sector expenditures allocated 
among various departmental categories in the three Plans is 
presented in Table 12, 
Comparing the public investment programs in the three 
Plans shows that transport and communication received top pri­
ority in the First and Third Plans, Industry and power re­
ceived first place in Second Plan. Agriculture and forestry 
was in second place in the First Plan and near the third place 
in the subsequent two Plans, 
The progress made by various sectors in the Third Plan 
appeared to be moving in line with the targets from the expend­
iture side; the achievements in terms of physical targets 
1 
seemed to have remained below the targets. 
The planned outlays and expenditures are presented in 
Table 13. 
1 
It is not possible at this stage to have a full apprais­
al, especially in terms of physical targets. The Plan has 
nearly six months more to go, to be completed by June, 1970, 
Nevertheless, from the expenditures side, almost a full ac­
count can be obtained as the budgets for the last year have 
already been approved. For appraising the progress in the 
physical targets, it refers to the progress made in general 
development and growth up to July l4, I969, 
Table 12. Planned public sector investment outlays in the three Plans by major 
departments (Rs. in million) 
Outlays Percent of Total 
Department Plan I Plan II Plan III Plan I Plan II Plan III 
A. Transport, communication 
Roads 
Aviation 
Telecommunication, postal 
Railway 
B. Agric. Village Dev. 
Agric. resettlement 
Land reform 
Cadastal survey 
Food 
Panchayat (Vill. Dev.) 
Coopérâtives 
Forestry 
Irrigation 
C. Industry and Power 
Industry 
Cottage industry 
Mining 
Tourism 
Power 
124.0 143.-5 615.0 
112.5 500.0 
25.0 70.0 
6.0 36.0 
9.0 
94.5 117.1 377.2 
32.0 28.0 130.0 
2.5 20.0 
10.0 25.0 
10.0 
42.5 20.0 30.0 
3.0 10.0 
13.4 61.5 
20.0 40.0 100.0 
193.0 385.0 
25.0 90.0 85.0 
10.0 15.0 
20.0 
2.0 5.0 
v
D 0
 
0
 
91.0 26.0 
37.6 23.9 34.4 
28.7 19.6 21.6 
-, A A 32.2 22.1 
Table 12 (Continued) 
Outlays • Percent of Total 
Department jpian I Plan II Plan III Plan I Plan II Plan III 
Social services 44. 0 115.2 292.S 
Education 19. 0 40.0 130.0 
Health 25. 0 37.0 120.0 
Drinking water 24.0 20.0 
Sports 1.7 2.5 
Training 12.5 15.0 
Miscellaneous 12. 5 31.5 70.0 
Public administration 5.0 10.0 
Statistics 23.0 9.0 
Buildings 20.0 
Hydrological survey 14.0 
Broadcasting publicity 3.2 17.0 
111 
19.1 16.8 
4.1 
Total 330.0 60 0.0 1740.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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Table 13. Planned and actual outlays in the Third Plan by-
major activities^ 
Activity Planned Actual , outlays expenditures 
(Rs. in million)(Rs. in million) 
Percentage 
of planned 
outlay 
Transport, com­
munication, 
power 875.00 883.37 100.9 
Agri., forestry, 
panchayat 277.00 276.47 99.6 
Industry, commerce 125.00 161.60 129.2 
Irrigation 100.00 116.06 116.0 
Education, publicity 145.00 129.96 89.5 
Health 147.50 113.36 76.8 
Miscellaneous 70.00 149.82 214.0 
Total 1740.00 18)0.64 105,2 
Budget speech (38,41,43,4?). 
b 
"Actual"expenditures include the actual expenditures in­
curred during 1965-66, 1966-67 and 1967-68; the ex­
penditures for 1968-69 are revised estimates; the ones 
for 1969-70 are budget estimates. 
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Table 13 shows the expenditures incurred in the public 
sectors. There are no estimates of expenditures available for 
the private and panchayat sectors. However in the panchayat 
sector savings worth about Rs, 114.4 million were collected 
from the farm sector during the four years of the Third Plan 
in cash and kind under the land reform program Compulsory Sav­
ings Scheme. Out of this, about Rs, 62 million were disbursed 
as loans to farmers and to other individuals to support agri­
cultural activities (45 p.5). 
The annual government budgets also show that a sum of 
about Rs. l60 million was disbursed as loans to the private 
and panchayat sectors from the Government sector expenditures 
of Rs. 1,830,64 million. Taking this into account, comparing 
the original estimates of Rs. 1,950 to be spent in the public 
sector with the actual expenditures of Rs. 1,830,64 million, 
shows that the Government sector expenditures would come to 
about 94 percent of the total planned outlay. 
In the sources of finance, it appears that the amount of 
contribution from the revenue surplus would come to Rs. 708,56 
million, as against the planned estimate of Rs. 550 million. 
The total amount of foreign aid made available during the Plan 
period would come to Rs. 1,019,12 million, whereas the expect­
ed contribution was Rs. 1,050.00 million. The Government 
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would raise Rs. 57.80 million from internal loans and Rs. 
19.52 from external loans, as against the stipulated Rs. 50.0 
million and Rs. 200.0 million loans from internal and external 
sources. (Table 14) 
The total resources available for the Third Plan come to 
Rs. 1,805 million, whereas the total expenditures would be Rs. 
1.830 million, showing a deficit of Rs. 25 million. The ex­
ternal assistance share comes to 56.7 percent ; that of Gov­
ernment revenues 38.7 percent; internal loans 3.I percent; and 
deficit financing 1.5 percent, of the total public sector ex­
penditures. The heavy rate of reliance on external aid shows 
a gradual decrease during the Third Plan as compared to the 
previous Plans (the First Plan 90 percent; the Second Plan 78 
percent). 
The rate of increase in revenue receipt during the Third 
Plan is on the average 21 percent per year. The rate of in­
crease in regular expenditures is 12 percent. The savings from 
revenue receipts over the regular expenditures show an average 
annual rate of Increase of 40 percent. The annual rate of in­
crease in external assistance, as outright grants, is 18 per­
cent . 
The Third Plan has shown relatively satisfactory results 
in resource mobilization and expenditures. Following is a 
brief review of the progress made in achieving the main objec­
tives and some of the physical targets. 
Table l4. The revenue income, regular expenditures, external aid and loans in the 
Third Plan (Rs. in million) 
1965-66 • 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70 Total 
Actual Actual Actual Rev. Est. Estimates 
Revenues 216.50 256.60 325.98 400.19 442.26 1641.53 
Expenditures 147.33 170.60 180.79 201.50 232.75 932.97 
Balance I 69.17 86.0 145.19 198.69 209.51 708.56 
External aid| 175-30 142.20 i58.ll 214.24 329.27 1019.12 
External loans 3.30 3.70 - - 12.52 19.52 
Internal loan 7.50 0.70 10.00 19.60 20.00 57.80 
Total 186.10 146.60 168.II 233.84 361.79 1096.44 
a 
Budget speech (34, 38, 4l, 43, 47). 
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The main objectives of the Third Plan, as mentioned 
earlier, were s 1) to increase production; 2) to provide in­
stitutional reforms - to facilitate transfer of the labor 
force from the agricultural sector to the non-agricultural 
sectors 3) to build up economic infrastructures - transport, 
power, efficient markets ; 4) to accelerate the industrial de­
velopment process by establishing basic and essential indus­
tries; 5) to improve foreign trade by diversifying the trade 
pattern and to earn and spend more foreign exchange for de­
velopment; and 6) to bring social justice by the allocation of 
benefits to a larger number of people, and by increasing health 
and education facilities. 
The production targets and the progress made during the 
first four years of the Plan are presented in Table 15. 
Considering the outlook for agricultural production in 
1969-70, it appears that given the normal rainfall, produc­
tion of cereal grains will increase by 12 percent by the end 
of the Plan period as against the Plan target of 15 percent 
Increase. Similarly, in cash crops, production will Increase 
by only 36 percent as against the Plan target of 73 percent. 
In industrial production, there is practically no prog­
ress, except In a few cases like sugar and cigarettes. Some 
of the new industries envisaged in the Plan, such as paper, 
cement, beer distillery, cotton textiles, solvent extract, 
flour mills, etc., have not yet been established. 
Table 15. Some of the main production targets and the achievements in four years 
of the Third Plan 
Items Unit Situation 
in 196^-65 
Plan target 
1969-70 
Achievement 
1968-69 
Percent of 
achieved 
target 
A. Agricultural pro­
duction 
Food grains 
•000 
Paddy rice metric ton 
Wheat and barley metric ton 
Corn metric ton 
Cash crops 
2201 
152 
854 
2368( 7.5) 
425(179.5) 
918( 7.5) 
2321( 5.45) 98.0 
256( 68.4 ) 60.2 
899( 5.33) 97.9 
Sugar cane metric ton 126 252(100.0) 188( 49.20) 74.9 
Tobacco metric ton 9 23(150.0) 6( -33.3 ) nil 
Jute metric ton 39 39( 40.0) 33( -15.60) nil 
Oilseeds metric ton 51 60( 19.0) 57( 11.76) 95.0 
Potato metric ton 285 - 290( 1.40) — — 
a 
The target figures are from the Third Plan Document; production figures up to 
1964-68 are from official released in the progress report of respective min­
istries; those for 1968-69 are preliminary estimates. 
b 
Figures in parentheses are the planned percentage increase over 1964-65 pro­
duction. 
c 
Figures in parentheses are the percentage increase in production over 1964-65 
production. 
Table 15 (Continued) 
Percent of 
Tfemc Tini-t- Situation Plan target Achievement achieved 
in 1964-65 1969-70 1968-69 target 
B. Manufacturing 
Sugar metric ton 7 43(614.0) 17(142. 9 ) 3.95 
Jute products metric ton 19 34( 79.0) 17(-10. 5 ) 50.0 
Paper metric ton — 15 nil nil 
Soap metric ton 11 23( 19.0) 16( 45. 5 ) 69.6 
Cement metric ton — 61 nil nil 
Cigarettes million sticks 410 3000(631.0 ) 9Q( 34. 
2658 ( 14. 
0 ) 64.3 
Cotton textiles '000 meter 435 18400 4 ) 15.0 
This is mainly synthetic fiber textile production. 
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The overall growth rate of the economy is bound to fall 
short of the target. The estimate for gross domestic products 
is presented in Table l6. 
The aggregate growth in GDP in four years was 12.3 per­
cent. This growth falls short by 6.7 percent of the planned 
target of 19.0 percent growth in five years. Although there 
is one year more to complete the Plan, it would be obviously 
difficult to have a growth rate of 6,7 percent in the remain­
ing one year of the Plan, when so far the annual average growth 
rate has been 3.0 percent. 
The per capita GDP is estimated to have increased from 
Rs. 590 in 1964-65 to Rs. 6lO in 1968-69 (Table 17) and the 
population increased by about 8.6 percent in the same period, 
thus leaving an annual average per capita real GDP increase 
1 
of 0.9 percent at 196^-65 constant prices. 
The available information is not sufficient to examine 
the occupational shifts and employment patterns. Nevertheless, 
some estimates can be obtained by studying the employment pat­
terns, production, potential and existing employment in some 
of the industries and the new jobs opened in the service sec­
tors. It is assumed that the additional labor required in 
these sectors have come from the agricultural sector and the 
Ï 
Prices in I968-69, as compared to 1964-65 prices, are 
estimated to have increased by 1? percent for non-agricultural 
and 11 percent for agricultural commodities. The general un­
weighted prices have increased by about 15 percent (49). 
Table l6. Gross domestic products of Nepal for 1964-65 to 1968-69 at 196^-65 
prices (Rs. in million) 
Agriculture Non-Agriculture Total Sectoral con-
Year Value Percent 
change 
Value Percent 
change 
Value Percent 
change 
tribution percent 
Agric. Non-Agric, 
1964-65 3915 1968 5883 67 33 
1965-66 3954 1.0 1902 -3.4 5856 -0.5 68 32 
1966-67 3849 -2.7 2043 7.9 5892 0.6 65 35 
1967-6% 4153 7.9 2129 4.2 6282 6.6 66 34 
1969-69 4265 2.7 2341 9.9 6606 5.1 65 35 
Aeeregate growth 
(percent) 8.9 18.8 12.3 
Average annual rate 
( percent) 2T22 4.7 3.0 
a 
GDP for 1964-65 to 1967-68 are from revised estimates of the Central 
Bureau of Statistics, National Planning Commission Secretariat's Fourth 
Plan Working Papers; the ones for 1968-69 are from the preliminary es­
timates of the Economic Analysis and Planning Division, Ministry of Food 
and Agriculture, HMG Nepal, August 1969. 
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a 
Table 17. Population and GDP per capita in 1964-65 and 1968-69 
Percent 
change 
Total population (million) 9.B6 
Total GDP (Rs. in million) 5883.00 
10.82 
6606.00 12.30 
8.60 
Per capita GDP (Rs.) 590.00 610.00 3.70 
a 
In terms of United States dollars the per capita GDP in 
1968-69 would come to about $84 at 1968-69 prices, 
making adjustmentments for the devaluation of Nepalese 
rupees by 24.78 percent in December 1967. There are no 
official estimates for per capita national income. The 
main sources of Income from abroad are Gorkha soldiers, 
remittances from the UK and India and the few Nepalese 
working abroad. The Gorkha remittances in convertible 
currencies are estimated at Rs. 44 million; remittances 
in Indian currency for Gorkha soldiers and other sources 
from abroad are estimated at about Rs. 830 million. De­
ducting from this about Rs. 56 million for payments to 
foreign nationals (mostly seasonal agricultural labor­
ers, about 200,000), the per capita national Income in 
Nepal would come to about #94.00. 
natural Increase in population in agricultural and nonagrlcul­
tural sectors have remained the same. The estimates show that 
in 1968-69 the labor participation rate was 46.5 percent or 
5.03 million people of the total population of 10.82 million. 
The percentage of labor force in agriculture was 86.3 and in 
nonagrlculture 13.7. In 1964-65, labor participation was 
45.8 percent or 4.56 million people. Out of this total labor 
force, 90.0 percent were in agriculture and the remaining 
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10.0 percent were outside of agriculture. These estimates 
show that there was an increase in labor participation rate 
by 0.7 percent, and that the total labor force increased by 
10.3 percent in four years. Although the percentage change 
in labor engaged in agriculture in 1968-69 decreased by 
about 3.7 percent, in absolute number, it Increased from 4,10 
million laborers in 1964-65 to 4.34 million in 1968-69, an 
increase by 6.0 percent. 
The other major areas the Third Plan addressed Itself 
to were toward developing the economic Infrastructures (viz 
transport and power, foreign trade, convertible foreign ex­
change earnings and the tax structures. In the field of 
transport and power, only about 50 percent of the planned tar­
gets have been achieved so far. In the Plan targets of con­
structing 757 kilometers of all-weather and 607 kilometers 
of fair-weather roads by the end of I968-69, 425 kilometers 
of all-weather and 29O kilometers of fair-weather roads were 
constructed. In all, Nepal has now II9B kilometers of all-
weather and 2,l48 of fair-weather roads. In power generation, 
25,604 kilowatts of power will be available by the end of 1968 
1969. 
The foreign trade deficit does not seem to have Improved 
during the Plan period. The export-Import statistics up to 
1964-65 show that from 1956-57 to 1964-65 the annual average 
export of Nepal was Hs. 212,53 million, while the total import 
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was of the value of Rs. 4l2.ll million, showing an average 
deficit of Rs. 199.58 million annually. In 196^-65 alone the 
deficit was Rs. 378 million (42). 
In trade diversification (moving away from Nepal's tradi­
tional trade pattern of depending almost entirely on India), 
the export and import statistics in 196O-61 and 1966-67 (be­
yond 1966-67 statistics are not available) show that 96 per­
cent of Nepal's total exports went to India and 9^ percent of 
the total imports were from India in 196O-61. In I966-67, 
there was a slight change in this pattern. Of the total ex­
ports from Nepal, 73 percent went to India and of the total 
imports , 69 percent were from India. Table 18 shows that the 
trade deficit in 1966-67 was reduced as compared to the 196O-
61 figures. This reduction is not due to an increased rate 
of export in relation to import, but seems rather due to the 
devaluation of Indian currency in 1966 and, as Nepal did not 
devaluate its currency then, the automatic revaluation of Nep-
alese currency from the IC?NC exchange rates of 1:1.60 to 
1:1,01. In fact, Nepal's trade deficits are actually rising, 
6ee also 1 and 95.) 
The trade deficit nothwithstanding, Nepal's income and 
expenditures and the surplus in convertible foreign exchange 
have shown a steady rise in the Plan period, except for 1969-
70 as shown in Table 19. On an average, the annual income 
will have increased by about 45 percent, expenditure by about 
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Table IR, Foreipcn trade statistics of Nepal in I96O-6I and 
1966-67^ (Rs. in million) 
1960-61 1966-67 
India Overseas Tibet Total India Overseas Tibet Total 
Exports 202.17 7.00 0.57 209.74 156.60 51.00 8.10 215.70 
Imports 375.09 19.13 3.76 397.98 264.60 110.00 9.00 383.60 
Balance-172.92 -12.13 -3.19-188.24-108.00 -59.00 -0.90-167.90 
^'Data for 196O-61 are from the Central Bureau of Statis­
tics, Nepal, (42); for I966-67, overseas trade data 
are from the Nepal Rastra Bank (76); India trade data 
are from Department of Commerce and Intelligence, Cal­
cutta, India, as quoted in 1 and 95; data for Tibet are 
projected from the past data. 
Table 19. Nepal's income and expenditure of convertible for­
eign exchan<;e, 1964-65 to 1969-70^ (Rs. in million) 
Year Income Expenditure Balance Remarks 
1964-65 70.29 39.84 30.45 Actuals 
1965-66 100.05 41.66 58.39 Actuals 
1966-67 122.48 71.62 50.86 Actuals 
1967-68 223.00 122.60 100.40 Actuals 
1968-69 248.80 108.40 140.40 Estimate 
1969-70 216.00 235.20 - 19.20 Estimate 
a 
Budget speech (34,38,41,43,47). 
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^5 percent, expenditure "by about 38 percent and savings by 
about 65 percent. However the fact that Nepalese currency was 
devalued in December 196? by 24.78 percent should be borne in 
mind as well. This was the reason for the steep rise in 
1967-68 in all the items. 
Coming to the tax structure and revenue, it was men­
tioned earlier that revenue incomes have risen at the rate of 
about 21 percent annually during the Plan period. The rela­
tive rise in the rate of revenue contributions from different 
components in the revenue structure of the Government may be 
examined in the table presented in Table 20. The major share 
of revenue comes from customs duties; second is land revenue. 
Taxes (item 5) were insignificant until 1964-65; it is only 
during the past three years that they have taken third place. 
When compared with the 1964-65 situation, taxes in 1968-69 
have increased by nearly eight and one-half times. Taxes on 
income and wealth account for about 5 percent of the total 
revenue of the Government. 
The rate of increase in domestic resource mobilization 
and the rate of Increase in taxes appear encouraging. How­
ever, if we examine further these performances in relation to 
the need and the potential for mobilization of the 
resources in the economy, it will be less than satisfactory. 
The total revenue income in 1968-69 was only 6.5 percent of 
the total GDP of the country. This is low not only by 
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Table 20. Revenue Income of Nepal by sources in 1964-65 to 
1969-70^ (Rs. in million) 
1964-65 1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70 
Customs 83.31 93.51 121.75 129.73 170.79 193.12 
Excise 13.88 20.06 19.96 21,48 29.82 31.20 
Land 
revenue 
43.16 44.52 56.65 83.29 86.00 86,50 
Forestry 20,87 19.39 16.53 21.82 20.08 20,37 
Taxes^ 7.41 16.37 24.84 44.25 64.50 69.30 
0 
others 23.72 22.63 16.94 25.41 29.00 41.77 
Total 192.35 216.48 256.67 325.98 400,19 442.26 
1968-69 figures are revised estimates; 1969-70 are bud­
get estimates and the rest are actuals (47,76), 
b 
Taxes include income, entertainment, sales, urban prop­
erty taxes, 
c 
Others include registration fees, water charges, trans­
port and postal fees, interest and dividend, royalties, 
presents. 
B3 
Western standards, where tax ratios to national income come to 
30 to 40 percent in countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, 
Norway, The United Kingdom, the United States (18 p. 115)» but 
also by the Asian standards. In India and Pakistan, govern­
ment revenue was 11 percent, in Burma 19 percent, in Ceylon 
20 percent and in Thailand l4 percent of the national income 
in 1963 (11 p. 87). 
The reviews of the development Plans indicate that Nepal 
has undergone both problems and fruitful experiences. For ex­
ample, during the First Plan the absorptive capacity of the 
economy was terribly low; given the relative gain in the 
absorptive capacity during the Second Plan, lack of proper 
identification of problems and weaknesses inherent in the econ­
omy and thereby heavy reliance on external assistance caused 
the priorities for development to be shifted. Having tried to 
correct some of the weaknesses and having been able to set a 
goal for development in physical terms, the Third Plan made 
some headway in economic growth, but failed by a considerable 
extent to achieve the desired goals. The lessons and policy 
implications for a future development policy which may possi­
bly be derived from the experiences of the past fifteen years 
are considered in the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER III. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR APPRAISING 
THE PERPORPIANCE OF THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 
In the preceding chapter, the general macroeconomic 
structure was reviewed in terms of some basic economic aggre­
gates. The overview of the economy thus obtained suggests a 
variety of problems. The economic structure, reviewed for 
the period 1956 to 1969. shows positive as well as negative 
features from the standpoint of development. 
The aggregate growth has crossed the stagnation or sta­
tus-quo condition that had been prevailing for a long time. 
Considered on a per capita gain basis, the progress has not 
yet achieved the momentum necessary to escape from their im­
poverished condition for the vast majority of the people. The 
gap in regional imbalance is widening. The distribution of 
development activities has favored the relatively prosperous 
parts of the country. Given the nature of population distri­
bution and the nature of wealth distribution among few pros­
perous areas, disparities in income distribution are growing. 
The activities of the Government sector has been growing 
and have shown some impact on the economy; on the other hand, 
the private sector has been too slow to move forward, both in 
manufacturing and agricultural activities. The service sec­
tor, such as marketing, has not shown any appreciable prog­
ress. Structural reforms, as envisaged in the Plans, have 
not brought significant changes in the economic system. 
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The Development Framework 
The major problem in economic development in Nepal, as 
described in the preceding chapter is related to the agri­
cultural sector. The major areas of policy concern in eco­
nomic development - such as level of income, investments or 
capital formation, employment, income distribution, balance 
of payments - therefore weigh heavily on the performance of 
this sector. 
However, this is not meant to imply that agricultural 
development can be pursued without support or interactions 
with other sectors of the economy. Although agricultural prog­
ress is a strategic element in the development process in Ne­
pal, it cannot be the only one. It is only one part of the 
economy or development system, though a major one, and other 
parts of the system—such as services.manufacturing, must move 
along with it. In the initial stage of development it is im­
portant to focus on interrelationships between agriculture and 
other sectors and the contributions that each can make to the 
other. 
This interrelationship in the context of Nepal may be 
illustrated as in Figure 1. 
The development system, as illustrated on the next page, 
has agriculture as a core component or part of the system. 
The rate of progress in the economy will depend upon the pol­
icy measures taken to strengthen the mutual interdependence 
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Development 
and Growth 
Transport 
Communication 
Power Industry 
Agricultural ^  
Activities Commerce 
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Research \ Trade 
Health 
Other Services 
Figure 1. Development system of linkage with agriculture as 
of the core part with other identifiable parts such as trans­
port, communication and power, social services, knowledge, 
manufacturing and trade, in order to enable the system to 
adapt to the overall objective - national development. The 
concept of the interrelationships may be broadly categorized 
as inflow and outflow linkages. In the present example, the 
transport, communication, power, and social services provide 
inflow linkage; manufacturing, processing, commerce, and trade 
provide outflow linkage. 
In the agriculture based outflow-lnflow-linkages concept, 
the emphasis on development policy guidelines will converge 
around agricultural activities in such a manner that the 
a core component 
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development activities in other parts of the system serve bas­
ically inducement mechanisms to the development in agricul­
ture. The rate of reinforcement or inducive effects of link­
ages (that show the lateral linkage movement path in the sys­
tem as presented in the above figure)^ depend on the degree 
of absence or presence of traps, such as structural traps in 
the path, related to incentives, knowledge and capital, about 
which more will be said later. 
It is not possible to examine the linkage effects or the 
degree of structural interdendence in a quantifiable manner in 
Nepal's present economic structure. Also, since in Nepal's 
case it is not possible to examine the interdependence by de­
riving information from an already existing system of activity, 
since a new activity is introduced, (e.g. opening hitherto iso­
lated areas by constructing new roads, establishing a new in­
dustrial structure), the degree of interdependence cannot be 
analyzed in a quantifiable manner as Ghenery and Watanabe (6) 
The outflow and inflow linkages may appear similar to 
Hirschman's (22 pp. 98-119) backward and forward linkages. 
However, there is some difference to the extent that in Hirsch-
man's case, it is based more on direct effects of an increase 
in the final demands of any one industry on the other sector 
of the economy. In his analysis of linkages, forward linkage 
cannot be regarded as an independent inducement mechanism, 
though it works as an important reinforcement to backward 
linkage. In the present analysis, the linkages provide a sort 
of cumulative mix of effects and causes; the same activity 
may provide both inflow and outflow linkage and the activity 
may provide independent inducement mechanisms, when we consider 
agricultural activity rather than industrial process of growth 
as a core activity in the system. 
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did by using data from Italy, Japan and the United States in 
working out the ratios of inter-industry purchases and sales 
to total production and to total demand. Their analysis is 
more of an intra-temporal nature, where the cause and effect 
of interrelationships are fairly settled and structural inter­
dependence show a fairly well-developed pattern of providing 
a relatively measurable impact on the economy. Such a situa­
tion does not exist in the present case. 
Nevertheless, the concept of outflow-inflow-linkages will 
be valid in designing a development policy for the present sit­
uation in Nepal. The policy decisions will be derived from 
intuitive judgment rather than empirical testing in identify­
ing interdependence with linkage effects. Since intuitive 
judgments are unavoidable in the policy-decision-maklng proc­
esses, this concept will help refine intuitive judgment guide­
lines. 
The existing pattern of development in Nepal, described 
in the preceding chapter, indicates that in the public sector 
investments (estimates for private sector investments are not 
available) made in development activities for fourteen years 
(1956-57 to 1969-70) f nearly 7,1 percent and 10 percent of the 
total investment were on activities that would provide Inflow 
linkage and outflow linkage effects respectively to agricul­
tural activities, while investments in agriculture were 
about 19 percent as shown in Table 21. 
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Table 21, The public sector investment on development activ­
ities in 1956-57 to 1969-70 (Rs. in million) 
Percent to the 
Activities Investment Total 
Agriculture 5^1.36 19.0 
Transport, communication, 
power 1273.01 46.0 
Industry, trade 285.39 10.0 
Social services, etc, 670.88 25.0 
Total 2770.64 100.0 
a 
Compiled from Chapter II, see Appendix, Table, 
As long as investments are made on the activities that 
are within the development system, the amount of investment 
spent on A or B per se is not really so important as the com­
plex issues of time (both in an inter-temporal and intra-
temporal sense within a specified prospective planning hori­
zon) and the spacial location of activities in regenerating 
and reinforcing the linkage effects for speedier growth of the 
economy. For instance, to spend as high as 46 percent of the 
total development investment on activity with considerably high 
capital-output ratio such as transport, may appear at the out­
set rather an unwise allocation of scarce resources. But, 
for all those who are familiar with conditions in Nepal, it 
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will be inconceivable to think of development in Nepal with 
the present rudimentary transport facilities. 
In the development system presented above, agriculture 
has been considered to become "the vehicle" for the growth of 
Nepal's economy. A well developed transport system is a neces­
sary condition to induce speed in this vehicle too. It will 
be therefore a perfect logical and sound policy decision to 
give high priority to this activity. The crux of the problem 
in policy decision and the focus of emphasis in the present 
analysis is in the selection of a spacial location for trans­
port development and the nature of the transport facility. 
This must be guided by the concept of inflow linkage from 
transport to agricultural activities. Similar will be the case 
in manufacturing and processing industries. In the case of 
these industries, however, the timing of establishing such in­
dustries will be as important as the location. 
Decisions on these issues can be made in a fairly simple 
manner. The agro-climatic regions of the country are broadly 
known, the areas of population concentration are known, and 
along with these the existing cropping patterns will provide 
good ideas regarding the prospects of agricultural develop­
ment in different regions. At this stage of decision-making, 
it is irrelevant whether area A has a comparative advantage 
over B in growing crop x. If known, so much the better for 
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the successive phasing of programs, but presently little is 
known about this in Nepal. 
The transport facilities and the industries established 
during the past fifteen years will provide helpful guidelines 
in policy decisions. The highway that connects the Bokhara 
valley with the plains (Tarai) has substantially increased 
market activities in the area. The farmers can buy improved 
Inputs (chemical fertilizers, seeds, tools and implements) at 
much cheaper prices than before, as they are now transported 
by trucks instead of by aeroplane. The sugar factories in 
Birganj and Bhairahwa have encouraged the farmers to switch 
over to the cash crop sugar cane from the traditional crop­
ping pattern of cereals. 
The activities catering to the needs of agricultural de­
velopment can be developed without friction as a complement to 
the development system. To activate the large labor reserves 
in agriculture would require a relatively small amount of ad­
ditional capital. The export sector that generates the high­
est proportion of domestic savings is agriculture based and, 
therefore, would not compete with other sectors of potential 
development for those resources that constitute a bottleneck 
in economic growth, namely skilled labor, managerial and tech­
nical skills. 
The major areas for policy concerns mentioned earlier -
raising the level of income, capital formation, employment, 
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income distribution and balance of payments - can be effective­
ly implemented via the process of agricultural development. 
Given the high existing weight of the agricultural sector in 
the economy (nearly 2/3 of the national income, 4/5 of employ­
ment and 4/5 of the export trade), the autonomous growth in 
this sector will substantially contribute to the national 
growth in terras of direct contribution and, indirectly through 
outflow-inflow linkages that effect growth in other sectors. 
While increased productivity in agriculture will contribute 
to raising the level of income, to releasing farm surplus 
(and capital) to support activities in other sectors and to 
help improve the balance of payments, income distribution can 
be effected through the redistribution of wealth and assets, 
as land is the major form of assets and wealth in Nepal, 
Conceptual Framework for Appraising 
the Agricultural Sector 
The theory of economic development in agriculture is 
traced basically through three phases in the literature. The 
concept follows essentially Rostow's (9^) stages of develop­
ment - emphasizing the traditional stage, and transitional or 
precondition stage for take off and the take-off stage. Af­
ter take-off, it appears that other sectors, not agriculture, 
will take the floor and "drive the economy to maturity and to 
the age of high mass consumption." 
93 
The recognition that agricultural progress is a strate­
gic element in the development process in underdeveloped coun­
tries is recent, possibly starting from Arthur Lewis's (63) 
article on "economic development with unlimited supplies of 
labor" in 195^* Rostow's explicit emphasis on productive in­
vestment implied more investment in manufacturing on the basis 
of an analogy derived from the experiences of the Western coun­
tries' development process. Nurske's (79) emphasis on capital 
formation through the employment of "unlimited supplies of la­
bor" from agriculture to the capital goods industry with a 
"reasonable balance" in agriculture to provide "growth through 
trade" between agriculture and manufacturing, would be prob­
ably more suitable for a long-established private enterprise 
economy, where there are enough market inducements. Such a 
condition is exceptional rather than general in the underdevel­
oped economies. 
It is not Intended to go into the details of the general 
theory of development as whether it should follow Hosentein 
Rodan's (93) theory of "big push" or Hirschman's (22) theory 
of "unbalanced growth," "development as a chain of disequi-
libria" and so on which are essentially growth theories via 
industrial development. The present analysis is concerned 
with the development of the agricultural sector as a strategic 
process in the transformation of a traditional rural economy 
into a modern economy. 
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It was probably after Arthur Lewis wrote that "it is not 
profitable to produce a growing volume of manufactures unless 
agricultural production is growing simultaneously. This is 
also why industrial and agrarian revolutions always go togeth­
er, and why economies in which agriculture is stagnant do not 
show industrial development" (63 p. 173) » an Intensive an­
alysis on the importance of agriculture in economic growth was 
rediscovered. 
Agricultural development, as stated earlier, is classi­
fied as in traditional, transitional and commercial stages, 
Arthur T, Mosher (71) follows this pattern, putting emphasis 
on "getting agriculture., moving" through provisions of "acceler­
ators and essentials" such as fertilizer as a "leading" input. 
His greater emphasis is on physical inputs to provide an accel­
erating effect, specially in the traditional stage as an educa­
tive process. Institutional structures are assumed as given 
and the process of development follows by providing incentives 
to the private sector, 
Maurice Perkins and Lawrence Witt (88) go one step fur­
ther and include institutional reforms in the process of de­
velopment. They classify stages by the nature of development: 
intensive use of unused available resources without technolog­
ical change but with institutional changes such as land tenure 
to accumulate capital within agriculture. This is followed by 
technological change and investment in social overhead 
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(education, research, extension) to bring changes in the rate 
of output. In the third stage, commercialization of agricul­
ture takes place with changes in production functions and ag­
riculture becomes capital intensive. 
Johnston and Me11or (56) specify three distinct phases 
of agricultural development. In Phase one, preconditions for 
agricultural development are provided by creating an environ­
ment suitable for change, making available knowledge of im­
proved techniques, and market outlets. In Phase two, expan­
sion of agricultural output takes place on labor-intensive and 
capital-saving techniques supported by technological innova­
tions. In Phase three, agricultural production is increased 
through the use of capital-intensive and labor-saving technol­
ogy. 
Clifton Wharton, Jr. (113), while synthesizing the 
"staging models" brings them down to two stages: static and 
dynamic. He defines the static stage as one where motive for 
change is negative and agriculture is practiced for survival 
with bare necessities within the traditional techniques and 
decision-making processes. The dynamic stage arrives when re­
sources are fully used and technological change becomes dynamic 
and decision-making, rational. Farming becomes commercialized 
and external economic forces begin to operate in agriculture. 
If we try to fit "the theory of stages of economic de­
velopment in agriculture" to Nepal's stage of economic 
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development, none would be found to have met the boundary 
lines. There is a labor surplus in the Hills; the Tarai im­
ports substantial agricultural labor; the Hills are subsist­
ence and below subsistence level; the Tarai produce for mar­
ket. Apart from some dualism in agriculture and industry, 
which is a recent phenomenon, there is economic dualism within 
agriculture itself. In some parts of the country, especially 
the Hills, agriculture is traditional and may be considered 
relatively static; in other parts (e.g. Kathmandu Valley and 
nearby areas and the Narayani zone) the transitional stage 
with some modern inputs and technology being used is assuming 
"dynamic" nature. The economy within agriculture itself may 
be characterized by having Gerschenko's (15) scale of "degree 
of economic backwardness." 
Nepal's economy would fit possibly into Ranis and Pel's 
definition of an underdeveloped economy, with a "labor surplus, 
resource poor variety in which the vast majority of the popu­
lation is typically engaged in agriculture" (89 p. 533). It 
is more of a "one sector agricultural economy type" of 
Nicholl's, where agriculture is engaged "in food production 
and any agricultural surplus consists only of food" (?7 p. 19). 
Here again the economy is not entirely engaged in food pro­
duction; though most of the surplus consists of food, there 
are products like jute cultivated for export on small owner 
and/or tenant-operated farms. 
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The 8ta%e models and the concepts of development pre­
sented In these theories nevertheless help in examining the 
economy and provide some insight into the problems of devel­
opment, They describe the characteristics of an economy rath­
er than the policy means that would be required to effect a 
development process within the agricultural sector. Except 
for some implicit mention about the institutional set-up, 
there is nothing specifically ,mentioned about the institution­
al arrangements that may be necessary to provide incentives for 
increasing production efficiency in agriculture. 
Thorbecke (102) has presented a somewhat different ana­
lytical approach to agricultural development insofar as policy 
measures are concerned. His analysis of the agricultural prob­
lem follows essentially the same characteristics of phase 
structures as in Lewis, Ranis and Fei and others. A stagna­
tion or static phase is characterized by surplus labor; the 
transitional or take-off phase starts when the industrial sec­
tor begins to draw on surplus labor from agriculture and sub­
sequently reaches the phase of coiranercialized agriculture. 
Agriculture becomes integrated into the modern developed sys­
tem and a further process of sectoral development continues 
under competitive market conditions, giving rise to factor mo­
bility between agriculture and other sectors in response to 
economic incentives. Contrary to the other models presented 
above, in Thorbecke's analysis, the development process in 
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agriculture does not taper off after take-off stage but con­
tinues as a viable part of the system. 
In his framework of analysis, Thorbecke has incorporated 
policy means that bring changes in agrarian structures in each 
phase of the development process and it can also indicate how 
changes in the agrarian structure interact with other aims of 
an economic policy. This approach has substantial relevance 
for Nepal's economic development. Given the nature of the ex­
isting agrarian structure, substantial and rapid changes such 
as in the land tenure are inevitable in Nepal in its quest 
for economic development. 
In the analysis of the agricultural sector, therefore, 
an attempt will be made to identify the defects in the agrari­
an structure that obstruct the process of development in Nepal. 
Timmons' (104) conceptual framework will be applied as an an­
alytical tool in examining these structures. 
The "means-ends-continuum" is the framework of analysis 
that helps identify, develop and test various structures in ag­
riculture as variables in a development inquiry which is pol­
icy-oriented. The analysis proceeds with the construction of 
a conceptual framework for identification and analysis of de­
fects in agrarian structures; alternative modifications are 
identified in the light of national development goals or ends. 
The ends perform two-fold functions in the continuum; they 
establish the norm to determine the problematic situation, 
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which is a gap between the established norm and the existing 
situation. They also can be used to evaluate particular 
means in terms of their consequences that narrow or eliminate 
the gap between the present (the existing situation) and the 
expected or realized situation. 
In the "means-ends-continuum" the immediate end can be­
come an "end-in-view" in relation to a higher end; the immedi­
ate end can be looked upon, therefore, as the end-ln-vlew, as 
a means to another end-in-view, until we reach the basic goal 
of a given society. There is a hierarchy of ends or goals 
(105, 106), In the development process we may view this hier­
archy as something like pushing the society up the hill to­
ward a pass. Once the society has been able to reach the pass, 
this pass, which was to begin with an end-in-view, also be­
comes a means to move on into a new frontier and a different 
landscape. 
This may be Illustrated as shown on page 100. 
In this framework, economic development, which is the 
goal or broad objective of the National Plans in Nepal, is a 
means in relation to a higher or superior end - life, liber­
ty and opportunity, a common goal of all societies, irrespec­
tive of the approach they may follow in the development pol­
icy. 
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(end-ln-vlew) 
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liberty,and 
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Increase in productivity, 
per capita income 
per capita income distribution 
(means) 
Figure 2. Means-ends-continuum 
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The basic ends are not competitive when we look at them 
in their entirety (as a matter of fact there cannot be a 
single end functioning as an entity by itself in today's 
world); they are essentially complementary. Nevertheless, the 
relationships may become competitive and conflicts may arise 
in the process of achieving these ends. For instance, as 
Tiramons points out "life might be purchased with the cost of 
liberty and opportunity. Similarly, liberty might be pur­
chased with the cost of life, Wars have been fought with 
huge sacrifices in human life for liberty. Thus conflicts in 
achieving unitary units must be resolved in an optimum 
achievement of all ends" (106 p. 19). 
In the present analysis of the Nepalese agricultural 
structure, the end-in-view would have, in the context of over­
all development as implied in the National Plans, three con­
stituent components: economic growth, social justice, politi­
cal or social stability - a lower level end in relation to 
the "basic ends," An increase in per capita real income (the 
case of population decline excluded) denotes economic growth. 
Social justice means an equitable distribution of income and 
equal opportunity for individuals to develop their potential 
talents. Thus they are endowed with equal opportunity to par­
ticipate in the social, economic and political life of the 
country to the extent of their inherent ability. Political 
and social stability means Creating and maintaining a 
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sufficiently dynamic political and social order to accommo­
date necessary orderly change toward economic growth and so­
cial justice. Apparently conflicts may arise in maximizing 
the achievements In economic growth and/or social justice, 
and political stability. If tenants remain suppressed, or, 
for that matter, if landlords are pressed too hard, disorgani­
zation and chaos may erupt. 
It is therefore that the concept of proportionality for 
"optimum achievement of all ends" will have to be applied. 
What proportion of which component to give in the interest of 
achieving a little more of another component and what is opti­
mum depends upon the knowledge of the situation,will, determi­
nation, and desire of the Nepalese people and their leaders. 
In other words, the substitution rates between the components 
is influenced by the relative weights the decision makers as­
sign each component and its alternative. 
The analytical framework of the "means-ends-continuum" 
concept to be applied in analyzing Nepalese agriculture struc­
ture will proceed in the following manner. 
The development goals for agriculture specified in Ne­
pal's National Plans (31) are: 
a. Increase in agricultural productivity by efficient 
allocation of resources; 
b. Equitable distribution in the ownership and control of 
the material resources and thereby income; 
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c. Increase in per capita income of farm families. 
Among the means are; agrarian reform measures (fixation 
of rents, a provision of permanent tenancy rights, a ceiling 
on holdings, the saving of farm produce); providing employment 
opportunity outside of agriculture; structural reforms such 
as credit and marketing; agricultural research and dissémina-
nation of knowledge about improved agricultural practices. 
Given these goals and means, the consequences, both re­
alized and expected, will be examined. The interrelationships 
between goals and means and consequences will be analyzed by 
following the construct as illustrated by Timmons (104), which 
is presented in the diagram on the following page. 
In the diagram, the goals have been translated into Tar­
get Variables, as specified in the Plans. Those are ends-in-
view to be accomplished by bringing changes in the agrarian 
structures in Nepal. Considered in terms of Instrumental 
and Structural Variables, these targets are an integral part 
of Nepal's development goals and are to be achieved by means 
of Instrumental Variables as specified. The Structural Vari­
ables are basic in providing the instruments to achieve the 
targets. The Non-Target Variables are side effects of 
changes on other facets of economy. They are relevant to other 
sectors as influenced by side effects of the change. 
The analysis will be divided into a. Delimiting Phase, 
b. Diagnostic Phase, and c. Remedial Phase. In the 
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Figure 3. Analytical construct 
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Delimiting Phase the existing situation in terms of the 
goals realized and specified is analyzed. This will also in­
dicate the extent to which the existing agrarian structures 
obstruct and impede the achievement of development within 
agriculture and the nation. This is what was earlier re­
ferred to as the problematic gap. 
b. The Diagnostic Phase evaluates and determines the 
nature of a specific structure, such as land tenure struc­
tures, in terms of their defects or failure and success or 
contributing elements in the development process. In this 
part of the analysis, using the proposition that conditions 
for development center on Incentives , knowledge and capital, 
an attempt will be made to answer the questions of how and 
why a particular structure in agriculture affects adversely 
or favorably 1) the Incentive to Increase productivity given 
ample capital and knowledge; il) the technical and managerial 
innovations given sufficient capital and incentives; and, ill) 
the formation of capital or access to capital given incentives 
and knowledge, and bring about developmental consequences short 
of the developmental goals or how they have contributed to the 
achievement of developmental goals. In short, this provides 
an answer to the question of how a particular structure causes 
or restricts the problematic gap. These questions together 
provide the general proposition regarding the characteristics 
of agrarian structures which deny agriculture the incentives, 
the knowledge and the capital necessary for its development. 
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c. In the Remedial Phase, ways to remove the defects 
Inherent in the agrarian structure and means to expand the 
contribution of success elements by strengthening them and 
by introducing new ones as identified in the Diagnostic Phase 
are sought. 
The modifications suggested will be appraised in terms 
of the simultaneous achievements of the goals of agricul­
tural development as identified in the Delimiting Phase. 
The conformity of these goals will also be assessed along with 
the goals for overall economic development and for building 
up a "development system" with agricultural activities as a 
core component as discussed in the beginning of this chapter -
in terms of the Five Year Plan and the Perspective Plan ob­
jectives discussed in Chapter II. 
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CHAPTER IV. AGRICULTURAL SECTOR IN NATIONAL GROWTH 
UNDER THE NATIONAL PLANS 
The present chapter deals with the Delimiting Phase of 
the analysis in agriculture in the light of the hypotheses 
presented in Chapter I and the analytical framework pre­
sented in Chapter III, regarding the economic development 
goals in general (Chapter II) and agricultural development 
goals in particular. 
It was mentioned earlier that agricultural activities 
form the core component in the development system in Nepal; 
and that, along with the interrelationships of outflow-inflow 
linkages, the process of economic development involves the 
interaction of forces that provide incentives, knowledge and 
capital. These elements are then related to individuals or 
functions that are to be performed in a given phase of devel­
opment . 
Nepal's process of development is characterized as be­
ing in the initial phase. Development activities have been 
initiated and absorbed into the system with some positive re­
sults. In this sense, the economy has been introduced with 
some elements of dynamism. However, since the growth process 
has not yet got rid of the institutional lags that create 
frictions in the movement, the growth has not gained 
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sufficient momentum to move the economy far from a station­
ary position. To this extent, static elements are still 
persistent in the economy. The initial phase has, therefore, 
partly dynamic and partly static elements. This is also a 
crucial phase in the development process for the reason of 
the nature of activities involved, most of which are new to 
the system. In deciding Upon the course of economic approach 
the society would want to follow in the subsequent phases of 
development the whole process of development in the initial 
phase thus becomes 'experimental." 
In the preceding chapter it was proposed that in the 
process of agricultural development, the interactions of 
growth elements - incentives, knowledge and capital - are 
1 
influenced and conditioned by the agrarian structures, 
which may be broadly defined as the institutional framework 
of agricultural production. The central point of analysis 
in the present study Is the agrarian structures as influenc­
ing and conditioning factors in the initial development 
process in Nepal. 
The National Plans of Nepal, reviewed in Chapter II, 
Indicate that the Government policy for agricultural 
' I 
Agrarian structures In the present context include: 
a. tenancy and ownership patterns of land; b, financing, 
credit and marketing organizations; c. taxation In agricul­
ture; and d. systems of services - agricultural extension, 
education and research, health, and communication facilities. 
(See also 108.) 
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development is oriented toward 1) institutional reforms, 
2) adaptive research and extension service, and 3) develop­
ment of infrastructures as broad strategies of development. 
The implications of these policies, in terms of the economic 
objectives and goals specified in the Plans and the conse­
quences realized, will be analyzed in the following pages. 
Implications of Nepal's Economic Objectives 
for the Agricultural Sector 
In all the three Plans special consideration was given 
to the agricultural sector, although in the Second Plan the 
relative share of financial allocation was slightly reduced 
as compared to the First and Third Plans. The national 
economic development objectives of the Third Plan, noted in 
Chapter II, were stated as follows: 
1. To increase national income at an annual rate of 
3.8 percent, or 19 percent in five years, 
2. To move labor out of agriculture to other pro­
ductive activities. 
3. To improve the condition of tillers by effectively 
implementing the agrarian reform program. 
4. To develop an economic Infrastructure "as this de­
velopment will increase agricultural output and 
lead to a more efficient market system" (31 p. 15) 
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5. To increase food.grains production at an annual rate 
of 3 percent and. cash crop production at an annual 
rate of 14 percent. 
The progress achieved so far in various sectors has 
been presented in Chapter II. It was noted that any measure 
of economic development in Nepal, in its initial phase, must 
by necessity focus its attention on agriculture. One obvious 
reason may be found in the fact that although the growth in 
the non-agricultural sector in 1968-69 was estimated at 9.9 
percent, the growth in the whole economy was only about 5.I 
percent as the growth in the agricultural sector lagged be­
hind that of the non-agricultural sector. Considering the 
fact that nearly 86 percent of the total labor force is en­
gaged in agriculture and the agricultural sector contributes 
as much as 65 percent td the gross domestic products, low 
productivity in agriculture has been the main factor for the 
low level per capita income in Nepal, estimated at about #94. 
The development of underdeveloped economies implies 
that although the total income from agriculture goes on in­
creasing, its relative share in the aggregate national in­
come goes on decreasing. This is caused by sufficiently ex­
panding the productive activities in the non-agricultural 
sectors and by providing employment opportunities to transfer 
labor from agriculture, including the transfer required by 
Ill 
population growth. To sustain the process of labor transfer, 
the agricultural productivity of the labor remaining In ag­
riculture must go on Increasing, If the country is going to 
meet the growth goals. 
In Nepal, agricultural development has to meet this 
problem on three fronts. First, food production must be In­
creased to feed an Increasing population. Second, existing 
Industries and additional Industries (restricted by the fac­
tor endowment of the country other than agriculture-based 
resources) must be provided enough raw materials for manu­
facturing and processing. Third, foreign exchange earnings, 
must continue to grow, by export of agricultural commodities 
to support the Increase in Import requirements. 
These, along with the growth in population, which is 
projected to be rising at 2.4 percent annually in the 1970's, 
indicate that agricultural production will have to Increase 
at an annual rate of 6 , 1 k  percent^ to catch up with the rate 
^Estimated on the basis that the domestic demand for 
food will rise at an annual rate of 4.15 percent (see the 
following section); the demand for Industrial crops will 
rise at an annual rate of 14.0 percent (in want of other in­
formation, calculated under the assumption that to Increase 
1 percent in employment in manufacturing the total value add­
ed from this sector will have to Increase by about 3.5 per­
cent; the Third Plan estimate is also about the same;) main­
tain the present rate of percentage of export to GDP, which 
is about 9 percent. Given the relative weight of cash crop 
to total agricultural production as one-tenth and assuming 
that employment in manufacturing will have to increase by 
about 4 percent, agricultural production will have to in­
crease by about 1,45 percent annually; and to maintain the 
present rate of the share of export to GDP, an additional 
0,54 percent Increase in agricultural production will be nec­
essary, assuming that the rise in GDP Is 6 percent. 
112 
of development in developing southeast Asian countries by 
I98O, as implied in Nepal's perspective plans. 
With the present rate of growth in agricultural produc­
tion, about 2.2 percent per annum, to reach the target of 
6.l4 percent per annum the present efforts of increasing ag­
ricultural production will have to be more than doubled. 
Most of the increase in output will have to come from the 
increase in productivity of labor and land, as there is not 
much potential from which to bring new land under cultiva­
tion. 
One of the means of increasing productivity of the giv­
en land is the extensive use of modern practices in farming. 
However, given the nature of present employment, labor must 
be transferred from agriculture to other productive activi­
ties, But it is questionable if such transfer, taken without 
supporting measures (which has been broadly grouped as 
incentives, knowledge and capital) would not affect produc­
tion of agriculture in Nepal, 
Regarding the situation of surplus labor, one estimate 
by the Ministry of Economic Planning, HMG/Nepal, shows that 
almost 48 percent of the total labor in agriculture is sur­
plus (39). Nepalese economists, Dr, Y. P. Pant (86) pp. 
11-13) and Dr. B. P. Shrestha (97 PP. 30-49) seem to support 
this view of surplus labor. There is no clear definition 
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of agricultural labor nor of surplus labor in these estimates. 
Presumably, they adopted the definitions used in the National 
Agricultural Census (32), which defines agricultural house­
holds to include all those who "depend" for their living on 
farm income and the members of these households who are be­
tween the ages of, 15 and 59 as in the agricultural labor 
force. Child labor (below 15 years) is also considered, but 
under a separate "category. As per this definition, absentee 
landlords and their children who may have been in services 
or other jobs and part-time wage earners all are included as 
agricultural, hence "surplus labor." 
There is the problem of surplus labor if we analyze by 
regions. The Hills, which have nearly two-thirds of the to­
tal labor force and about 12 people per hectare of cultivated 
land, have surplus labor. It is not the same with the Tarai 
with only one-third of the total labor force residing in the 
area and with about 3.5 people per hectare of cultivated land. 
It would seem that this fact was overlooked in the estimates 
of the Ministry of Economic Planning, They indicate that 
the Hills ( lA'bludIng Kathmandu Valley) have 24 percent of the 
labor surplus and. the Tarai has 60 percent of the labor sur­
plus (39). It is inconsistent with the common observation 
as well as with the Information we have. In the case of the 
Hills, it is possible that there would be surplus labor to 
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the extent of 24 percent, although many of the Hills people 
go for outside the farm, such as in the army or as watchmen 
or non-farm laborer jobs, both inside and outside Nepal. 
But the Tarai have labor shortages especially in the 
peak crop season. One estimate shows that as many as 200,000 
laborers come from outside the region, mostly from India, as 
seasonal labor during the planting and harvesting of crops 
(9). There are also many Indian laborers working in con­
struction and factories as skilled and semi-skilled labor­
ers, in addition to agricultural laborers, while many Nepal-
ese workers go to India to work. 
In the context of transferring labor from agriculture 
to other sectors, the problem needs to be examined both from 
its real and apparent nature. It may be necessary to dis­
tinguish between "actual" laborer, working on the farm, and 
the "disguised laborers" who do not work on the farm and do 
not contribute anything to raise the farm income but derive 
income from the land by holding the ownership title of the 
land. As per the present definition, the tenants, owner cul­
tivators, landless agricultural laborers and their dependents 
would constitute the "actual" agricultural labor force. All 
the absentee landlords and their dependents are "disguised" 
labor. 
Considering the fact that nearly 40 percent of the to­
tal land is cultivated by tenants, the owners of this land, 
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who come under agricultural households in the census defi­
nition, constitute the surplus labor. Following the conven­
tional definition of discuised unemployment (92 p. 225ff) and 
underemployment (109 pp.? and 4l), though given essentially 
under static conditions, the surplus labor of absentee land­
lords has zero marginal productivity in agriculture. To fol­
low the Ranis and Fei definition (89 pp. 533-535)» the ab­
sentee landlord in Nepal is redundant labor force disguised-
ly employed in agriculture and his displacement out of agri-
} 
culture would not decrease total output. 
Although the present purpose is not to go so much into 
the theoretical controversy on employment or unemployment, 
however, it may be necessary to clarify some of the points 
that bear upon the problems in Nepal, The problem of pro­
viding employment or reducing the problem of unemployment is 
a very important and pertinent one. The problem will be ap­
proached from the point of productivity over time in a dynam­
ic sense, A deliberate change in the economic policy is 
conceived, the objective of which is to increase aggregate 
production in agriculture, not only to reduce the existing 
labor in agriculture. More relevant to Nepal is the ap­
proach to the problem of employment suggested by Myrdal (73)1 
to consider it in a dynamic sense and the one suggested by 
Viner where he says, "As far as agriculture is concerned, I 
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find It Impossible to conceive of a farm of any kind on 
which, other factors of production held constant ... it 
would not be possible, by known methods, to obtain some ad­
dition to the crop by using additional labor in more careful 
selection of planting of the seed, more intensive weeding, 
cultivation. ..." (Ill pp. 79-80). 
It is necessary that the policy implications of devel­
opment, the problems of unemployment, and the transfer of la­
bor from agriculture will have to bear heavily on this as­
pect, If the policy measures are directed toward withdraw­
ing or transferring labor from agriculture, without altering 
the present position of landlords and without providing sub­
stitutes for existing labor, output in agriculture is more 
likely to be adversely affected. There will be little scope 
left to introduce modern imputs in agriculture. For instance, 
the farmers in Nepal have experienced difficulties in growing 
the new variety of Lerma wheat as it takes more time and la­
bor in threshing by conventional methods of beating against 
a hard surface or by the method of using animals to walk 
over it. They are looking for small mechanical threshers. 
They have problems with the so-called Japanese method of rice 
cultivation, which requires transplanting seedlings in a row, 
weeding, Interculturing, and so forth, as against the hither­
to followed practice of broadcasting the paddy seeds. 
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If the economic objective is to increase the aggre­
gate production in agriculture, not only to reduce the sur­
plus labor in agriculture; and if the problem is approached 
from the point of increasing productivity over time, policy 
measures could be directed toward transferring either the 
landlords or the actual tillers to be replaced by landlords 
as actual laborers. In either case, the question is related 
to increasing the efficiency of the actual labor in agricul­
ture and to releasing the redundant ones. For increasing 
labor efficiency (along with more Investment and better 
knowledge in terms of better n.eeds, more fertilizer, better 
water management and control), personal incentives and pros­
pects for more remuneration are essential. 
The National Plans have emphasized the need for increas­
ing the efficiency of labor. The agrarian reform programs 
are measures taken to provide an institutional base condu­
cive to increasing productivity in agriculture and causing 
the transfer of labor to other productive activities. The 
program was initiated primarily as a tenancy reform program 
to provide permanent and inheritable tenancy rights to the 
tiller as a first step toward the ultimate transfer of own­
ership of land to the actual tiller. Along with this, fix­
ation of a celling on holdings was considered to usher the 
transfer of the landlord class to non-agricultural sectors. 
The landlord class was chosen for shifting to other sectors 
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since this class constituted the best available source of 
managerial talent and private capital. Although the expe­
rience of landlords as such may not be much in the non-
agricultural sector, nonetheless, the emphasis was on their 
sons and daughters who have had the best available opportu­
nity for education. 
How far these objectives are fulfilled is difficult to 
assess at this moment. Perhaps the six or seven years that 
have elapsed since the initiation of the agrarian reform pro­
gram are not enough to provide a visible impact on the econo­
my. Nevertheless, some evaluation can be made of the pro­
gram itself and on implementations thus far carried out. 
Agrarian reform The main program of agrarian re­
form, from its implementation side, was focused on; l) the 
acquisition of land above the ceiling limit and its distri­
bution to tenants and landless agricultural laborers; 2) the 
identification of tenants and the land tilled by them, with 
provisions for permanent. Inheritable tenancy rights, pro­
tection from unlawful eviction and prevention of illegal 
rent payments; 3) the assessment of agricultural loans and 
interception of payments by the Government; and 4) the col­
lection of savings from the farmers on a compulsory basis, 
and provision of institutional arrangements for credit and 
input supply. 
The implementation of these programs has not all been 
successful. The identification of land above the ceiling 
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limit (17 hectares for owners and 2.5 hectares for tenants) 
has brought insignificant results. Only about 62,000 hec­
tares from owners and about 17,000 hectares from tenants 
were identified as excess land by the middle of 1969. Out 
of this, the Government acquired only 28,000 hectares and so 
far only l6,000 hectares have been distributed, although the 
Government expected to acquire and distribute more than one-
fourth million hectares of land. One of the main reasons for 
little progress in this area was that most of the owners who 
had excess land made false transfers of ownership and some 
did not report all the land they had. In the absence of 
proper land survey records the land could not be identified, 
nor had the Government the machinery to enforce the law. 
Even the meager distribution of land that was made was taken 
mostly by the government officials or their relatives and 
friends. 
In the distribution of permanent tenancy certificates, 
in five years only about 30,000 tenants have received such 
certificates, out of a total of about I.9 million tenants. 
So far cadestral surveys have been completed in 18 out of 75 
districts. Until such surveys are completed and land records 
properly maintained, there can be no meaningful and effective 
implementation of land reforms as envisaged in the program. 
Credit reforms Agricultural loans amounting to Rs, 
10 million were assessed and debt repayments were intercepted 
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by the Government; but this has brought nearly 1.5 million 
cases of complaints regarding loan assessments and they are 
still pending with the Government, This has benefited the 
poor farmers little. The traditional source of money lending 
by village money lenders, landlords and village merchants has 
virtually dried up in many areas. The new institutions en­
gaged in the program to replace the traditional source of 
money lending have not been able to cover all the areas, nor 
has their performance been satisfactory to provide loans to 
the farmers. The traditional money lenders are gradually re­
suming their operations with higher charges on credit, in 
some cases to the extent of 40-50 percent per annum as 
against the 10 percent rate allowed by law, to cover the high­
er risk and cost of an operation that has to be carried out 
now from the "backyard," 
Credit has been regarded as the villain in the misery 
of the farmers in Nepal. Without provisions for outside 
credit, even the protected tenants would eventually be at the 
mercy of landlords. It was estimated that one village 
panchayat would need about Rs, 500,000 of credit a year to 
run the farming operations. To provide this much for each 
of the 3,R00 village panchayats that exist in the country was 
clearly impossible for the central government, A device was 
created in the form of the "compulsory savings scheme" to 
mobilize local resources for agricultural development (7), 
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The compulsory savings scheme was a noble idea, never 
tried before, not only in Nepal but probably also in Asia, 
and an unique experiment with unprecedental prospects for 
the mobilization of savings in the rural sector. This 
scheme originated from the agrarian reform program of 196^. 
Under this scheme, the landlords, owner-cultivators and ten­
ants were required to deposit with the local Ward Commit-
1 
tees a fixed amount of farm produce in kind (roughly about 
7 percent of the produce) in the case of general crops such 
as cereals, and about 9 percent of the produce in cash in 
the case of cash crops like jute and sugar cane. The depos­
ited savings would be refunded after five years with 5 per­
cent interest on the savings. Meanwhile, the farmers could 
borrow at 10 percent interest from the Ward Committees, when 
they needed seasonal loans. 
The program went smoothly for the first two years and 
a total of Es. 83.4 million equivalent savings were collect­
ed. In the meantime, the whole program got involved in po­
litical maneuverings and bickerings, both at the village lev­
el and at the national level. Consequently, only about Rs. 
31.0 million of savings were collected in the subsequent 
three years of the program, mostly from small farmers. The 
Î 
Each village panchayat is divided into nine Ward Com­
mittees, There are 3,800 village panchayats in Nepal, each 
panchayat with about 26,000 people. 
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Central Government has accepted the liability for all the 
savings collected, which is about Rs. 114,3 million, plus 
the interest on it. But the actual savings in the hands of 
the Government does not exceed Rs. 30.0 million; the rest is 
with the Ward Committees (there are about 3^1000 such Commit­
tees and each Committee has three members to run the busi­
ness) in the hands of local leaders, most of them former 
money lenders and landlords functioning now under the dis­
guise of "progressive panchas." The truth has not gone far 
from what one could expect of such leaders, who have become 
no more than the creation of a rural petite-bourgeoisie in 
the political, social and economic systems in Nepal. And 
the truth is that the hard-earned and equally hard-squeezed 
savings of the poor farmers are so far just in paper. Sav­
ings collected in kind are reported by several Ward Commit­
tees to have been damaged by insects or destroyed by fire or 
water. 
In 1968-69, the Government decided to abandon the col­
lection of savings in kind and lowered the rate of savings 
also. The farmers were asked to deposit the savings in cash, 
about Rs. 22 per hectare. However, most of the farmers, 
roused and supported by landlords and local leaders, refused 
to deposit savings either in cash or kind after the harvest 
of 1968-69. They argued that the Government was not compe­
tent enough to look after their savings. The Government was 
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forced to accede to their demand and finally abandoned the 
collection of savings with the announcement that "the col-
d, lection of savings is postponed until further notification. " 
The year 1969-70 is said to be devoted to settling all the 
accounts, preparing an Inventory, publishing balance sheets 
and beginning refunds to the depositors. 
These developments led the "compulsory savings scheme" 
to a complete failure. The reasons for the failure are (1) 
lack of strong commitment from political leadership; (2) 
maneuvering by local leaders as described In an earlier para­
graph ; (3) an ambitious program but immature thinking on the 
part of the Government In deciding on collecting savings in 
kind without proper storage and supervision facilities, and 
without establishing competent machinery to handle and manage 
the savings properly and efficiently. 
The savings that were collected and were In the hands 
of the Government have not been fully utilized except to pro­
vide lucrative jobs for a few persons, who seem to have the 
least concern with the farmers* problems, by the creation of 
the Land Reforms Compulsory Savings Corporation. The Cor­
poration has been buying Government saving bonds with the 
money deposited by farmers for the purpose of providing agri­
cultural credit. This clearly results In the act of defeat­
ing the purpose of collecting the compulsory savings. 
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The other reason for the debacle in the agricultural 
credit and savings program was the failure of the coopera­
tive movement was launched as an integral part of the agrar­
ian reform program to provide an alternative source of 
credit in rural areas. The entire agricultural development 
program in Nepal regarding the use of improved seeds, chem­
ical fertilizers, provisions of credit, and distribution of 
products was founded upon the premise that a strong, effi­
cient and modern credit and marketing system was being or­
ganized on a cooperative system.". . . and yet"the Coopera­
tive Review Committee, appointed by the Government in 1968, 
observed, "Disappointment in the performance of this system 
has come to prevail. So great is the disparity between ex­
pectations and performance that a serious review is warrant­
ed" (# p. 1). 
The findings of the Committee were that of the total 
1,295 cooperative societies established in the country, only 
185 were functioning relatively satisfactorily; the rest 
were either delinquents or existed only in register-books. 
The membership in the societies was dominated by landowners 
who gave their lands to the tillers for cultivation. Loans 
were distributed mostly among the Directors of the Board of 
the.society. The Directors, prior to the commencement of 
the agrarian reform program, were themselves money lenders 
125 
and landlords or village traders. The actual tillers for 
whom the societies were primarily meant to provide help were 
kept far in the background. Most of the financing provided 
by the Cooperative Bank (the Agricultural Development Bank 
since I968) went into the hands of people other than the 
actual tillers. The amount of outstanding loans are enor­
mously increasing (44 Ch. 2). The problem of agricultural 
credit is becoming acute due to the lack of efficient insti­
tutions at the village level. 
Next is dissemination of new knowledge, adaptable to 
the conditions in Nepal based on research findings. This 
was to be effected through efficient networks of agricul­
tural extension activities which were envisaged as a sup­
porting measure for the agrarian reform program, the ulti­
mate objective of which was to increase productivity in ag­
riculture. 
Agricultural research The program of agricultural 
research was initiated by establishing agricultural experi­
ment stations during the First Plan. There exist now nine 
agronomical experiment farms, eighteen horticultural, four 
livestock, three sheep,four poultry centers, and seven fish-
breeding farms in various climatic regions of the country. 
Nearly one-fourth of the total development budget of the 
Ministry of Food and Agriculture (Rs. 12.41 million out of 
Rs, 53.3 million in 1969-70) goes to support these activities 
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directly. Out of a total of 210 "senior technicians";(B,S. 
or higher degree holders in agriculture, horticulture or 
animal sciences) in 1968-69» 122 (nearly 60 percent) were 
involved in activities related to research fields, whereas 
in agricultural extension only 55 such technicians (not even 
one per district with an average population of about 140,000) 
were working. 
The purpose of the farms, centers, and stations is de­
scribed as to do adaptive research in various branches of 
agriculture and animal sciences, presumably such as testing 
new seeds, horticultural grafts and animal breeds, soil sur­
vey and soil analysis, plant and animal protection measures, 
agricultural tools and implements, water management, etc. 
The direct impact of the adaptive research purported to be 
carried on in these farms, most of which have been in exist­
ence for the last eight or nine years, is nowhere discernible 
except in wheat. In wheat there is a relatively successful 
introduction of Mexican Lerma wheats. Improved varieties of 
wheat have been increasingly replacing the low-yielding lo­
cal varieties. New varieties in other crops like rice and 
corn, have not yet entered the farmers' fields successfully. 
In horticulture and livestock practically nothing has 
come out of the research farms. Entire programs in these 
activities cannot be regarded as more than a sale-and-
purchase type of activity. They bring in indiscriminately 
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plant saplings or seeds and animals from outside the coun­
try and distribute them to the farmers. This kind of im­
portation, especially in horticulture, has also imported 
pests and insects not previously found in Nepal, such as a 
suspected virus disease in citrus which has almost wiped out 
one of the best citrus orchard areas in the country, in the 
Bokhara valley. The same is true with wooly aphids. The 
Government Plant Pathologists suspect that Nepal may have 
imported more Insects and diseases than the number of im­
proved varieties of seeds, plants, or animals imported in the 
last decade. 
In fisheries, some new varieties of German carp were 
successfully introduced. In poultry, improved breeds of New 
Hampshire and white birds have almost replaced the local 
low-productive breeds in city areas. Similarly, in vege­
tables such as radishes, tomatoes, green peas and carrots, 
the introduction of new varieties has been successfully 
adopted by the farmers in the cities and nearby areas. 
The performance in the field of agricultural research, 
on the whole, is less than expected. However, research in 
agriculture, by its very nature, is not something that will 
yield quick and positive results. This is the case especial­
ly in fundamental types of research. But, given the fact 
that the purpose of agricultural research in Nepal is not so 
much to be Involved in fundamental types of research or basic 
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research, but to test the adaptability of already invented 
technology and knowledge in other parts of the world to the 
conditions in Nepal, an eight- or nine-year period need not 
be considered too short a test time. 
The major bottleneck is not so much the time factor or 
resources-men-and-material-availability. It is due mainly 
to the lack of specific research policies and guidelines. 
There is no mention about research policy in Plan documents, 
except that "work will be done to determine suitability in 
Nepal of agricultural techniques that have been successful 
in other countries" (31 p. 65). Nor is there any mention in 
other documents except in the preface of the Ministry of Food 
and Agriculture Annual Report 1968 that the research policy 
in agriculture is to follow "adaptive research." Unless 
these are specified and translated accordingly into specific 
research programs related to the purpose of research in the 
context of overall national development, this cryptic phrase 
may mean anything or nothing in terms of policy guidelines 
for various research activities. 
The Department of Agricultural Education and Research 
that deals with agronomical crops publishes a list of re­
search projects. This contains just what the title says, se­
rialized items of trials and experiments to be conducted by 
the various Divisions in the Department drawn according to 
the desire and whim of the research workers who will conduct 
129 
the trials (51). Other departments, such as Horticulture, 
Livestock and Fisheries, do not have even this kind of re­
search project list, although all these departments are sup­
posedly involved in research activities in their respective 
areas. 
Agricultural extension program This program was 
started in the early 1950's under the Point Four Program of • 
the U.S.A. as the village development program. In 1959» the 
Agricultural Extension Section was created in the Department 
of Agriculture to provide technical supervision and guidance 
to the Village Development Department in running agricultural 
extension activities in rural areas, partly supported by the 
Indian-aid program in Nepal, In 1962 all operations were 
brought into the Department of Agriculture under the USAID 
program and the Village Development Department was dissolved. 
In 1965, USAID assistance was withdrawn from other activi­
ties such as horticulture, livestock and fisheries and was 
concentrated in cereal grains production. Agricultural ex­
tension activities were likewise limited to these crop areas. 
The Agricultural Supply Corporation was established in 1966 
in the public sector to function as the sole importer of 
chemical fertilizers and the wholesale seller of improved 
seeds of cereal grains in the nation. 
The coordinated program A package-deal program 
called the "coordinated agricultural development program" 
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was introduced in 1966 to provide better seeds, chemical fer­
tilizers, credit facilities, and technical know-how. Coop­
erative societies were organized with a view of providing a 
vehicle to carry these inputs to the farmers "as and when 
they need them," and agricultural extension personnel were 
to function as a catalyst in the process of adoption and dif­
fusion of improved agricultural practices with the research 
departments poised to provide technical backstopping. The 
Cooperative Bank (now the Agricultural Development Bank) and 
the Land Reforms Compulsory Savings Corporation, both under 
the public sector, would finance the credit. There was a 
separate agency, "Distric Minor Irrigation Development Com­
mittee," to look after water problems, A District Land Re­
form Officer, who had almost equal power with the District 
Magistrate, was given the function of coordinator in launch­
ing the "coordinated program." The Districts were phased out 
on the basis of their "stage of development" as: explora­
tory or preliminary districts, intermediate or transitional 
districts, and coordinated districts, probably similar to 
Rostow's "stage model" classification. There were thus all 
the ingredients one could think of available in the "policy-
program-briefcase" to make Nepalese farming better off, ex­
cept perhaps the farmer himself. Of this more will be said 
later. 
131 
"To provide greater impetus and efficiency in the ad­
ministration" in 1966 the Department of Agriculture was 
split into five full-fledged departments; (l) Agricultural 
Extension; (2) Agricultural Education and Research; (3) Hor­
ticulture; (4) Livestock and Veterinary; and (5) Fisheries. 
This led to further proliferation and strengthening of the 
"Central Coordination Coimnittee" and "District Coordination 
Committees" to coordinate the agricultural development poli­
cies and programs at the center as well as at the district 
levels. By I968-69, 37 districts were declared "coordinated 
districts" by establishing "District Coordination Commit­
tees"; 28 were put under intermediate categories, and the re­
maining 10 were left as preliminary districts. The main empha­
sis of the so-called "coordinated development approach" has 
been on cereal grains. 
There is no information available to determine the impact 
of the development programs in terms of actual production prior 
to 1961. Production trends of the major crops in the past 
years have been presented in the Appendix. Table 22 provides 
information on the total area, total production, and yield 
indices for major crops. 
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Table 22. Nepal Index of production, area and yield for 
major crops, 1964 to 1968 
Crops/year 1964-65 1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69 
Paddy rice 
Production 100.00 100.07 91.18 100.75 105.4 
Area 100.00 101.09 100.00 102.80 IO3.55 
Change in yield 100.00 99.20 91.18 97.95 101.78 
Wheat 
Production 100,00 II6.66 126,19 150,79 180.15 
Area 100.00 94.37 100.80 120.90 126.61 
Change in yield 100,00 123.6l 125,18 124.72 142.28 
Corn 
Production 100.00 100.23 96.49 102.45 105.21 
Area 100.00 103.45 102.97 99.34 99.73 
Change in yield 100,00 97.16 93.70 103.13 105.48 
Sugar cane 
Production 100.00 152.38 166.66 132.53 150.79 
Area 100.00 144.67 109.57 126.15 150.40 
Change in yield 100,00 IO5.32 152.04 IO5.O5 100.25 
Jute 
Production 100.00 99.80 98.93 101.77 85.02 
Area 100.00 100.00 100.I3 156.62 109.37 
Change in yield 100.00 99.80 98.62 64.97 77.73 
a 
Calculated from the data in Appendix, Table 47. 
133 
Except in wheat there is no appreciable increase in the 
area and productivity of other crops. Farmers have gradually 
increasing the area under a second crop by growing wheat af­
ter the rice harvest. 
In the use of improved farm practices (better seeds, 
chemical fertilizers) only a small fraction of the area is 
brought under such practices. In 1968-69. only 4.3 percent 
of the total area under rice was sown with improved seeds; in 
wheat it was more than 29 percent ; in corn just 1 percent -
Table 23; however, the Third Plan target is to cover 800,000 
hectares with the use of improved seeds by 1969-70 - an ob­
viously impossible task. 
Table 23. Area under improved seeds by major cereals, 
1968-69 
Area under im- Percent 
Cereal Total area ha, proved seeds ha, of total 
Paddy rice 1,138,800 49,000 4,3 
Wheat 172,900 51,000 29,5 
Corn 449,600 4,500 1,0 
Total 1,761,300 104,500 5,9 
134 
The use of chemical fertilizers is not impressive, in 
spite of heavy emphasis put on their use to increase produc­
tion and in spite of the government's liberal policy in re­
leasing convertible foreign exchange, almost without any lim­
itation, to buy fertilizers in the cheapest possible inter­
national market. The prices of fertilizer are kept on a par 
with the prices prevailing across the border in India. 
(See 98.) In I968-69, only 24,000 metric tons (in ammonium 
sulphate equivalent) of fertilizers were used. In terms of 
nutrients, about 2.5 K.g. per hectare were used, whereas thé 
average for India is 5 Kg. per hectare; for Japan, 322 Kg.; 
and for Asis, 8 Kg, (80 p. 17). As with improved seeds, so 
it is with the use of chemical fertilizer; it will be impos­
sible to meet the Plan target of using 86,000 metric tons 
annually by 1969-7O. 
Almost negligible are the uses of plant protection mate­
rials and improved agricultural tools and machinery. Only 
the equivalent of about 8,000 hectares of plant 
protection materials were used in the country in 1968-69. 
The Agricultural Tools and Implements Factory started in 
1967-6B, is still looking for buyers. It is estimated that 
there were 425 tractors (most of them 28-35 HP) in use in 
1968-69, which comes to about one tractor for about 4,300 
hectares of cultivated land. 
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In other fields of agricultural activities such as 
horticulture, livestock and fisheries, extension services 
virtually do not exist. The progress, from the research 
side or from actual production side is barely discernible. 
Although the distribution of new varieties of fruit grafts, 
vegetable seeds, new breeds of animals and fish fingerlings 
has been going on for the last eight or nine years, their 
impact on overall production is nowhere significant, except 
in vegetables and poultry in city areas, especially the 
Kathmandu Valley. Improved poultry birds, as said earlier, 
have been popular and poultry-keeping is growing as a prof­
itable enterprise. Egg prices have come down from 70 cents 
a dozen in 1966-6? to 53 cents a dozen in 1968-69 in the 
Kathmandu Valley (49). 
National food balance The National Pood Balance 
Sheet for Nepal (Appendix, Table 48 ) shows that the per 
capita per day calorie intake in 1968-69 was 2,031 calories. 
The contribution from cereals and other starchy foods was 
1,817 calories; animal products provided only 120 calories 
in daily diets. The consumption of animal protein was 4.7 
gm. per capita per day. The intake of proteins add protec­
tive food in the Nepalese diet is alarmingly low and cereal 
consumption is fairly high (87). 
Assuming that all the cereals produced in the country in 
1968-69 are made available for local consumption, 210 Kg. of 
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cereals (rice, corn, wheat, millets and barley in edible 
form) will be available per capita per annum for human con­
sumption, which converted into calories would come to about 
1 
2,600 calories per day. 
Compared with the situations in neighboring countries, 
in 196^-65 India had 1,430 calories; Pakistan, 1,62? cal­
ories; Ceylon, 1,280 calories (l4); and Nepal, 1,895 cal­
ories from cereals. In calorie intake from proteinous diets 
(pulses and nuts, meat, fish, eggs, milk), India had 321, 
Pakistan 258, Ceylon 375 (l4), whereas Nepal had 195. 
The policy directions of the development programs seem 
to have gone more toward cereal grains. There is clear evi­
dence for the need of redirecting the policy toward the nu­
tritional aspect of the diet. Of course, cereals would 
command a larger share of the development programs in agri­
culture, The development of livestock and horticultural 
crops, apart from the nutritional aspects in the food con­
sumption pattern of the people, is important from the point 
of reducing the regional Imbalance in the economy. 
1 
The actual calorie Intake in 1968-69 from cereals was 
estimated at 1,765 (87). The remaining cereals go for ex­
port, In the total agricultural and forest produce exports,; 
65 percent is rice. One estimate showed that production of 
cereals in edible form in I961-62 was 2.01 million metric 
tons and consumption requirements (at the rate of 187 Kg. per 
capita per year) would come to 1.75 million metric tons; the 
balance for export was 0.26 million metric tons (28 pp. 
33-34). 
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The Hills have a high population density: nearly 12 
people per hectare of cultivated land as against 3.5 people 
per hectare in the Tarai. In the Hills, except for some po­
tential to increase production by the use of better seeds, 
better water management, and chemical fertilizers, unless 
road transport is available, there is no other way to in­
crease cereal grain production. Practically every piece of 
land suitable for grain production has been brought under 
cultivation. Even the steep mountain slopes are used for 
grain production, which has aggravated the problem of soil 
erosion. The terraces on high mountains demonstrate the 
struggle of Nepalese farmers in raising food grains. The 
only possibility left is to use the hill and mountain slopes 
by growing fruit trees and pasture crops to support the in­
creasing population and to provide a means of living for the 
Hill people No doubt some forest lands In the Tarai can be 
opened to resettle some of the Hill people - but only some. 
The survey conducted on cereal grain production and 
consumption in 1964 estimated that there was a deficit of 
cereal grains in the Hills to the extent of 230,000 metric 
tons (30). Taking this figure and assuming that 18? Kg. of 
cereals in edible forms per capita per year is to be made 
available for human consumption, then nearly 2 million peo­
ple from the Hills need to be resettled elsewhere to leave 
the people in the Hills self-sufficient in food grains. 
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Providing the mininrum size of holding of 2.4 hectares per 
family, as allowed for tenants by the Lands Act, and taking 
the national average size of the family of 5.3 members, 
950,000 hectares of land will be required for cultivation 
to resettle the surplus hill people. The estimates of the 
Ministry of Forest show that at the most, possibly 100,000 
hectares of new land can be brought under cultivation. Be­
sides, new land is already required to settle displaced 
Nepalese families from outside the country. Of course, it 
is not necessary that all the people should be in farming. 
In fact, the economic objective of development is to shift 
the population from agriculture to other occupations. The 
analysis made here is to examine the magnitude of the over­
population in the Hills, There are also problems of a so­
ciological nature in migration, if it is to be affected, 
and, problems of a political nature (from the point of re­
gional development) that have to be considered. 
Contribution of the Agricultural Sector to the 
Development of Nepal's Economy 
The most obvious contribution expected of a growing ag­
riculture is to raise the level of national income. However, 
the development of agriculture and its contribution must be 
considered within the context of the overall economy. This 
broader setting requires an understanding of the mechanism 
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by which the agricultural sector relates to the whole econ-
1 
omy. The intersectoral relationships, as explained in 
Chapter III under the development system as outflow-inflow 
linkages, between agriculture and the rest of the economy, 
will be examined for the agricultural sector in terms of: 
1. National product 
2. Supply of factors of production of other sectors -
labor and capital 
3. Market interrelations, both domestic and foreign 
trades 
4. Development of infrastructures 
These classifications are not mutually exclusive but empha -
size the fact that agriculture's contribution has many di­
mensions in its interrelationship with the rest of the econ­
omy. 
National product contribution Historically, the 
economic growth of a country is measured by the aggregate 
product growth of the various sectors of the economy weight­
ed by their respective relative sizes. There are no detailed 
data available to study empirically the rate of contribution 
of agriculture over a longer peiod of time. The first esti­
mates of national products were made for 1961-62. Although 
the relevant data are incomplete and for some years of 
doubtful reliability, an analysis is made by dividing the 
•••The general,framework follows Kuznets (60) and Johns­
ton and Mellor (56). 
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period I96I to 1969 into two periods: 196I-62 to 196^-65 
(in 1961-62 prices) and 1964-6$ to 1968-69 (in 1964-6$ 
prices), by using the equation used by Kuznets (60 pp. 102-
119) to express the gross contribution of a sector; 
a a 
P - P pb 
nl no 1 + o , 
This measures the contribution made by the agricultural sec­
tor expressed as a proportion of the total Gross Domestic 
Product Growth. The symbols represent; 
P = product at the beginning of the period, super-
o s 
script "a" and "b" representing the agriculture 
sector and all other sectors respectively; 
P^ = product at the end of the period, the superscript 
representing the same as above; 
P = product at the beginning of the period, Nepal 
no 
total; 
P = product at the end of the period, Nepal total; 
nl 
a a a a « 
r = rate of growth of P such that: P^ = P^ (1 + r ): 
b b b b ^ 
r = rate of growth of P such that: P = P (1 + r ). 
1 o 
I4l 
1961-62 to 196^-65 GDP in millions of Nepalese Rupees of 
1961-62^ 
a a 
P = 2,393 ; P = 2,465 
o 1 
P = 3.7^8 ; P 3,973 
no nl 
b b 
P = 1,355 ; P = 1,508 
o 1 
a 
a P 
r = 1 - 1 = 2465 - 1 = 0,030 
2393 
0 
b 
b P 
^ = 1 - 1 = 15OB - 1 = 0.113 
1355 
0 
P - P 3973 - 3748 = 225 
nl no 
X 0.030 ^ 
P - P 225 
nl nl 
This indicates that the contribution of agriculture to 
the national growth was a little less than one-third of the 
total growth. The output of the agricultural sector at the 
beginning of the period (196I-62) was about 64 percent of 
Ï 
The data are from the Ministry of Economic Planning 
estimates as quoted in (100). The agricultural sector also 
includes forest products. 
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the total national output. The relative size of the sector 
decreased slightly to about 62.5 percent in 1964-65. 
1964-65 to 1968-69 GDP in millions of Nepalese Rupees 
of 1964-65.^ 
a a 
P = 3915 ! P = 4265 
o 1 
P = 5883 ; P = 6606 
no nl 
b b 
P = 1968 ; P = 2341 
o 1 
a 
JL 
a 
0 
b 
1 
4265 
3915 
2341 
1968 
1 = 0.089 
1 = 0.190 
P - P = 6606 - 5883 = 723 
nl no 
a a 
P . r 
= 191S X 0.089 = 0.468 
P - P 723 
nl no 
1 
1964-65 figures are revised estimates of the National 
Planning Coimnission Secretariat; 1968-69 figures are pre­
liminary estimates made by the Economic Analysis and Plan­
ning Division, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Nepal. 
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It appears that the contribution of the agriculture sec­
tor in the second period increased from about one-third to a 
little less than half of the national growth, which goes con­
trary to the historical economic growth process. In the sec­
toral contribution, the share of agriculture to the total GDP 
1 
in 1964-6$ was 6? percent which came down to less than 65 
percent in 1968-69. 
Apart from the fact that agriculture is making substan­
tial contributions to the national growth, a marked increase 
in agricultural productivity means an increased food supply 
and increased raw material supply for manufacturing and proc­
essing industries at relatively lower prices. 
The present 2,2 percent rate of population growth is es­
timated to rise to 2,3 percent (lower estimate) to 2,$ per­
cent (higher estimate) during 1970 to I98O. There are rea­
sons to believe that higher estimate will hold true. Nepal 
has achieved success increasingly in controlling malaria, 
cholera and typhoid, Nepal had been in one of the highest 
death rate countries (28 per thousand) in the early 1950's, 
and the population growth was only 1.6 percent, which reached 
2,1 percent in mld-1960's, 
Î -
There seems to be some discrepancy in the figures. The 
share of agriculture to the total GDP in 1964-65 at 1961-62 
prices was about 62,5 percent, but at current prices of 1964 
-65 the revised estimates show agriculture's share as 67 
percent in 1964-65. There was perhaps underestimation of 
agricultural products in the first estimates and this was 
subsequently revised upward. 
1# 
If we assume that the projected per capita income growth 
of 3.5 percent for 1970's will be achieved and the income 
elasticity of demand for food will stay around O.5O, food 
production will have to increase by ^.15 percent^ annually 
during 1970-80 to meet the internal demand. If the food sup­
ply lags behind the general growth in demand, food prices 
may rise substantially. Rising food prices will place a 
damper on economic growth. Because higher food prices means 
lower real wages, as Nepalese spend nearly 70 percent of 
their expenditure on food (87), lower real wages would lead 
to less money left for other goods. 
In the case of Nepal, however, unlike in food-deficit 
countries, an increase or decrease in agricultural production 
affects favorably or adversely the export trade as well as 
industrial production. 
Supply of Factors of Production The process of his­
torical econonomic growth is characterized by a marked trans­
fer of population from agriculture to the manufacturing and 
service sectors. This transformation was achieved in now de­
veloped countries even when the natural rate of population 
growth in the agricultural sector was higher than in other 
Î 
Using the Ohkawa equation, demand for food, D = p + ng, 
where p and g are rate of growth of population and per capita 
income and n is income elasticity of demand for food (quoted 
in 56 p. 572) D = 2.4 + 0.50 (3.5) = 4.15. 
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sectors. The data analyzed by Kuzmets (6l pp. 106-10?) show 
that the proportion of the labor force In agriculture de­
clined from 0$ percent (the same as that of Nepal In 1969) 
to 33 percent between iPyZ and i960 In Japan; and from 68 
percent to 12 percent between 1840 and 1950 In the United 
States. Structural, technological and Institutional changes 
that took place in these countries during that period made it 
possible for such transfer without creating food shortages. 
The second factor of production, capital, may be trans­
ferred from one sector to the other. As indicated by Kuz-
nets (60 p. 114) this may occur either by compulsory trans­
fer through price controls or taxation where a sector is 
taxed above the value provided by the government, or from 
investments made in one sector using savings originated in 
other sectors. Historically, compulsory or forced capital 
transfers have been made from agriculture to other sectors 
in the Initial phase of development. The second type of 
transfer usually has also been from agriculture to nonagrl-
culture in the form of embodied capital in human labor, when 
the labor force raised with agricultural Income (savings) in 
the farm is transferred to nonagriculture. 
In Nepal, to the extent that redundant labor exists, 
especially in the Hills) and considering the relatively high 
population growth, the agricultural population provides a 
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a steady source of labor force,^ It appears that It will 
require formidable efforts to maintain even the present la­
bor in agriculture and transfer only the additional labor 
force brought about by the natural growth in population. 
There will be about 0.114 million new additional labor force 
every year, assuming that the labor participation rate is 46 
percent and the population growth 2.3 percent. To keep 
this additional labor force outside of agriculture the pres­
ent rate of transfer from agriculture to nonagriculture will 
have to be stepped up about eight times. 
In the meantime therefore, it appears that the contri­
bution of agriculture to the economic development in Nepal 
will also have to be made by providing employment for a grow­
ing labor force which, in the short run, has no alternative 
employment. This means that an increase in per unit produc­
tivity of land is crucial for increasing the absorptive ca­
pacity of the farm with regard to surplus labor. 
This is possible, to some extent, if the earlier men­
tioned basic propositions of incentives, knowledge, and 
^Given the lower estimate of population growth of 2.3 
percent and the present distribution of labor in agriculture 
(86 percent) and nonagriculture (14 percent), to keep the 
present number of labor force in agriculture, other sectors 
would be required to absorb labor to the extent of: 
100 (1 + 0.023) = 14 (1 + na) + 86 (1 + Oa) 
102,3 = 14 + l4na + 86 
na = 16.3 percent in the initial period 
This is nearly eight times the present rate. 
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capital are made sçood that will facilitate the direct la­
bor investment of the local farmers. Although some activ­
ities other than regular farm work, such as working as 
hired-out labor or working within-farm production activi­
ties for self-consumption purposes or for side-income as 
kitchen gardening, poultry-keeping are observable, their con­
tribution would not in any way be substantial enough to de­
mand additional labor. 
The present cropping intensity index is about 121, a 
considerably low figure. The yield rates are also low. 
These are shown in Tables 2k and 25. 
Table 24. Areas under different crops and yield rates in Kg, 
per ha. in 1968-69^ 
(Total area under cultivation: 1.845 million ha.) 
Crops Area Percent of total Yield rate 
Paddy rice 1,138,800 50.84 2040 
Corn 449,600 20.07 2000 
Wheat 172,900 7.72 1312 
Other cereals 120,500 5i16 1540 
Potato 43,000 1.42 6705 
Jute 28,000 1.21 1170 
Oilseeds 97,000 4.33 585 
Tobacco 8,200 0.37 763 
Sugar cane 11,700 0.54 16090 
Pulses 80,000 3.59 900 
Vegetables 50,000 2.23 -
Miscellaneous 40,000 1.80 -
Total 2,239,700 100.00 
Ministry of Pood and Agriculture, HMG/Nepal (45). 
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Table 25. Average yield of some of the principal crops in 
Nepal as compared to selected countries (1963-64)f 
Kg. per hectare 
Counties/ 
crops 
Rice Wheat Corn Sugar cane Tobacco 
Nepal 2010 940 1970 13,200 680 
India 1540 790 1000 29,090 880 
Pakistan 1720 830 1030 27,000 1150 
Japan 5240 - 2670 - 2160 
USA 4440 1700 4240 48,440 2230 
World 2050 1200 2120 1130 
a 
For other countries PAO (13). 
There is large potential area left for double cropping. The 
estimates show that wheat as a second crop can be cultivated 
in nearly 1.4 million hectares of land (27). whereas the pres­
ent area under wheat is 0,173 hectares. In the last four 
years the area under wheat has increased by about 33 percent 
partly due to the intensive efforts made under a grow-more 
wheat campaign. 
Similarly, rice also can be grown twice a year in some 
areas, especially in the eastern Tarai where some farmers have 
done so when water is available. It would require a substan­
tial investment in irrigation and water control and a supply 
of fertilizers. Presently only about 11 percent of the total 
cultivated area is irrigated by man-made irrigation systems. 
The estimates of the Ministry of Power and Irrigation indicate 
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that nearly two-thirds of the present cultivated area can 
be brought under intensive production under irrigation (46). 
The contributions of agriculture by supplying manpower 
to other sectors cannot be rapid until capital and other fa­
cilities are available in the form of machinery, plants, 
transportation, and raw materials. In the initial phase of 
development, the agricultural contribution in supplying capi­
tal is likely to be of considerable importance since agricul­
ture provides and receives the largest part of the national 
income. 
The net direction of capital movement from agriculture 
to nonagriculture or vice versa is difficult to measure. His­
torically agriculture has provided capital to develop the non-
agricultural sector. The transfer of the labor force itself 
represents an important contribution in the form of past in­
vestments as it demands a sizable investment in the upbringing 
of a human being. Each laborer carries the investment made in 
the past in the form of embodied capital. 
Apart from this, agriculture in Nepal has been contribut­
ing to the total revenue of the Government to the extent of 
25 percent of the Government income. The land tax has been 
one of the easily manipulative items in the Government budget 
to meet the deficit in expenditures. In a period of ten 
years (1951-52 to I96O-61), the land tax was increased by 
112.7 percent. In I962-63, there was an additional increase 
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of about 75 percent as compared to that of 1965-66 was made. 
In 1967-68, there was a further Increase by about 50 percent 
as compared to the previous year. 
In terms of the total GDP contribution from the agricul­
tural sector (forestry included) and the Government revenue 
in 1968-69, as against a total GDP of Rs. ^,153 million from 
this sector, the revenue contribution was about Rs. II6 mil­
lion (land revenue and other taxes pertaining to agriculture), 
which is about 2.8 percent of the total agricultural GDP. 
There is no scientific basis for collecting the land tax re­
lating to the value or the production of land. There seems 
to be a possibility of increasing the land tax provided pro­
ductivity in the value of land is determined on a scientific 
basis. 
However, when we compare the land tax with the develop­
ment expenditures incurred by the Government on agriculture, 
agriculture has made contributions to the development funds 
for other sectors. For instance, in 1968-69, income from 
land revenue was about Rs, 86 million and the development ex­
penditure from the Government budget was about Rs. 22 million 
(47). In addition to the land revenue, farmers were making 
contribution in the form of compulsory savings, essentially 
a forced savings, discussed earlier, which would support 
agriculture-based industries. 
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Market Interrelations Economic development Implies 
increasing interdependence between different sectors. One 
major implication of the relatively low per worker product 
in agriculture is that it is operating under a condition of 
isolation that is difficult to penetrate by modern economic 
methods. For instance, inputs used in production are almost 
restricted to land and labor with some capital in the form 
of draft animals and simple tools. Most of its products are 
consumed situ. This relegates it to isolation from the 
rest of the economy. 
The development of agriculture, which implies technolog­
ical transformation in terms of manufactured inputs such as 
chemical fertilizers, better tools and machinery, pesticides, 
and so on, brings changes in economic isolation and increas­
es sectoral interdependence both from the factor and product 
sides. The contribution to the national growth brought 
about by the increasing Interdependence comes through the 
provision of intermediate goods to the agricultural sector, 
which contributes directly to the growth of the non-agricul­
tural sector; and, secondly, an increase in the supply of ag­
ricultural commodities is likely to be accompanied by a de­
crease in the prices of these commodities rendering an 
upward effect on the level of real wages and, consequently, 
a favorable competitive position of the non-agricultural sec­
tor. 
152 
Historically, the economy of Nepal has not been an In­
tegrated one. The sectoral interdependence is not yet well 
developed. The difficulties in transport and communication 
have forced large areas of the country into isolation; market 
operations have been severely restricted. Nonetheless, the 
areas newly opened by roads (e.g. Bokhara, Trishuli, Araniko) 
have had an increased flow of goods and services. Similarly, 
the sugar factories and tobacco factories have encouraged 
the farmers to switch over to cash crops. 
The contributions of Nepal's agriculture have been 
more prominent in its participation in external trade rather 
than internal. Since the first and the most important activ­
ity in Nepal's economy has been agriculture, Nepal has been 
exporting agricultural (mainly foodstuffs) and forest prod­
ucts for a long period of time to India, from where it ob­
tains the basic consumer goods. The long-run advantages and 
disadvantages of exporting primary goods and importing fin­
ished goods have been widely discussed in the literature 
(19» 107), In Nepal's case because of its size and the tra­
ditional pattern of trade, depending on almost entirely one 
country for exports and imports, the importance of trade and 
the obstacles thereby are very prominent. 
The more advanced methods of production become eco­
nomic when they can be employed upon a sufficiently large 
scale. If it has no trade, a small country like Nepal cannot 
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adopt advanced methods of production which depend on econo­
mies of a large scale. A small country is hampered thus "by-
diseconomies of a small size. For such countries Hicks sug­
gests that they concentrate production on things that are 
best suited to achieve an output limited not by its own size 
but by the world market for such commodities (20 pp. 3^B-
352). But here again landlocked countries like Nepal situ­
ated far from a seaport and having no other alternative out­
let than passing through a single country, have the addition­
al disadvantage of being unable to take advantage of the best 
price offer in the world market. Nepal is extremely vulner­
able to the disadvantage of specialization in production. 
A similar kind of situation occurred in 1968-69. The 
good harvest in that year, especially in paddy rice in Nepal 
as well as in the border States in India, created the prob­
lem of a sudden price decline in rice, Nepal's bid to find 
an alternate market did not succeed since the existing rice 
mills were geared toward parboiled rice and its quality par­
ticularly suited to the Indian markets. Tibetan markets (im­
porters) would want a higher-quality plain rice with lesser 
percentage broken. The rice mills in Nepal were not equipped 
1 
with such facilities. The continued and steady improvement 
in production and rice milling in India poses the greatest 
For details see "expanding export market for Ne.pali 
rice," Grigsby (16). 
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and immediate threat to the continued development of paddy 
rice production and the existing rice milling facilities in 
the Tarai, 
The gains from external trade in Nepal have been so 
far of a static nature, in the sense that although Nepal has 
been trading goods (mostly primary goods), the indirect bene­
fits such as the spread of technical knowledge. Increased use 
of capital, and so on, have not been visible in the produc­
tion process. Trade statistics are not available prior to 
the period 1955-56; however, it is generally believed that 
during that period the exports and imports were almost in 
balance and the economy remained, in a sense, in a self-
contained position, though poor and entirely agricultural. 
After the depression and around World War II, efforts were 
made to alter the economic structure by introducing the 
process of industrialization, which brought little effect In 
the economy. 
It was only after 1951 that the importance of trade 
came to focus on development. The process of development re­
quired large imports of goods, both capital and consumer 
goods. Since 1956-57 Nepal had a regular deficit in the bal­
ance of payments, as shown in Table 26. 
The figures in Table 26 indicate that during the period 
1956-57 to 1964-65 the trade deficit had been rising on an 
average of about 45 percent. Although the exports were 
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Table 26. Nepal's foreign trade - 1956-57 to 1964-65^ 
(Rs. In million) 
Item/Year 
1956-57 1957-58 1958-59 
X M X M 
Poodd 72.95 37.59 47.79 38.77 87.90 43.02 
Beverages and 
tobacco 1.35 14.29 1.83 13.22 0.89 21.53 
Raw materials 16.18 14.50 18.25 9.31 25.80 7.78 
Minerals, fuels 0.05 12.64 0.08 11.10 0.02 15.43 
Oils and fats 0.17 8.21 0,66 10.21 0.61 10.50 
Chemicals, drugs 0.03 7.98 0.06 6.60 0.10 9.31 
Manufactured 
goods 1.22 57.69 1,13 46.84 1.61 91.69 
Mach. and trans­
port eq.pt. 0.03 5.61 0.05 6.54 - 6.37 
Misc. Mfd. goods 1.48 7.11 1.24 11.13 0.36 12.13 
Miscellaneous 
(n.e.s.) 
2.00 4.27 2.21 4.61 0.64 5.63 
Total 95.47 169.89 73.30158.35 117.93 223.39 
a 
Central Bureau of Statistics,'Nepal (^2), 
b 
X = Export, 
0 
M = Import. 
d 
Includes live animals for food. 
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Table 26 (Continued) 
Item/Year 
1959-.60 i960. -61 1961-62 
X M X H X 
Food 98.89 65.86 158.57 55.18 174.14 63.77 
Beverages and 
tobacco 0.92 20.65 2.48 21.81 2.14 39.27 
Raw materials 27.33 13.27 43.45 20.30 50.58 25.92 
Minerals, fuels - 20.87 0.08 28.31 0.01 36.56 
Oils and fats 0.37 4.76 0.68 10.32 1,66 11.09 
Chemicals, drugs 0.54 11.94 0.09 22.52 0.12 23.73 
Manufactured 
Roods 2.31 106.78 
o
\ I—1 
185.91 
1—1 
192.69 
Mach. and trans­
port eqpt. 0.02 8.33 0.11 25.83 0.13 24.78 
Misc. Mfd. goods 0.89 18.71 1.38 16.37 1.49 23.16 
Miscellaneous 
(n.e.s.) 
0.46 16.35 0.94 11.42 0.53 3.43 
Total 131.74 287.53 209.74+397.98 265.22 444.41 
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Table 26(Continued) 
Itera/Year 
1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 
X M X M X M 
Food 166.78 42.66 196.42 97.43 258.92 102.23 
Beverages and 
tobacco 1.85 40.08 3.31 35.24 1.12 58.80 
Raw materials 67.32 32.81 59.23 30.87 115.94 82.26 
Minerals, fuels - 46.20 0.07 71.53 0.07 72.35 
Oils and fats 3.17 11.97 3.08 14.94 8.73 16.66 
Chemicals, drugs 0.53 23.58 1.35 35.28 1.78 37.85 
Manufactured 
goods 46.06 296.37 25.26 247.21 50.36 352.61 
Mach. and trans­
port eqpt. 0.12 32.84 0.52 30.98 0.14 53.30 
Misc. Mfd. goods 1.65 26.91 1.77 40.34 3.17 41.94 
Miscellaneous 
(n.e.s.) 0.16 0.60 0.16 0.73 0.33 0.86 
Total 287.65 604.02 291.17 6o4.56 440.56 818.87 
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also rising (about 40 percent), the imports were rising at 
a higher rate (about 42 percent). The share of food to the 
total export is about 66 percent on an average for the peri­
od and its share to the total import is about l6 percent. 
Exports of raw meterials also have increased. On the import 
side, manufactured goods import increased from Es, 57*69 mil­
lion in 1956-57 to Rs, 352.61 million in 1964-65; the import 
of machinery and transport equipment increased from Rs, 5.61 
million in 1956-57 to Rs. 53.30 million in 1964-65. 
The relatively high rate of increase in manufactured 
goods indicates the increasing expansion of domestic markets 
for such goods. The traditional pattern of production based 
on rice export is beginning to cast doubts on its possibility 
of sustained expansion in the future, though not in the imme­
diate future, as long as India remains deficit. While the 
importance and the need for diversifying Nepal's traditional 
trade direction has been realized, the time has come, it ap­
pears, to diversify the traditional agricultural production 
pattern. This could be directed toward supporting the manu­
facturing and processing industries that use agricultural 
products. Even domestic markets for such products as sugar, 
canned fruits, vegetables, milk and meat products are gradu­
ally expanding. 
Developinent of infrastructures As the increase in 
inter-sectoral relationships tend to expand the market 
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structures, and when a dual economy exists, the ultimate 
problem for the country's future development depends upon, 
among other things, how fast the modern exchange sector ex­
pands while the indigenous sector contracts. This interre­
lationship is very much influenced by the infrastructure, and 
by the contribution that one sector makes to the development 
of the basis infrastructures of another sector. 
The most important components of the basic infra­
structure, with general reference to agriculture, are classi­
fied by Wharton (114-) in three groups: 1) capital intensive 
components such as irrigation and public water facilities, 
transport and power; 2) capital extensive components, mainly 
research, extension, credit and marketing institutions, 
education and health; and 3) institutional components relat­
ed to formal and informal political, social and cultural in­
stitutions. Wharton points out that the increases in produc­
tivity experienced by a developing agriculture are most like­
ly the results of investments made on the whole infrastruc­
ture complex. 
Historically, the development of infrastructures has 
been one of the prerequisites for an overall economic growth 
of a country. Although no empirical analysis can be made re­
garding the contribution of infrastructures in the develop­
ment process in Nepal at this stage, its importance, foremost 
among them the transport system, is self-evident. The 
l6o 
The historical or conventional transport in Nepal consists 
almost entirely of porters, a few pack animals and in the 
Tarai, bullock and buffalo carts. 
In 1968-69, there were 10,500 registered motor ve­
hicles^ for a population of 10,82 million people, which comes 
to about 1,000 people per vehicle. There are 1198 kilometers 
of permanent and 2148 kilometers of fair-weather roads -
about 30 kilometers of road per 100,000 inhabitants or 0.024 
kilometers per square kilometer of the area, which is very 
low even by developing Asian countries' standards. For in­
stance, India had 73? people, Ceylon 69 people, Malaysia 46 
people per vehicle and the UÛA 2,4 people per vehicle in 
1963 (53 p.3). No wonder, one Western observer remarked, 
that Nepal was 20 times bigger than the U.S.A. - from the 
point of transport. 
The Importance of transport development and the need 
for giving it high priority may be summarized in the words of 
the IBRD transport Mission to Nepal; "The special high-
priority problems facing Nepal which can be ameliorated by 
improved transport are; (1) food distribution; (2) food 
shortages; (3) the rising cost of living, particularly in 
the Hill areas and in Kathmandu Valley; (4) transport bottle­
necks restricting the benefits of maturing existing 
Ï 
Registered by Police Departments. Includes all trans-
Port vehicles such cars, jeeps and trucks. Information sup­
plied on request by the Department, 
l6l 
Investments from accruing to the country; (5) transport bot­
tlenecks inhibiting the exploitation of tourist potential; 
(6) concentration of population in areas which are completely 
inaccessible except on foot; and (?) concentration of invest­
ments and services in Kathmandu" (53 P. 2R). 
Along with the transport, the other areas of priority 
concern are irrigation development and structural and insti­
tutional developments, which were partly discussed in the first 
section of this chapter and about which more will be said in 
the following chapter. 
The Problematic Gap 
The preceding analyses show that the agricultural sec­
tor has been the most important sector in the economy and 
also the most important single contributor to the nationwide 
growth, It also shows that its share of contribution has 
not changed during the last decade or so. Contributions 
to the GDP, the employment structure, and foreign trade pat­
terns have remained almost the same. Labor migrations out of 
apcriculture have not been very significant; however, it ap­
pears that it is likely to be more significant once the 
agrarian reform programs are implemented to their full intent, 
which may eventually stir up the landlord class sufficiently 
to make employment policy outside of agriculture an important 
variable in overall planning. 
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An examination of the growth in real per capita income 
and the increase in agricultural production show that the 
slow rate of growth in the agricultural sector has been the 
main reason for the slow rate of growth in the economy. The 
growth in the average annual real per capita income fell 
short of the targeted growth rate of 1.8 percent to 0.9 per­
cent in the first four years of the Third Plan, Thus the 
realized growth rate is only $0 percent of the expected 
growth rate. Since the share of the agricultural sector in 
the economy is exceedingly high, the poor performance in 
this sector has held back growth in the overall economy. The 
average annual growth rate in the non-agricultural sector, 
during the above-mentioned period, was ^.7 percent, whereas 
the growth in the overall economy came to 3.0 percent since 
the growth rate in the agricultural sector stayed at 2,22 
percent. The share of the agricultural sector in the GDP 
was about 65 percent, but its contribution to the growth was 
only about k6 percent, as against the non-agricultural sec­
tor, which contributed more than 50 percent to the overall 
growth, though its share in the GDP was 35 percent. 
Compared to the goals, the realized consequences have 
shown a gap in performance. Nevertheless, the economy has 
also shown some positive results. This implies that, with 
some success elements introduced in the economy, the failure 
elements still persist in the system. These elements that 
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have contributed to or impeded the growth of agriculture in 
Nepal and thereby the growth in the overall economy are dis­
cussed in the following chapter. 
l64a 
CHAPTER V. POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR 
PROGRESS OR LACK OF PROGRESS 
The analysis of performance in the agricultural sector 
in the preceding chapter showed that this sector was lagging 
behind the targeted rate of growth. Considering the rela­
tively heavy weight of the agricultural sector in the nation­
al economy, the slow progress in this sector had considerably 
retarded the growth of the economy as a whole. This chapter 
identifies and explains the elements that caused the slow 
rate of growth in the agricultural sector. It evaluates both 
the success and failure elements in line with the conceptual 
framework outlined in Chapter III. 
Since it is not possible to deal with the entire prob­
lematic situation in a single study, this chapter is con­
cerned with the segment of the situation delimited in the pre­
ceding chapter and follows the headings concerned with In­
centives, knowledge and capital. 
Inasmuch as agriculture is not homogeneous in its na­
ture, its problems and solutions to these problems are bound 
to be hetergeneous. Thus, both the defects and contribu­
tions will be examined within this perspective. While some 
aggregative analysis for the agricultural sector as a whole 
on a national basis will be provided toward the end of the 
l64b 
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chapter, case studies recorded in selected districts in 
Nepal will be discussed first. 
Agricultural Performance in the Selected Districts 
Nepal's total area is divided into 75 districts for ad­
ministrative and development purposes. Each district has on 
the average about 1^0,000 people. The district consists of 
panchayats (village panchayats and town panchayats), which 
function as the lowest tier in the political-administrative 
system in Nepal. Six of these districts were selected from 
different regions for detail study. They are; (l) Jhapa, 
(2) Bara, (3) Parsa, (4) Bhaktpur, (5) Gorkha, and (6) 
Kailali. 
The selected districts together produce nearly l6 per­
cent of the total agricultural products in Nepal on about 15 
percent of the total cultivated area of the country. Nearly 
10 percent of the total population of Nepal live in these dis­
tricts, These districts provide a broad approximation of the 
existing agricultural and economic structures in Nepal. 
Jhapa. In the far eastern Tarai, produces the largest 
quantity of rice of any single district and is a net exporter 
of agriculture products. Along with foodgrains, Jhapa ex­
ports substantial amounts of jute (second highest district in 
jute production), which is one of the main sources of con­
vertible foreign exchange earnings for Nepal. This is also 
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one of the tea-producing districts in Nepal. It receives 
monsoon rain in fairly good amounts and is relatively pros­
perous in terms of the agricultural productivity potentials. 
It also has the advantage of easier access to the Calcutta 
markets in India where prices (especially for rice) are com­
paratively high. 
The first phase of the implementation of the present 
agrarian reform programs in Nepal was initiated in this dis­
trict on an experimental basis in 1964, Until then it was 
one of the "neglected" districts, sparsely populated and 
adversely affected by tenancy problems, for the fertile for­
est soil and the damp jungles were havens for both the ab­
sentee landlords and mosquitoes, (Although DDT succeeded in 
eradicating the latter, the former still persist.) 
Bara and Parsa are situated in the central Tarai. 
(The two adjoining districts were selected from the same re­
gion because of the difficulties encountered in separating 
the leakage and interflow of the development activities.) 
These districts rank at the top of the advanced districts in 
the Tarai. They have fairly well developed transport sys­
tems, Birganj, the district headquarters of Parsa, is one 
of the growing industrial towns in Nepal, representing the 
modern part of Nepal's economy. These districts have easy 
access to both the internal (Kathmandu) and the external mar­
kets, Development activities in these districts have been 
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going on since 1956. Bara and Parsa were among the first 
16 districts to initiate the application of the 1964 Lands 
Act. 
Bhaktpur. one of the three districts in the Kathmandu 
Valley, is adjacent to the capital and is agriculturally 
the most prosperous and advanced district in Nepal. It has 
a long tradition of being the best farmers' district with 
modern facilities that go with incentives, knowledge and 
capital, including a good tenurial system, better prices for 
its products, good transportation, extension services and 
credit facilities. Bhaktpur is also a show place for the 
efforts of foreign and domestic agricultural technicians and 
advisers. 
Gorkha is one of the least developed hill districts, 
remote and almost abandoned except for its name. This is 
one of the deficit districts where agriculture is at a sub­
sistence level. Corn is the main crop and is grown in 
small high-altitude valleys and plateau areas. The northern 
part borders Tibet and has rugged Himalayan terrain charac­
terized by a continuum of ecological differences and fragmen­
tations of agricultural zones. The farmers located at less 
than 200 meters apart on a slope pursue various activities -
cereals on the south to potato, buckwheat (Teete Phaper), 
and cattle (some yak) and sheep on the north. Except for an 
airfield on the southern tip of the district, it has no modern 
transport facility. 
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Kallall. a far west Tarai district, is a net exporter 
of food, mainly rice. It also produces substantial amounts 
of oilseeds as a cash crop. Like Jhapa, because of malaria 
Kallall, too, remained one of the neglected districts in the 
Tarai until 1964. Agrarian reform programs have not moved 
as fast in Kallall as in Jhapa. Although the land records 
show large areas under owner-operatorshlp, most of the land 
is cultivated under a cultIvat1on-by-proxy method, where the 
actual tiller is called a manager instead of a tenant. This 
is Raining momentum In other districts too, as an aftermath 
of the agrarian reform programs. Kallall also has the worst 
credit and marketing systems (8). 
The main source of credit was Indian traders (Mahajan) 
who would visit the villages during the planting season and 
provide the farmers with not only money but also consumer sup 
plies - including grains on credit - and fix the price of the 
produce when the farmers were hard-pressed for money and sup­
plies. The traders, with their business acumen, provided 
services to the villagers which the cooperatives could not 
replace but the traders also provided themselves with most 
of the produce the farmers had at the time of harvest. Af­
ter the agrarian reform program through lessening of the 
Influence of traders, though not in terms of credit availa­
bility through alternative sources, the situation improved. 
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Kallali has great potential for agricultural develop­
ment and area expansion under cultivation. Nearly 50 per­
cent of the total area is under forest, half of which has 
marginal forest which could be used for resettlement if irri­
gation facilities - one of the bottlenecks in Kailali - and 
water control are improved. Settlers from the Hills have 
been squatting in the area and the Government has recently 
begun a program for resettlement. 
Expected production targets in these districts calcu­
lated on the basis of a proportional share in the national 
agricultural production, and the achievements realized are 
presented in Table 27, 
Except for Gorkha and Kailali, in cereal production 
the districts were above the target level with Bhaktpur as 
high as 48 percent above. In cash crops, Jhapa was much be­
hind, partially due, perhaps, to the failure of the jute crop 
because of a long dry season, Bara and Parsa did well in 
cash crops, as the area under sugar cane increased substan­
tially, a result of an extensive grow-sugar-can campaign 
launched by the Birganj Sugar Factory (a public enterprise). 
The farmers were apparently encouraged to switch to sugar 
cane cultivation since the factory provided credit facilities 
in cash and kind including tractors on an installment basis. 
Also in 1968-69 the price of sugar cane increased from about 
Rs. 10. per quintal to Rs. 15 per quintal. Even the Indian 
Table 27. Targets and production of cereal^ and cash crops^ in the selected 
districts in 1968-69 (in metric tons)° 
Districts 
Target Achievement Percent of target 
Cereal Cash crop Cereal Cash crop Cereal Cash crop 
Jhapa 
Bara 
Par sa 
Bhaktpur 
Gorkha 
Kailali 
Total 
Nepal 
173,755 
132,129 
94,377 
22,650 
27,425 
113,326 
563,662 
3,775,092 
24,950 
17,797 
15,848 
10,662 
69,257 
389,846 
176,210 
133,678 
98,635 
33,521 
26,321 
88,432 
556,797 
3,657,588 
12,723 
26,443 
29,730 
5,836 
65,752 
283,402 
101.3 
101.0 
104.5 
148.0 
96.0 
7 8 . 0  
98 .8  
96.8 
50.5 
148.0 
130.0 
51.0 
95.0 
72.6 
Cereal crops include paddy, corn, wheat, barley and millets. 
b 
Cash crops include sugar cane, oilseeds, jute and tobacco. 
c 
Targets are calculated using existing areas under different crops 
in the respective districts as weights on the basis of the Third 
resp ctive §ïst^l^ê°^ figures. Achievements are compiled from the 
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farmers from across the border found it profitable to sell 
their sugar cane to the Birganj sugar factory, whereas in 
previous years Nepalese farmers used to take their sugar 
cane to Indian factories. 
In the use of improved seeds, chemical fertilizers and 
provision of loans from the Agricultural Development Bank 
there was a marked difference in these districts as shown in 
Table 28. Loans were also advanced from Ward Committees' 
funds collected undg^TiJ:Jije-XQfflpu^,my-gfl^ff4rtg^--SnhTmTnfi-,— 
trict breakdowns were not available. 
Table 28-, Proportion of the total area using improved seeds. 
chemical fertilizers, and loans (ÀDB) in 1968-69. 
Area under improved seeds Share of fertilizer 
Districts use and credit as a 
percent of the total 
used in the country 
Rice® Wheat Corn® Fertilizers Credit° 
Jhapa 2,6 35.0 1,0 0.8 9.0 
Bara 10,0 45.0 3.0 8,0 -
Par sa 6 , 0  68,0 3.0 6,0 1.6 
Bhaktpur 33.0 84,0 6,0 20,0 24,0 
Gorkha 1.0 2,1 nil nil nil 
Kailali 1.5 20.0 nil 0.3 5.0 
Nepal 4.3 29.5 1,0 100,0 100.0 
a 
Compiled from the District Office Records. 
^Percent. 
Credit figures are for 1967-68, 
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In the use of improved seeds, chemical fertilizers and 
credit, Bhaktpur was first, followed by Bara and Parsa; the 
remainder of the districts showed negligible use. In In the 
use of improved seeds, wheat was well ahead. In most of the 
Tarai districts, sowing wheat as a second crop was a new 
practice, thus easier to introduce. (The research farms had 
been successful in testing and proving high yielding wheat 
but not new varieties of rice. New corn, too, had been a 
failure. The Experiment Stations came out with high-yielding 
synthetic corn - Rampur yellow and Khumal yellow - but the 
new corn turned out to be unsuitable for storing under local 
storage conditions as it was, unlike local varieties, highly 
susceptible to Insects and disease. Farmers could not adjust 
themselves to these sophisticated varieties.) 
The data in Table 29 indicate that the broad occupa­
tional patterns in the districts have followed the same 
stages in the development of agriculture - the more developed 
the agriculture, the fewer people on the farms, Bhaktpur, 
Parsa and Bara have fewer households in agriculture than 
other districts and also than the national average. Infor­
mation was not available for examining the detailed pattern 
of employment, income status, or level of education of the 
people in the area. During the survey it was observed that 
a large number of people had migrated to the Tarai districts, 
especially in Jhapa and Kailali, during the last five years 
Table 29. Total population, area under cultivation and proportion of agricul­
tural to non-agricultural households in the selected districts in 
1968-69 
Total 
population^ 
Total area un-
"h 
Proportion of agricul­
tural and non-agricul­
tural households° 
Districts der cultivation 
Agricultural 
Non-
Agr i cultural 
(Number) (Hectares) (Percent) (Percent) 
Jhapa 195.000 92,000 86 14 
Bara 30-0 ,000 60,500 76 24 
Par s a 211,000 45,000 64 34 
Bhaktpur 97,000 8,600 55 45 
Gorkha 165,000 10,875 90 10 
Kailali 162,000 58,000 87 13 
Total 1,170,000 274,975 85 15 
Nepal 10,820,000 1,845,000 86 14 
^Total population projected from the National Agricultural Census, 1961, and 
adjusted for possible migration from Hills to the Tarai as observed in the 
•j^surveyed districts. 
Total area under cultivation (^5)• 
c 
Proportion of households estimated from the field surveys. 
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or so. It was generally observed that farmers in the Hills 
follow relatively more intensive methods of cultivation. 
This observation was supported by the fact that, on an aver­
age, per unit yield of land in the Hills is higher than in 
1 
the Tarai, which is attributed to the intensive method of 
cultivation in the Hills. 
In terms of soil fertility, Tarai lands are more fer­
tile than the Hill lands. Useful information may be pro­
vided by studying the performances and cultural practices in 
farming of Hill farmers in the Tarai vis-a-vis the local 
Tarai farmers. 
There were also marked differences in tenure systems, 
average size of holdings and the average number of parcels of 
land per holding. The total number of owners and tenants 
for the districts are given as provided in the land survey 
records. However in terms of actual households of owners and 
tenants, the actual figure may be smaller than presented in 
Table 30 for if the owners as wall as the tenants have land 
^Average yield rates of major cereals by regions, 
1967-68 (kg./ha.) (99 P. 42). 
Cereal Hills Valleys Tarai 
Paddy 2122 2870 1621 
Wheat 836 1280 780 
Corn 1726 2022 l495 
Table 30. Pattern of tenancy, size of holdings and number of parcels of land in 
the selected districts in 1967-68 
Total Total Proportion of Average Average Average 
Districts owners tenants tenant owner size of number of size of 
holding parcels parcel 
(number) (number) (percent) (percent) (ha. ) (number) (ha.) 
Jhapa 19,441 34,456 63 37 1.70 3.0 0.61 
Bara 85,000 52.951 38 62 0.45 2.3 0.19 
Par s a 39,338 42,122 52 48 0.55 2.4 0.23 
Bhaktpur 44,14? 18,380 30 70 0.14 2.6 0.06 
Gorkha na na 27 73 - - -
Kailali 9,405 5,243 38 62 3.90 5.0 0.80 
Nepal - - 40 60 H
 
H
 
0
 
5.7 0.08 
a 
Calculated from the land survey records made available by the Land Adminis­
tration Department, HMG/Nepal. For Nepal as a whole, taken from the 1961 
Census (32). 
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above the ceiling limit the land is under the name of each 
of the adult members in the family. It was not possible to 
differentiate the actual household from the legal household. 
Information indicates that Bhaktpur, which had the 
second highest percentage of owners, is also the most pros­
perous district. On the other hand, Gorkha, which had a 
slifirhtly higher number of owners than Bhaktpur, was also one 
of the least developed districts, Bhaktpur also had the 
smallest size of holding, while Kailali had larger than av­
erage size holdings among the group. In general, Bara, 
Parsa and Jhapa illustrate that tenancy patterns and size of 
holding, while providing some positive effects on growth, 
alone may not be sufficient to increase agricultural produc­
tion. For instance, Gorkha, with a relatively high percent­
age of owners, in the absence of other facilities and credit 
remained below the targeted growth rate. 
Bhaktpur, with a high percentage of owners, coupled 
with good markets, credit, transport, and the availability 
of modern techniques, surpassed all the districts. Because 
of these facilities and their proximity to one of the big­
gest markets in Nepal (Kathmandu), Bhaktpur farmers grow 
crops all year round. The scattered holdings in Bhaktpur 
may have, in fact, helped the farmers to plant different 
crops during different seasons. Given the undulating nature 
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of the land, and some upland and low land in the district, 
farmers have found crop rotation convenient and profitable. 
Comparable data were not available for examining the 
situation over time in regard to production and per unit 
yields on a district basis. 
Table 31. Yield of major crops by selected districts 
in 1968-69 (kg./ha.) 
Districts Paddy Wheat Corn Sugar cane Jute Oilseeds 
Jhapa 2,132 1,100 1,740 15,000 1,407 500 
Bara 2,028 1,210 1,625 18,000 700 600 
Par s a 2,100 836 1,625 18,000 - -
Bhaktpur 3,900 1,320 2,135 - - -
Gorkha 2,500 1,320 2,135 - - -
Kailali 1,600 833 1,600 16,000 700 679 
Nepal 2,040 1,312 2,000 16,090 1,170 
00 
a 
Economic Analysis and Planning Division, Ministry of 
Pood and Agriculture, HMG/Nepal (^B). 
In the yield rates, of cereal crops, Bhaktpur again 
topped the list and Kailali was last. In cash crops, the 
trend appeared to have followed the agro-climatic conditions 
in the area. For instance, Kailali with its relatively dry 
weather appeared to have a comparative advantage over Jhapa 
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in %rowin% oilseeds, Bara and Parsa did better in sugar 
cane. Unlike cereal crops which are grown in all the dis­
tricts in Nepal, different cash crops are concentrated in 
different pockets in the country. Growing cereal crops in 
all the districts without regard for the comparative advan­
tage would also suggest the nature of subsistence farming 
conditioned by the lack of facilities for the movement of 
products between the regions. 
The historical pattern of cropping in the country as a 
whole indicates that farmers in their own way, however naive 
as it may appear, have in general taken into consideration 
the comparative advantage of growing a particular crop (other 
than cereal) in a particular region. The eastern Tarai pro­
duces more than 95 percent of the total jute crop, where jute 
yields are highest. The central Tarai has more area under 
sugar cane followed by oilseeds and the western Tarai grows 
oilseeds as a cash crop as shown in Table 32, There are 
some deviations in the pattern caused mainly by the market 
situation, Rupandehi, for instance, has a relatively large 
area under sugar cane supplying sugar cane to the Mahendra 
Sugar Factory and Distillery located in the district although 
productivity appears comparatively low. Similarly, Jhapa and 
Morang have large areas under oilseeds, although yield rates 
are relatively low, Morang has the first industrial town of 
Table 32. Area and yield rates of major cash crops in some of the Tarai districts 
in 1968-69 
Districts 
Sugar 
area 
cane 
yield 
Oilseeds 
area yield 
Jute 
area yield 
(ha. ) (Kg.) (ha. ) (Kg.) (ha.) (Kg.) 
Jhapa 50 15,000 1,200 500 8,000 1,407 
I-Iorang 500 16,500 1,800 500 9,800 l,l64 
Saptari 60 15,000 2,200 
- 707 2,700 1,600 
Mahottari 60 15,000 1,400 500 30 800 
Bar a 1,400 18,000 2,000 600 35 700 
Parsa 1,100 18,000 1,500 600 -
-
Chitwan 150 15,000 13,500 625 30 700 
Rupandehi 1,300 15,800 1,500 450 60 700 
Dang 25 14,800 10,500 673 20 700 
Bardiya 20 15,000 7,085 625 35 628 
Kailali 25 16,000 7,800 700 50 679 
Nepal 11,700 16,090 97,000 585 28,000 1,170 
^Economic Analysis and Planning Division, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, 
HMG/Nepal (^8;. 
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Nepal at Blratnagar, which has a number of oil mills, and 
Bhadrapur in Jhapa also has several oil mills. Saptari 
which supplies jute to the jute factories at Biratnagar had 
the highest yield rate in jute. 
The prices of agricultural commodities are generally 
higher in the eastern Tarai and lower in the western Tarai. 
Kathmandu Valley has higher prices than in the Tarai. In 
the Hills there is the chronic problem of scarcity of both 
Koods and money. Comparable price data are not available at 
the time of this writing;. The paddy rice price data obtained 
1 
from the districts indicate that Bhaktpur had the highest 
price and Kailali, the lowest in the group. Jhapa has the 
advantage of the West Bengal (Calcutta) market in India 
where rice prices are generally higher. Bara and Parsa hav 
access to both an internal deficit area (Kathmandu) and the 
external markets in Bihar in India. Kailali has a less favor­
able situation both in internal and external markets. The 
^Average price of paddy in the selected districts in 
196^-65 and 1968-69 (Rs, per quintal) (49) 
District 1964-65 1968-69 
Jhapa 80 77 
Bara 73 65 
Parsa 75 67 
Bhaktpur 87 80 
Gorkha 82 81 
Kailali 69 59 
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Western Hill districts in Nepal are deficit in food grain 
production, except for small amounts carried by Hill people 
on their backs when they come down to Kailali for seasonal 
employment for there are no possible facilities for the move­
ment of goods. The adjoining markets in Uttar Pradesh in 
India are not in as much of a short supply of rice as those 
in West Bengal. There are no restrictions on the inter-state 
movements of food grains in India, 
In June I969, Nepal finally convinced India to allow 
Nepal to export rice into the rice-deficit States in India 
(Maharastra and Kerala). But the rice bags containing Nepa-
lese rice turned out to be manufactured in the People's Repub­
lic of China and the cargo was seized by Indian authorities at 
the point of entry into China. 
Among the irrigation projects undertaken by the Govern­
ment after 1956, one project (Mahadev Khola Project) was lo­
cated in Bhaktpur, completed in 196O, and provides irrigation 
facility for 9^0 hectares. Two minor irrigation projects 
also were completed that provide water for about 405 hectares. 
In Bara the Sirsia Dudhawa Project was completed in 1959 and 
provides water for 1,350 hectares of land. In Parsa, the 
Tilawe Project completed in 1959 provides irrigation facilities 
for 4,300 hectares of land. Minor irrigation projects were 
constructed in Jhapa districts with an estimated capacity pro­
viding irrigation facilities for about 1,500 hectares of land. 
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There were no additional irrigational facilities available in 
Gorkha and Kailali.^ 
Regarding the general farm income, one study shows 
that the gross income from a hectare in Bhaktpur in I967-68 
was about Rs. 7,200 as against the average similar income of 
Rs. 3,200 in Tarai. The average net farm income ratio be­
tween the two areas was estimated at 2.5:1 for Bhaktpur and 
Tarai farmers respectively. In Bhaktpur about 500 laborers 
(man-days) were used per hectare, while in the Tarai it was 
about 250 laborers (6? pp. 7-8). 
An Explanation for Success and Failure 
An examination of the agricultural performance in the 
selected districts showed that Bhaktpur ranked first followed 
by Bara and Parsa. Bhaktpur is also agriculturally the most 
prosperous district in Nepal. The average net income of the 
Bhaktpur farmer is as much as 150 percent more than that of 
the average Tarai farmer and would be still higher than that 
of the average Hill farmer. Product per unit of land is more 
than double as compared to the Tarai area. The average amount 
of labor input per unit of land used in Bhaktpur is 500 com­
pared with 250 in the Tarai. 
Ï 
The information was provided by the Ministry of Irri­
gation and Power. Detailed data regarding minor irrigation 
projects constructed by local panchayats could not be compiled. 
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The total production of cereal grains in Bhaktpur in 
1963-64 was estimated at 21,^57 metric tons. This rose to 
33,521 metric tons in 1968-69, more than 56 percent or more 
than 11 percent per annum. This is a clear indication that a 
substantial increase in the rate of growth in agriculture is 
possible and practicable in Nepal. 
Possible propositions for success elements in the proc­
ess of agricultural development are identified and explained 
as follows: 
1, Land tenure structures with reasonably low (one-
fourth) and fixed rental systems and well established inheri­
table tenancy rights have provided favorable incentives for 
the farmer - provided knowledge and capital were made avail­
able. 
Bhaktpur is one of the districts which have no tenancy 
problems as such. Apart from the high ratio of owner-cultiva­
tors (70 percent), the tenants have permanent and inheritable 
tenancy rights, well established over the last ten years. 
Rents have been fixed at an absolute quantity, equivalent to 
about one-fourth to one-third of the principal product. In 
other districts permanent tenancy rights have not yet been 
fully implemented and rents are fixed at 50 percent of the 
principal produce. The farmers in Bhaktpur are thus certain 
regarding their future control over the land and also are cer­
tain that they will be rewarded fully if they expand their 
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efforts in farming, since the landowner is entitled to a fixed 
amount, low as compared to those in other districts. The dis­
tricts of Gorkha, although having a high percentage of owners, 
is still behind, because there are no facilities for improved 
farm practices nor access to capital and it is isolated due 
to lack of transport facilities, 
Bara and Parsa, although having transport facilities 
and access to modern knowledge (improved inputs and chemical 
fertilizers) and capital, have not come up to the level of 
Bhaktpur, Many of the farmers still do not use fertilizers 
although they are available, since the extra cost must be 
borne by the tenant while 50 percent of the benefit goes to 
the landowner. The tenants have little incentive and motiva­
tion to improve their productivity. 
The experience of Budhabare village pahchayat in Jhapa 
district may be a case in point to provide further illustra­
tion, Budhabare village panchayat is the one where the agrar­
ian reform program was tried for the first time in Nepal, 
This was an experimental program started in late 1963. Based 
on experience gained in Budhabare, subsequent land reform pro­
grams were developed and applied in other districts in the 
country. The approach followed was that first the actual till 
er and the tract of land he tilled were Identified, Rents 
were fixed to provide incentives for the tiller to Increase 
outfit. Cooperatives were established to provide credit for 
1^5 
the tillers. The result was that in the second year of the 
implementation of the program, paddy production increased by 
3.3 percent. A substantial area was brought under a second 
crop, and as a result, the total crop production in the 
panchayat increased by 4,8 percent. When compared with the 
situation before reform, the incomes of the owner-tillers 
increased by 8 percent and that of the tenant-tillers in­
creased by 35 percent in the year following the reform (64). 
Jhapa, before the agrarian reform program had the worst 
tenancy situation. Wolf Ladejinsky who surveyed this area 
in 1962-63 found that "in eastern Terai in Nepal, an area 
of relatively sparse population, landownership is for the ex­
ceptional few. The economic consequences are such that even 
a landlord admitted that 'the tenants are often getting no 
more than the rice straw'" (62 p, 44?), 
The market facility in Bhaktpur has also been an impor­
tant factor in providing incentive to the farmers to grow 
different crops throughout the year. Bhaktpur is one of the 
three cities that comprise Kathmandu Valley, seat of the 
capital, Kathmandu Valley has been a food deficit area for 
over 25 years. There are modern transport facilities that 
reach almost all the villages. There are many traders who 
travel from village to village buying re,gular agricultural 
products and moving them to intermediate markets. In many 
instances, the farmers themselves take their products to the 
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market.^ Bhaktpur has been one of the best and largest vege-
table-pçrowing districts. The farmers in Bhaktpur (Kathmandu 
Valley as a whole) have not only the advantage of finding a 
ready market for their product but also are benefited with 
higher price margins in the sale of their produce as compared 
to the farmers in other districts. 
2, Given favorable tenurial system and market struc­
tures, technological innovations associated with the trans­
fer and adaptation of modern knowledge have favorably af­
fected the increase in agricultural production in the dis­
tricts, 
Bhaktpur has been one of the first districts in re­
ceiving knowledge regarding improved agricultural practices. 
New varieties of wheat were first tried extensively in this 
district. Now so are rice and corn varieties (see Table 2A). 
This district was also one of the first experimental dis­
tricts to try the coordinated development program discussedin 
Chapter IV. 
Of an estimated 24,000 metric tons (gross) of chemical 
fertilizer used in Nepal in 1968-69, nearly 5»000 metric tons 
were used in this district, though it has only 8,600 hectares 
of land under cultivation as against 92,000 hectares in Jhapa. 
There are also problems associated with moving a new 
product, for Instance wheat, as Kathmandu Valley has been tra­
ditionally a rice-consuming area. This aspect will be dealt 
with later. 
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Bhaktpur used nearly 124 Kg. of chemical fertilizers (in 
terms of plant nutrients) per hectare of the net cultivated 
area, whereas the average for Nepal is about 2.5 Kg. per 
hectare. In addition to the agricultural extension services 
which were supervised from the Center, cooperatives played 
a substantial role in the credit and distribution of inputs 
in the initial period, which since 1968 exist only in 
name. 
Bara and Parsa come next in the use of modern farming 
knowledge. Agricultural extension services have been working 
in these districts for the last thirteen years. These dis­
tricts were also among the first to start the Village Devel­
opment Centers initiated during the First Plan (1956-61). 
Parsa had the first village level workers' training center. 
(Since 1961-62 it no longer exists.) The first Agricultural 
Experiment Station opened in the Tarai, the Parwanipur Agri­
cultural Station (now one of the best), is in the Bara dis­
trict. Along with horticulture and fisheries experiment 
programs, the Government's Central Poultry Hatchery is also 
located in the Station. The Agricultural Tools and Imple­
ments Research Station and the Agricultural Tools and Imple­
ments Factory are located in Parsa. This shows that if the 
farmers of Bara and Parsa have enough incentive to use modern 
practices in farming, technical knowledge and materials are 
available. Apparently the 50 percent rate of rent and the 
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large number of unindentified tenants do not provide as fa­
vorable a situation for adapting to new practices as does 
that of Bhaktpur farmers, 
Jhapa saw the extension worker and probably the first 
grain of improved seed in 196^ when the agrarian reform pro­
gram was initiated. The activity remained confined for about 
two years in one village panchayat, Budhabare. The Agricul­
tural Extension Office started functioning only in 1967-68 
with little support from the Center. Kailali had practical­
ly no access to improved practices until 1967-68. Gorkha 
is still an abandoned case as far as new farm practices are 
concerned. The Agricultural Extension Office was opened in 
1968-69, but had no men or material support to provide mean­
ingful technical help to the farmers, 
3. The formation of capital and access to outside cap­
ital were favorably affected where incentives to use capital 
and technical knowledge were provided. 
Complete information on capital formation in the dis­
tricts is not available. This too needs further investiga­
tion, However, the data on credit use and the use of pur­
chased inputs (improved seeds, chemical fertilizers) will 
provide some indication. Table 28 indicates that of the to­
tal agricultural production loans advanced by the Agricultur­
al Bank in 1967-68, as much as Zh percent was used by 
Bhaktpur. (Of the total agricultural credit advanced, 
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Rs. 3.6 million, Rs. 0.877 went to Bhaktpur.) Next with 9 
percent was Jhapa, followed by Kailai with 5 percent. While 
Gorkha received no loans, Bara and Parsa together had only 
1,6 percent for which no explanation was available. Pre­
sumably Bara and Parsa had received substantial loans from 
Compulsory Savings through Ward Committees, 
In Bhaktpur, during the past ten years, nearly 1,100 
hectares of land were improved by terracing in the higher 
slopes and by providing drainage in the low-lying areas, A 
sizable amount had also been invested in irrigation. Of the 
cultivated area of 8,600 hectares, nearly 6,200 hectares get 
water for about ten months, the highest figure for any dis­
trict. Since Bhaktpur farmers used the maximum anount of fer­
tilizer for the country, this implies that these farmers have 
spent the maximum amount on purchased inputs. Even in labor 
input, Bhaktpur used the highest man-days per hectare (500 
against 250 in the Tarai), The increase in productivity and 
the increase in income helped the farmers to invest more on 
land both by way of fixed capital as well as operating capi­
tal. 
In the area of the technical trap caused by the size 
of holdings and the fragmented and noncontiguous nature of 
the holdings, data available from the selected districts is 
not sufficient. Considering the complexity of problems asso­
ciated with the heterogeneous nature of agriculture in 
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various heterogeneous areas, it is difficult to ascertain 
the magnitude of the roles played by different factors in 
the process of development. The problem of the size of hold­
ings and the nature of holdings require a broader setting or 
a broader picture of the economy rather than a district-
level approach. For instance, to associate the size of 
holding with the increase in productivity in terms of one 
input (per hectare) may be misleading. In the development 
process, land also becomes a variable input like labor (man­
agement) and capital. The problem of the size and nature of 
holdings will be dealt with in the following section from 
the point of national as well as regional economy. 
Observations made in the selected districts suggest 
that l) the district which has incentive factors, ceteris 
paribus. tends to use more modern knowledge and capital 
(e.g, Bhaktpur); 2) although incentive factors are necessary, 
they are not sufficient to increase productivity in the ab­
sence of infrastructures, knowledge and capital (e.g. Gorkha); 
and, as a corollary to suggestion (1) it may also be stated 
that 3) in the districts where incentive factors are absent, 
farmers seem not encouraged to use the modern knowledge and 
the capital even when they are made available (e.g. Bar a and 
Parsa). 
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An Explanation for the Failure of Nepal's Agri­
culture to Achieve the Target 
The discussions in the preceding chapter and the ob­
servations made on the performance of agriculture in the se­
lected districts show that if agriculture is to perform its 
role effectively in the national growth and achieve the ex­
pected goal, it is not the question of one siiigle factor that 
can make agriculture successful in fulfilling its objective. 
There is a whole range of interacting factors that must be 
satisfied before agriculture can perform its role effective 
ly. It was also noted that the range of factors differ even 
within the district according to the situation. 
The most obvious reason for the agricultural sector not 
being able to achieve the targeted rate of growth in Nepal is 
that farmers inter alia did not produce more than currently 
realized. It may appear a simple tautological statement. 
But this is nontheless the crux of the problem. The possible 
reason for not producing more by Nepalese farmers could be: 
1) they are conservative and nonresponsive to more productive 
methods of production, or 2) the environment within which 
they have to operate the farms does not provide opportunities 
and incentives to increased production, 
Nepalese economist Dr. Y. P. Pant believes Nepalese 
farmers are essentially more conservative, though earlier he 
mentions them "as efficient as other fellow cultivators in 
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advanced countries," He writes, "But they are essentially 
more conservative and fatalistic in their views. Due to 
their conservative outlook and illiteracy they are reluctant 
to use A'ood seeds, compost manures, chemical fertilizers, 
improved techniques of cultivation, irrigation water and 
pesticides on their own initiative (R6 p. ^3). 
Mr. K. B, Malla, an agriculturist by profession, who 
now occupies the position of the Chief Secretary to His 
Majesty's Government of Nepal and who has probably contrib­
uted more than any other single individual to shaping the 
Government's present nature of agricultural development in 
Nepal, finds Nepalese farmers just the opposite of what Pant 
believes. Malla observes: "Nepalese farmers are responsive 
to change. The most encouraging lesson of the past almost 
two decades' experience is that, unlike the reported resist­
ance to change by farmers in some parts of the world, Nepal­
ese farmers accept change when they have the knowledge, the 
skills, the inputs and incentives. This has been demonstrated 
in Kathmandu, Chitwan, numerous places along the Tarai and in 
some hill areas" (66 p,4). 
The facts Indicate that to attribute low agricultural 
productivity to "the cumulative effect" of the conservative 
outlook and fatalistic attitudes of Nepalese farmers is no 
less than a grossly misleading and overly distorted view of 
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the real matter of fact. It is no longer true, probably 
never was true, that Nepalese farmers are not responsive to 
change or that their conservatism has prevented them from 
using modern methods of farming, e.g. the farmers in the 
Kathmandu Valley. They have responded to change whenever 
such opportunity came. It was not the lack of response to 
change, but it was merely the lack of a progressive struc­
ture with incentive, adequate capital and knowledge that kept 
them bound to the traditional farming. They have always as­
pired to more income and a better way of life. 
Frequent studies have shown that farmers want to pos­
sess the most prized pair of bullocks in the village so as 
to grow the best crop of the village on their farms. If they 
were satisfied with a bullock cart ten years ago, they now 
want a bicycle in addition to the bullock cart. They do not 
shun a transistor radio, nor a tubewell in place of a dug-in 
open well. If twenty years ago, the choice was between 
sending a son to school or keeping him in farm work, now for 
farmers with better incomes the choice is between sending a 
son and daughter to a village or district school or to 
Kathmandu and an English boarding school. Farmers also know 
that it all requires money and they need to earn that money. 
If the means are there, and if one shows them a better way of 
farming to earn more income, and if they are sure that they 
and their families will be the beneficiaries of that income, 
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seldom will one ever find the Nepalese farmer refusing that 
opportunity, and turning to his old unproductive practices 
and considering his life a fait accompli. District perform­
ance figures support these statements. 
The exodus of farm boys to enlist in foreign armed 
forces, the millions of farm terraces carved by hand in the 
steep hills overlooking the formidable chains of mountains, 
the toil of Tarai farmers in the damp jungles bear evidence 
of the hard work of Nepalese farmers - not only to earn a 
subsistence for their families but also to provide a living 
for those who resided in palatial buildings and, in addition, 
to build such buildings. They would certainly have liked to 
provide a shelter for their family in a stone or brick-built 
house instead of in a thatched hut. 
If the situation is such that the farmer is uncertain 
about the outcome of an extra input but is certain that the 
additional benefit will go to someone else, whereas if there 
is a loss only he and his family will suffer it and if he 
also knows that his and his family's very existence on the 
farm is uncertain, he had better be a "conservative* than a 
"progressive" farmer. Only the farmer who operates on a sub­
sistence level knows how substantially high is the marginal 
utility of a rupee lost and that of a rupee gained under these 
circumstances. 
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The reason agriculture failed to achieve its target 
and the Nepalese farmer did not produce seem to lie in the 
fact that 1) the situation of tenant-at-will, rack-renting, 
usurious money lending, and small size of holding and non­
contiguous tiny parcels of land leave him with little incen­
tive; 2) the lack of tested knowledge regarding better farm 
practices and the lack of facility to procure them, even 
if they were available and 3) the lack of capital to own a 
farm, to bring water into the field and to improve the farm­
land, and the lack of capital to buy better inputs, deny him 
the opportunity to farm in a better manner. 
1, Since nearly 60 percent of the farms or about 40 
percent of the cultivated land is operated by tenants (ex­
cluding the manager-run farms) and the tenants bear all the 
cost of production but receive only 50 percent of the pro­
duce, the total production of agriculture in Nepal is bound 
to be less than the "optimum" level of owner-operated farms. 
Professor Heady maintains that "an Industry composed of ten­
ants would have a supply function to the left of that for an 
industry composed of owners" (17 p. 588), 
Using Heady's illustrations (1? pp. 507-588) one can 
examine the effects of tenancy and the production level for 
tenant- and owner-run farms. 
The owner-operator maximizes his profit when the mar­
ginal product is equal to the factor/product price ratio for 
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for each resource. A tenant maximizes his profit by equating 
the share of marginal product he receives to the factor/prod­
uct price ratio multiplied by the proportion of input cost 
he furnishes. 
If rents are fixed at 1 - r proportion of product for 
landlord and r proportion for tenant, while the tenant fur­
nishes s proportion of the input x^, the tenant profit is 
maximized when; 
= 3 ^ 
^"1 ^ 
P 
37 _ S xi 
~&Xi ^ Py 
Since in Nepal the tenant has r = 0.5 and s = 1, we 
—1 
have the ratio sr =2. This means that the marginal pro-
th 
ductivity of the i nonland resource for the Nepalese tenant 
must be twice that for the owner for maximum tenant profit. 
Under this situation the Nepalese tenant can double the mar­
ginal productivity of the resource, given a production func­
tion identical to that of the owner-cultivator, by decreasing 
the input of the resources rather than by increasing them. 
If all the farms were operated by tenants under the 
present rental system, the total production of agriculture in 
Nepal would more likely be less than it has been. Conversely, 
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productivity in agriculture in Nepal can be increased more 
than it is today if: a) all tenants are made owner-opera-
tors, or b) rents are reduced substantially, or c) land­
lords are made to bear an equal proportion of the cost of 
additional input. 
The performance of farmers in the Kathmandu Valley 
lends support to these assertions. The rents in the Kathman­
du Valley are fixed at an absolute amount, which is, on an 
average, 25 percent of the produce; in the rest of Nepal it 
is 50 percent (there are only negligible exceptions). The 
tenants of the Kathmandu Valley can use an input (e.g. ferti­
lizer of up to two-thirds times more than that of the rest 
of the tenants, other things being equal). That, in fact, has 
been done. The Kathmandu Valley uses more than 70 percent 
of the total chemical fertilizers used in Nepal, in spite of 
higher prices of fertilizer in the Kathmandu Valley as com­
pared to "the prices in the Tarai. 
2. The nature and the size of the farm holdings are 
other factors that have caused Nepalese agriculture to fail 
to achieve the target. The sample survey of the National 
Agricultural Census, 196I-62 (32), shows that the average 
size of holding for the country as a whole came to about 1.1 
hectares. Nearly 46 percent of the households, cultivating 
nearly 50 percent of the total cultivated land were between 
0.5 to 3.0 hectares. The remaining 8 percent of the total 
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households were more than 3 hectares in size and occupied as 
much as 39 percent of the total cultivated land. This shows 
that 92 percent of the total agricultural households had 6l 
percent of the total cultivated land, whereas 8 percent of 
the households had 39 percent of the total cultivated land. 
A survey conducted in the selected agricultural areas 
in 196^-65 "by the Ministry of Economic Planning and the Trib-
huwan University (36) also came up with similar information, 
which is presented in Table 33. 
In the Hills as much as 83 percent of the households 
in the selected areas were less than 0,5 hectares. In the 
Western Tarai 66 percent of the households in the selected 
areas were larger than 4 hectares. On the whole, the Hills 
had much smaller holdings ( 6 percent of the households were 
less than 1 hectare) followed by the Valley. 
Regarding the number of parcels of land cultivated by 
a household and the size of the parcels of land, it was men­
tioned earlier that the number of parcels of land varies from 
two to ten and the area of parcel or the average size of the 
plot was 0.09 for the Tarai and O.O68 hectares for the Hills, 
The number of parcels of land in five districts select­
ed from the Hills and Valley of the Tarai are shown in Table 
The percentage of households possessing one parcel of 
land is higher in the Hill districts (Dhankuta and Gulmi) and 
Table 33. Number of households by size of holdings and by regions^ 
Size in hectares 
Regions 
0. 5 0.5 -
0
 
H
 1.0 -. 2.0 2.0 -. 4.0 4. 0 Total 
Hills 350 
b (83)  57 (13) 14 (3) 1 ( 1) 0 ( 0) 422 (100) 
Eastern Tarai 52 (15) 69 (17) 117 (29) 92 (23) 70 (18) 400 (100) 
Western Tarai 6 ( 1) 26 ( 6) 41 ( 9) 77 (18) 285 (66) 435 (100) 
Central, Inner 
Tarai 15 ( 4) 28 ( 1) 76 (18) 164 (39) 136 (32) O
N
 H
 (100) 
Valley 207 (52) 120 (30) 65 (16) 7 ( 2) 1 ( -) 400 (100) 
Total 630 (30) 300 (15) 313 (15) 341 (17) 492 (23) 2076 (100) 
a ( 3 6 ) .  
b 
Figures in parentheses indicate the proportion of households in a 
respective size-group. 
Table Proportion of households according to the number of land parcels held 
in selected districts in 1961-62^ 
Number of parcels of land 
Districts 1 2 3 - 5  6 - 9  H
 0
 
1 H
 
14 Total 
Dhankuta 15.70 21.90 39.90 16.50 4.70 1.30 100.00 
Jhapa 5.02 31.38 46.44 11.04 4.19 1.93 100.00 
Kathmandu 20.29 H
 
H
 
O
 
30.58 24.04 10.06 2.92 100.00 
Gulmi 16.76 16.17 35.97 20,06 7.76 3 .27 100.00 
Banke 1.80 7.30 29.50 38.70 17.40 5.30 100.00 
a 
(32) . 
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highest among the group in Kathmandu. The average size of 
holdings, less than 0.5 hectares, also indicates the pressure 
of population on the land in these districts. 
The majority of the farmers in all the five districts 
had between 3-9 parcels of land. In Dhankuta, 6 percent of 
the households had more than 10 parcels; in Gulmi, more than 
11 percent; in Banke about 22 percent; in Jhapa, 6 percent; 
and in Kathmandu, 13 percent. 
The parcelling and fragmentation of land holdings into 
noncontiguous tracts tend to preclude the use of many im­
proved technologies which could yield economies of scale and 
proportionality. This, of course, depends on the stage of 
development. For instance, in the case studies, Bhaktpur has 
the smallest average size of holdings and the smallest size 
of land parcels, but at present it is also one of the dis­
tricts which has the highest per unit land productivity in 
Nepal. If one tries to establish the relationship of produc­
tivity with the size of holdings or parcels from this infor­
mation one may say that productivity is not affected by the 
size of holding. Given all the facilities that Bhatkpur has, 
one might as well ask, "Would not Bhaktpur have had a greater 
Increase in production than it now has if the size of hold­
ings were bigger and less noncontiguous?" No precise answer 
can be provided at this stage. Meanwhile, with the increase 
In cropping intensity and with the introduction of new 
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varieties of wheat and rice which require more labor, espe­
cially in threshing, the farmers of Bhaktpur have felt the 
need for a mechanical thresher. They have also found that 
even the smallest possible thresher is big when compared to 
the size of their harvest. 
Historically, increased productivity in agriculture, 
especially in the Western countries, is associated with the 
increase in the size of holding since this makes it possible 
to employ more effective methods of production and improve 
the technical efficiency of fixed capital. The experience 
in countries like Japan and Taiwan shows that productivity 
could be raised manyfold without any significant enlargement 
of farm size. In these countries the small size of farms 
has been in a way compensated for by a high multiple-cropping 
system ( 5, 81). 
In the Western Countries, Japan, and Taixfan, farm size 
and productivity àre measured under different contexts. 
Farm size in Japan and Taiwan is measured in terms of a sin­
gle input ; the land and productivity are also measured on 
the same basis. In the Western Countries productivity is 
measured in terms of land, labor and capital, all as varia­
bles. The conclusions derived from the experiences of Japan 
or Taiwan (similar conclusions may be drawn from the Bhaktpur 
case in Nepal) may be misleading under different conditions. 
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Under certain conditions the small size of holding or 
scattered holdings may also help increase production by 
necessitating, if pressure of population rises, intensive 
cultivation and, in case of scattered holding, "by providing 
a sort of built-in insurance against hazards and uncertainty. 
Such considerations are more likely to be sustained essen­
tially in a static sense. As long as farmers have no choice 
other than concentrating on the use of traditional factors 
of production, the size of holding per se may not have an 
appreciable effect on productivity. But once the process 
of development is introduced, this implies that changes will 
occur in the resource and product mixes. And for such changes 
to occur, the unit of operation must be above that of the 
minimum threshhold. 
Comparing the average size of a farm with those of 
other Asian countries, Nepal has slightly larger holdings 
than Mainland China, Japan and South Korea, but smaller hold­
ings than other countries, (Table 35). Althoucih the Tarai 
region has relatively large farms, the Hills have an average 
size per farm household of less than 0.5 hectare. For Nepal 
as a whole, 46 percent of the total farm households have less 
than 0.5 hectares. The agrarian reform programs Implemented 
during the Third Plan, although making a breakthrough, are far 
from providing a satisfactory Impact on the economy. No 
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program has been initiated regarding the economic size of 
holdings or regarding the problem of fragmented and noncon 
tiguous holdings. 
Table 35. Average cultivated area per farm household in 
Asian countries 
Country Year Av, cultivated area per 
farm household ha. 
Nepal 1961-62 1.105 
Burma 1938-39 3.520 
China (main) 1956 0.920 
India 1954-55 2.307 
Japan i960 0.884 
Korea (South) i960 0.874 
Pakistan 1956-57 3.769 
Taiwan i960 1.106 
a 
For other countries (5^ p. 213). 
3. The provision of credit and modern input supply, 
as explained in the preceding chapter, has not made any 
headway into the rural areas. Apart from the lack of proven 
varieties of better seeds, the dissemination of knowledge 
of better farm management practices and the general agricul­
tural extension service and research activities, and new cred­
it institutions are still entrenched in administrative in- -
efficiencies and in organizational wrangles. The coopera­
tives envisaged as a vehicle to carry credit and distribution 
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functions into the rural areas have emerged as a failure. 
Market structures, the distribution system, and the sectoral 
market interdependence have not showi signs of improvements. 
Investments in agriculture, either through the private 
sector or public sector, have not moved to the extent of ex­
pectation. Progress in irrigation and water management is 
lagging behind; only 11 percent of the total cultivated area 
is irrigated. Much of the chemical fertilizers has not 
moved out of the godowns.^ 
The gap in the performance of the economy lends support 
to the earlier proposition that agriculture is the core com­
ponent in the development system in Nepal and its develop­
ment must therefore be considered in the context of the over­
all economy. It also shows that agricultural production can 
be increased and it can make substantial contributions to 
the overall growth, if the persistent problems and the inher­
ent obstacles that are present in the system are remedied. 
The sale of chemical fertilizers in Nepal, 1963-64 to 
1968-69 (nutrients in metric ton)®' 
1 
Year N 
3^5 
370 
3^2 
P 0 
2 5 
K 0 
2 Total 
592 
19&T?4 
1964-65 
1965-66 
1966-67 
1967-68 
1968-69 
1,070 
1,839 
3,050 
90 
180 
90 
276 
728 
900 
w-
42 
12 
104 
167 
225 
1,450 
2,734 
4,175 
444 
a 
(45, 48). 
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The policy Implications of these observations and find­
ings may be "briefly restated. Since the major policy ob­
jectives of economic development are to increase per capita 
real income and to provide social justice, these objectives 
may be specified as: (l) maximization of products (income), 
and (2) optimization of the distribution of income. 
To accomplish these, the process of economic develop­
ment implies that the traditional self-contained type of 
economy moves toward the modem exchange economy where sector­
al interdependence gets reinforced through outflow and inflow 
of products and resources - between and among the sectors. 
The implications of moving toward the modern exchange economy 
are that the conditions must be made consistent in the policy 
framework to satisfy the mlnimax concept of allocating and 
utilizing the factors of production in such a manner that 
their costs are minimum, or if the cost given, the production 
is maximum, producing that output which will equalize the 
marginal social cost to the marginal social returns. 
It follows then that, conceptually, the farm, the unit 
of production, needs to be viewed in the context of a busi­
ness firm in the Hicksian sense. This is possible only if 
the structures, economic as well as institutional, allow 
for a perfect association of cost and benefit. With the eco­
nomic and institutional control over his unit of production, 
the farmer (the dlsion maker) would have greater flexibility 
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in choosing the production plan, in a dynamic sense, so that 
it would bring him a greater positive value of flow of ser­
vices (satisfaction). Then - in the context of decision 
making - land, labor and capital can become dependent varia­
bles (the degree of dependence depending on the stage of de­
velopment) , and given the competitive nature of agricultural 
industry, the consideration of profit maximization would 
lead to efficient configuration of resources. 
With this sketch as a premise for development policy 
implication, which is the subject for the next chapter, the 
failure of Nepalese agriculture to meet the target may be 
briefly summarized as follows; 
The economy predominantly traditional agriculture with 
little support from the modern sector, suffers from the 
problems of land tenancy, market structures, labor redundancy, 
lack of modern technical knowledge, and capital inefficiency. 
The problems are related to incentives, knowledge and capi­
tal, which were earlier characterized as "structural traps" 
and have hindered the growth of the total economy. 
The disassociation of benefit from cost that is 
brought about by the prevailing tenancy abd marketing systems 
is the "incentive trap" of a technical nature. 
The lack of proven varieties of better seeds, of infor­
mation regarding improved farm practices, cropping patterns 
and production techniques suitable to the different 
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a%ro-cllmatlc regions of the country, and the inefficient 
communication facilities to disseminate the knowledge of 
better farm management practices provide for the "knowledge 
trap." 
High fixed costs associated with the land that pre­
vent a tenant from becoming an owner, high fixed costs asso­
ciated with irrigation and water management, land improve­
ment and drainage, and financing and credit for purchasable 
inputs are "capital traps," 
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CHAPTER VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING THE 
FOURTH PLAN (1970-71 - 1974-75) 
The analyses in the preceding chapters have shown that 
the current tempo of economic activity in Nepal is insuffi­
cient to meet the economic objectives of bringing about sig­
nificant improvements in the productivity and living standards 
of the people. The achievements in the Third Plan may well 
fall short of the targeted growth by 40 to 50 percent. It was 
also seen that agriculture formed the key component in the de­
velopment process and the lag of growth in this sector held 
back the total economy. 
In an attempt to identify and appraise the causes for 
the slow rate of growth in the agricultural sector, three hy­
potheses - the delimiting, the diagnostic, and the remedial -
were advanced and verified to the extent that available data 
permitted. The preceding chapter dealt with the first two 
types of hypotheses with the objective of examining the per­
formance vis-a-vis the target and identifying and appraising 
the elements that hindered or contributed to the growth of the 
economy. Some of the failure elements identified and examined 
were l) the failure to integrate agricultural development as 
a core component into the process of overall development; 2) 
the failure to improve the agrarian structures: high rents, 
insecure tenancy, inefficient organizations for credit and 
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and factor and product distribution, especially at the village 
level; slow progress in agricultural research; 3) the failure 
to improve upon the extension service; and k) the lack of in­
vestment in irrigation, water management and land improvement. 
In the districts where these failure elements were di­
minishing, success in the development of agriculture had 
moved at a satisfactory rate (e.g. the Kathmandu Valley). 
The success element in developing agriculture in the rest of 
the districts lies, therefore, in the reform of the structures 
(as identified above) that have proved a hindrance. The pres­
ent chapter suggests modifications and to strengthen success 
elements in the development process, especially in developing 
the Fourth Plan, with emphasis on the,agricultural sector. 
Implications for developing the Fourth Plan are presented in 
terms of the national economy, size and structure of the Plan, 
modifications for agricultural development and modifications 
in agrarian structures. 
The National Economy 
The development Plans in retrospect Nepal's efforts 
at development planning in the last fifteen years have included 
both successes and failures. In examining the successes and 
failures in the development process, no deliberate attempt is 
made in the present study to make a comparative evaluation. 
The areas of successes are new while the areas of failures 
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have been entrenched in the system for over a century. With 
this fact in mind, an examination of the performance of the 
development process in the last fifteen years provide reasons 
to be optimistic regarding the future growth in the economy 
and the prospects for development in Nepal. 
Such optimism springs from the realization among the 
people of their dissatisfaction with the status quo and the 
awareness of the failures in the areas of development - better 
institutions, better organizations, and better ways of de­
velopment. This phenomenon has put the people in search for 
effective ways of development - better institutions, better 
organizations, and better ways of production and distribution. 
The impression given by an examination of the economic devel­
opment of Nepal is that the country is undergoing the process 
of experimentation - political, social and economic. There 
are, therefore, a large number of factors to be brought under 
control before a dynamic growth process can be initiated in 
the economy to engender a visible impact on the living stand­
ards of the people. 
The major areas of success are seen in the establish­
ment of foundations for education and training. New skills 
have been acquired to use the modern inputs and the modern pro­
duction practices. Institutions have been established for 
research and for the dissemination of new knowledge. New in­
dustries have been introduced and industrial infrastructures 
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are being gradually extended. Areas in the countryside have 
been opened to settlement by the construction of roads and air­
fields. Public administration is in the process of moderniza­
tion, There has been some remarkable progress in the area of 
public health, for instance, malaria eradication and control 
of major diseases such as typhoid and cholera. While these de­
velopments provide reasons to be less apprehensive concerning 
the future of Nepal, there is little room for complacency. 
There is yet a long way to go to put these development process­
es into practice. 
The most striking failure in the development efforts in 
Nepal has been the failure in the planning process itself. 
Apart from the weaknesses in the Government organization and 
the techniques in planning, the determination and commitment 
from the Government and its leaders is sadly lacking. The 
planning process has fallen into the disarray of experimenta­
tion because of the extreme flexibility in its design and the 
Government's lack of commitment and determination in the per­
formance and implementation of specific functions. 
Dr. Devendra Raj Pandey, under-secretary in the Ministry 
of Economic Planning, observes: "An examination of our experi­
ence so far indicates a practice of putting greater emphasis 
upon creating elaborate structures than upon functional compli­
ance. The structural emphasis has been both the cause and ef­
fect of our apparent illusion that establishment and 
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continuation of a central planning organization of one kind 
or another alone will ensure effective planning. . . . The 
planners in Nepal will have to eat their pride and accept 
the fact that, except for brief intervals, there has been lit­
tle planning as such in Nepal" (83). 
Development planning still continues to be a rather 
elusive concept in Nepal, The aggregate national plans have 
been drafted and promulgated, but in terras of policy changes 
and execution of programs they have had little impact. De­
spite the existence of the formal plans, development planning 
has not yet resulted in a determined national commitment, 
functioning to accelerate economic development through ration­
al and coordinated policies and programs. It is surprising, 
1 
therefore, to find that some growth took place even under 
such conditions. 
There is no doubt awareness of disappointing perform­
ance; however, much of the self-criticism has not been pushed 
through to the cores of the problems that have hindered the 
development planning. Instead it has fallen back on modifica­
tions of the structure, which have turned out so far to be a 
proliferate breeder of organizations - commissions, committees, 
_ 
In a period of fifteen years (from 1955 to 1 9 6 9 ) ,  the 
planning organization was reconstituted eight times and the 
planning secretariat (ministry) was headed by nine different 
secretaries. 
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departments and so forth - rather than an effective performer 
of a committed task. Planning has thus been misconceived as 
merely having symbolic status. The least consideration has 
been given to its functions and realistic capabilities. 
Similar is the case with the executive branches or the 
ministries of the Government, The Ministry of Agriculture Is 
such a case in point. It has passed through the spate of 
eight or nine organizational experimentations in the past fif­
teen years. Except for changing the legal pad of the Ministry, 
It has had little impact on policy formulation, Investment pro­
gramming or the Implementation required for the resurgence of 
the agricultural sector - pointing to such critical areas of 
action as agrarian reforms, extension service, research, credit 
and overhead capital to enhance agricultural productivity, 
A development policy in agriculture is conspicuous by 
its absence In program formulation. The agricultural develop­
ment policy is said to have placed emphasis upon "an integrated 
development program based upon specific objectives rather than 
piecemeal projects and programs" (31 P. 27 ). This has in es­
sence resulted In the proliferation of organizations and com­
mittees, which were noted in Chapter IV. New ideas and con­
cepts were visualized and put into practice, but there was 
little consideration for their execution or implementation. 
The striking example Is the Compulsory Savings Scheme, Noble 
Ideas were invented or borrowed and applied without due 
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consideration to the local situation and the realities of 
the rural areas. The result is a failure, e.g. the coopera­
tives, Similarly, in the implementation of the programs, 
rules, procedures and guidelines are specified, job descrip­
tions and activities are written down and circulated, but dis­
ciplines to follow through are seldom maintained. Such is 
the case with the Coordinated Agricultural Development Program. 
These happenings have led many to believe incorrectly 
that a list of activities by itself constitutes progress. Ac­
tivities are not interpreted in terms of their actual achieve­
ment but, rather, are confused with their stated function. 
This has misled some of the people into becoming complacent 
about the development efforts. Such instances abound. Vil­
lage development programs in the First Plan ended with the es­
tablishment of 55 village development centers at the cost of 
Rs. 26.7 million, the second highest amount of investment 
made on any activity in the Plan. It was no doubt a remarkable 
accomplishment to establish 55 centers exceeding the Plan tar­
get of 48 centers. But it did not take long to find out that 
although the community development approach through village cen­
ters may have been good for other countries, it was no good for 
Nepal. The remains of village development activities are seen 
in the ruins of buildings and offices built up to the plinth 
level and abandoned in places like Janakpur, and in the unused 
equipment and machinery dumped as useless in several places. 
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Agriculture experienced another flurry of activities in 
the Second Plan and in the first two years of the Third Plan 
in establishing agriculture experiment stations. Agricultural 
research farms and research stations were opened and abandoned 
or neglected (e.g. Dhankuta, Jiri, Bokhara and Doti). Cam­
paigns were launched to increase production, such as to grow 
more rice, grow more wheat, grow more corn, grow kitchen gar­
dens, and so forth. The most discernible aftermath of these 
campaigns was the formation of the Coordinated Agricultural De 
velopment Program, which suffers from the lack of coordina­
tion. Similar was the case with the minor irrigation cam­
paign. Its only impact was the virtual paralysis of the Irri­
gation Department and the breakdown of the irrigation program. 
More than 80 percent of the technicians of the Irrigation De­
partment were involved in the campaign with a detrimental ef­
fect on the major irrigation programs. The minor irrigation 
campaign did satisfy the political purpose of distributing 
funds to the various districts, but it could not serve the 
purpose of bringing water into the farmers' fields. 
The failure of these programs indicates that although 
the concept of experimentation and the pilot project was 
understood, it was not sufficiently practiced to provide mean­
ingful Information and training for the personnel responsible 
for carrying out these programs on a national scale - the main 
reason for the failure of the national level programs. 
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The obvious lesson is that no matter how noble the 
ideas may appear and no matter whosoever initiates such ideas, 
they must be tested properly and the techniques to implement 
them must be mastered before they are successfully carried out 
at a national scale. The success of the Fourth Plan, which 
will have to achieve a much higher rate of growth to make up 
for the shortage of the rate of growth in the Third Plan, 
very imch depends upon the avoidance of such mistakes. 
The national growth target Nepal has set a long-
term target of doubling the national income in fifteen years 
and of increasing per capita real income by 62 percent by 
19^0. The target for 1965-70 was set to increase the per cap­
ita real income by 9.0 percent. The performance in the first 
four years of the Third Plan shows that the annual growth in 
the per capita income has been only 0.9 percent, as against 
the annual target of 1,8 percent. The population is estimated 
to have increased by 2.1 to 2,2 percent during the Third Plan 
while the projected estimate was 2,0 percent. Making allow­
ances for the gap in growth during the Third Plan and the in­
crease in population, the annual aggregate growth between 1970 
71 and 197^-75 will have to be 6 percent and the per capita 
income will have to increase by 3.7, assuming that the popula­
tion does not increase by more than 2,3 percent, if the long-
term target is to be achieved. 
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The rapid increase in population has been another cru­
cial factor holding back the gain in per capita income. As 
shown earlier, the aggregate annual growth in the economy was 
3 percent, which is about 21 percent lower than the targeted 
Rrowth rate of 3.8 percent. But in terms of per capita growth 
it was only 50 percent of the target (0,9 percent against the 
target of 1.8 percent). 
If the present trend in the population growth is not 
checked, it is more than likely that the population growth rate 
will reach 2.4 percent before 1980. It is also equally likely 
that, if substantial improvements are not made in the economy, 
the present rate of aggregate growth in the economy may not be 
able to go beyond a 4.0 percent level. This means that there 
will be only 1.6 percent annual per capita income growth. If 
this happens. It will require 43 years to double the national 
income from its present level and by then, the population 
will have increased almost threefold. On the other hand, if 
Nepal succeeds in keeping the population stationary, even a 
5.0 percent Increase in aggregate national income would double 
the per capita income in about twelve years. 
The démographie pattern With the malaria almost erad­
icated typhoid, cholera and smallpox controlled, and the grad­
ual improvements in the public health services, the crude 
death rate from its early 196O level of 29 per thousand is esti­
mated to decrease to I9 per thousand by 1975. This could 
219 
easily reduce further to 12 or l4 per thousand in a matter of 
five or six years. The data in Table 36 show that the per­
centage decrease in the crude birth rate may be in aggregate -
6.6 percent in a period of fifteen years; the percentage de­
crease in the crude death rate could move to to 3^ percent 
and the population growth could increase by 43.7 percent. 
This has happened in other countries. In Ceylon, the death 
rate was reduced from 22 per thousand to 12 per thousand in 
just seven years from 19^5 to 19.52, after malaria was wipéd 
out. It took seventy years for England and Wales to achieve 
such a fall (72 p. 31). 
Nepal is among those countries that have high child 
mortality. In 1961, the ratio of young (less than I5 years 
of age)to the 15-59 age-group was O.7O. The present birth 
rate of 44 per thousand is at its limit of natural fecundity. 
It was only due to the high death rate (29 per thousand in 
1961) that the growth rate was held to 1.6 in the early 1960's. 
Since children become the first victims of malaria and 
epidemic diseases, the control of these diseases also brings 
about a sudden change in the infant mortality. Without a cor­
responding change in the birth rate, the result could be a 
rapid shift in age distribution in population toward younger 
ages (see Table 36). The increase in the number of children 
also means a sudden increase in the number of demanders, 
while the proportion of working-age population is diminished. 
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The proportion of working ages (15 to 59) will decrease 
from 55.7 percent in 196I to $1,6 percent in 1975 in the pro­
jection shown in Table 36. 
If the birth rate does not decline and the infant mor­
tality Roes on diminishing;, with the expansion of the longev­
ity of the working-age .group, it will be difficult to increase 
per capita growth. A consistently declining proportion of 
the population of working age will have to support the con­
stantly increasing proportion of non-working age. This will 
leave little resources to spare for investment. In addition, 
the increase in children would demand sizable increases in 
human investment (education, health) required for economic 
growth. 
The slower rate of population growth would in most 
cases make it easier to accumulate capital in the form of 
productive equipment, education and health protection. A 
slower population growth is likely, therefore, to stimulate 
the growth of the total economic products and larger total 
production, for a more slowly growing population means more 
rapidly increasing per capita income (78 p.23). 
The problem in economic development is based, there­
fore, both on economic and demographic factors. Professor Ken­
neth Boulding observes that in underdeveloped countries "inabil 
ity to cope with problems of adjustment to an unprecedently 
rapid rise in population and in the proportion of the young 
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Table 36. Actual and projected demographic patterns of Nepal, 
1961 to 1975^ (Population in million) 
Items 1961 1965 1970 1975 
Total population 9.39 10.0 10.97 12.23 
Male 4.62 4.95 5.47 6.11 
Female 4.77 5.05 5.50 6.12 
Birth/1.000 45 45 44 42 
Death/1,000 29 28 23 19 
Growth/1,000 16 17 21 23 
A%e-Kroup 
Less than 5 years 1.25 1.42 1.81 2.18 
5 - 1^1- years 2.37 2.59 2.70 3.03 
15 - 59 years 5.23 5.42 5.83 6.31 
60 years and above 0.54 0.57 0.63 0.71 
Group ratios 
Ratio of youn%^ to 
15 - 59 c 0.70 0.74 0.77 0.82 
Ratio of old to 
15 - 59 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 
Ratio of youncç and old to 
15 - 59 0.80 0.84 0.88 0.93 
Ratio of youn,e: to 
total 0.385 0.401 0.410 0.426 
Ratio of 15 - 59 to 
total 0.557 0.542 0.532 0.516 
Ratio of old to 
total 0.057 0.057 0.058 0.058 
a 
Projected from the 196I Census (35). 
b 
Youn% include those less than 15 years of a^e. 
c 
Old include those 60 years and above. 
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Table 36 (Continued) 
Items 1961 1965 1970 1975 
D. Children of school-
age (5 - l4) 
d 
Labor force 
2.37 2.59 2.7 3.03 
E. 4.30 4.57 5.04 5.68 
F. Density/sq. Km, 66 71 78 86 
d 
Labor force includes the population between the ages 
15 to 59, excluding household workers, students and 
the handicapped. In Nepal, nearly 78 percent of the 
population of the age-group 15 to 59 are estimated to 
be economically active. Nearly 40 percent of the fe­
male population are estimated to be economically 
active. The labor participation rate is estimated to 
increase to 46.5 percent of the total population by 
1975. 
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people may prevent them making the transition to a developing 
economy" (3 P. 104). 
The developed countries in the West and Japan made rap­
id economic development when population growth was low -
around 1 percent. In these countries large populations have 
grown up after and as a consequence of economic development 
(6l pp. 34-46). In Nepal, it has been the reverse. The popu­
lation growth is outstripping the economic growth. This makes 
development very much dependent on the decrease in population 
growth. If the rate of increase in population is not slowed 
dovm, even the best economic efforts will become nullified. 
The problem of employment The available informa­
tion is not sufficient to examine the magnitude and nature of 
the current unemployment level. The Third Plan has not set 
the target for employment, apparently due to the inherent dif­
ficulties associated with estimating the employment level. The 
current unemployment level (i,e, the people openly unemployed 
who are actively looking for work at the going rates and em­
ployment conditions) may be estimated at 15 percent of the 
total labor force.^ If the partially or disguisedly unem­
ployed are also included, this figure would go considerably 
higher, because of the existence of a large number of house­
hold enterprises where each individual's job is hardly defined. 
•4?his is estimated by using the sample survey data on 
labor mobilization, which had estimated 48 percent of the agri­
cultural labor force to be "surplus" (39). In the present es­
timate. those who do not look for employment at the going rates 
or employment conditions are excluded, e.g, the landlord class. 
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An examination of the demographic pattern and estimates 
(Table 36) indicates that in 1962, 0.420 million children 
were born and the population increased by O.15 million people. 
In 1971. 0,4R3 million children will be born and the popula­
tion will increase by O.23O million people, as compared to 
the 1970 level. This shows a considerable rate of increase 
in dependents. If the young people (less than 15 years of age) 
and the old (60 years and above) are grouped as dependents, 
the ratio of dependent to working age (15 to 59 years) will 
increase from the level of 0.80 in I96I to 0,88 in 19 
0.93 in 1975. This implies that along with the problem of 
providing more job opportunities for a larger number of people, 
there will also be the problem of providing higher real wages 
to the laborer as the number of dependents will be larger in 
the subsequent years. 
It was mentioned in Chapter II that in 1964-65 there 
were 4,56 million people in the labor force and 4,10 million 
of them were in the agricultural sector. In 1968-69, 5.03 
million people were in the labor force, out of which 4.34 mil­
lion were in the agricultural sector. Assuming that 15 percent 
of the labor force is unemployed and that the increased pro­
duction activities in agriculture envisaged during the Fourth 
Plan will provide employment for the estimated backlog of un­
employed labor force, the additional labor force brought about 
by the natural growth in population need to be provided with 
jobs outside of agriculture. 
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The total labor force for 197^l'-75 is estimated at 5-68 
million. In 197^-75, to keep the number of the labor force in 
the a.crricultural sector the same as that of 196R-69 ('+.3^'' mil­
lion), there will be 0.6$ million additional laborers that may 
need additional jobs outside of the agricultural sector. This 
is nearly three times more than was achieved during the Third 
Plan. (The number of labor force in the non-agricultural sec­
tor increased from 0.46 million in 1964-65 to O.69 million in 
1968-69). If this is achieved, then 76.4 percent of the to­
tal labor force will be engaged in the agricultural sector, 
as against the B6.3 percent in 1968-69 and 9O.O percent in 
1964-65. 
A. shift in employment of this magnitude is required to 
increase the degree of labor utilization in agriculture. 
However, it may be difficult to provide new jobs in the non-
apiculture sector to attract rural labor, unless there is a 
prospect of a significant differential output per worker in 
the non-agriculture sector, which would need to provide em­
ployment for as many as O.65 million additional people during 
the Fourth Plan. An examination of the past trend in employ­
ment shift indicates that it may be possible to cause a trans­
fer of labor from the agricultural to the non-agricultural sec­
tor to the extent of 6 to 7 percent. If this is achieved,then 
there will be about a 4.5 million labor force in the agricul­
tural sector by 1974-75. 
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The Size and Structure of the Fourth Plan 
The considerations of the required rate of growth, 
demographic patterns and the problem of employment underline 
the necessity that the size of the Fourth Plan will have to 
be substantially high. There appears also the need for chang­
ing the structure in the Plan so as to make the agriculture 
sector a contributor to the growth by removing the drag it 
has had in the growth of the economy. 
The estimated size and structure of the Fourth Plan in 
terms of investment to achieve the required rate of an ag­
gregate growth of 6 percent per annum is presented in Table 
37. 
Table 37. The GDP estimate and the investment requirement in 
the Fourth Plan by major sectors (Rs. in million) 
q Projected GDP Targeted GDP ^ Total 
^ in 1969=70 1974-75 investment 
Agriculture and 
forestry 4$51 (65) 5620 (60) 2.0 2138 (27.0) 
Transport, power, 
communication 420 ( 6) 7^9 ( 8) 8.0 2632 (33.3) 
I'lanuf actur in g, trade, 
tourism I61I (23) 23^2 (25) 2.2 I60A (20.2) 
Social services 420 ( 6) 656 (7) 6.6 1557 (19.5) 
Total 7002 (100) 9367 (100) 3.3 7935 (100.0) 
a 
Marginal Capital Output Ratio. 
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'l?he estimates of the GDP target for 197'l—75 are cal­
culated on the basis of a 6 percent annual aggregate growth 
for each intervening year^ The sector contribution to GDP is 
calculated under the assumption that only about 79 percent 
of the total labor force will be engaged in the agricultural 
sector and the remaining 21 percent will be in the non-agri­
cultural sector (transport, power, and communication 10 per­
cent, manufacturing and trade 6 percent and services 5 Per­
cent) , and the per worker product ratio of the agricultural 
to the non-agricultural will be 0.42. This ratio is slightly 
higher than the ratio observed in the Third Plan. This is 
d.ue to the envisaged larger percentage of shift of the labor 
force from the agricultural sector to the non-agricultural 
sector. 
The marîrinal capital output ratio (MCOR) is based on the 
estimates made by Dr. Bhekh Thapa (100). The MCOR was arrived 
at by "relating the average increment of capital to the average 
increment of the GDP" (100 p.30). Estimates are not available 
to calculate the actual incremental change in GDP on a year-to-
year basis and to relate this to the incremental change in the 
capital outlay. Besides, the estimates of the private sector 
investors are not available. The total investment outlay shown 
for the agricultural sector reflects mostly the monetized 
part of the investment. The non-monetized investment may be 
as hish as 12 - 1^ percent. The investment outlay shown for 
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the awicultural sector is mainly of a capital nature, hence 
the hifcher MCOR. 
It may appear at the outset an impossible task to pro­
vide an outlay of Rs. 7935 million in the Fourth Plan, which 
is about three times larger than the Third Plan. If the 
past trends of development outlay were considered, the pro­
posed size of the Fourth Plan may be within the reach. The 
contributions from the private and the panchayat sectors in 
Third Plan were estimated to be 30 percent of the total in­
vestment, Information is not available to determine the ac­
tual investment from these sectors; nevertheless, considering 
the activities of these sectors undertaken during the Third 
Plan, their contribution may have been well over 35 percent. 
The contributions from these sectors can be brought to the 
level of percent during the Fourth Plan by providing in­
centives for private investment. The development of industri­
al infrastructures and the backlog of technical skill acquired 
during the preceding Plans will provide some multiplier ef­
fects for growth in the private sector investment. 
If the contributions from the private and the panchayat 
sectors are brought to the 40 percent level, the total outlay 
for Investment from the public sector will come to Rs, 4791 m 
million, (Table 38), 
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Table 38. Investment outlay for the public sector and the 
private and panchayat sectors in in the Fourth 
Plan by major sectors (Rs, in million) 
Sectors Public 
sector 
Private and 
panchayat sec­
tors 
Total 
Agriculture and forestry 1275 86] 213% 
Transport, power and com­
munication 2211 421 2632 
Manufacturing, trade and 
tourism 496 1112 I6O8 
Social services 779 778 1557 
Total 4761 • 3174 7935 
The contribution from the public sector to the agri­
cultural sector is estimated at 55 percent of the total in­
vestment in this sector. This is partly due to the higher 
rates of investment required in irrigation and reclamation of 
land. In transport, power and communication the share of pub­
lic sector comes to about 84 percent. This is warranted be­
cause the contribution from the private sector may be neglible 
and the panchayat sector can make only some investment in 
transport. In manufacturing and trade development, most of the 
burden lies in the private sector. In social services such as 
public health and education, the private and the panchayat 
sectors' contribution is estimated at 50 percent. This may 
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appear low, "but given the fact that the Government will have 
to provide substantial amounts to support some institutions 
in the form of subsidies, and even the entire expenditure may 
have to be borne dy the Government in activities such as fam­
ily planning, the public-sector contribution should not be 
less. 
The public sector will have to mobilize resources to 
the extent of Rs, 4/61 million during the Fourth Plan, The 
total development expenditure during the Third Plan is esti­
mated at Rs, 1830,64 million and in the Second Plan at Rs, 
615.56 million. There remains substantial scope in the mobil­
ization of internal resources. The share of the Government 
revenue to the GDP was 6.5 percent (in 1968-69). Dr. Bhekh 
Thapa estimates that internal resources could be mobilized to 
the extent of 13 percent in the Fourth Plan (101 p. l4). 
This is still a low figure compared to those of neighboring 
countries see Chapter II), The other estimates by Dr, Puskar 
Pant (84 pp. 17-21) and Mr. T, M. Shrestha (99 PP. 24-32) in­
dicate the possibilities of raising the Investment level to 2 
percent of the national income. 
Assuming that the Government is determined to mobilize 
internal resources in the quinquennium of the Fourth Plan to 
the extent of 13 percent, Rs. 4958 million will be raised from 
the revenue (Table 39), out of which Rs. 1773 million will go 
for the regular budget expenditure. The rate of Increase in 
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the repcular budget during the Third Plan was on an average of 
12 percent per annum. During the Fourth Plan this rate of 
increase will be 10 percent. Even at this slightly reduced 
rate of increase, the proportion of regular expenditure to 
the total development outlay comes to about 22 percent, and 
nearly 36 percent of the total revenue will be spent on regu­
lar activities or on current outlays. The proportion of regu 
lar expenditure to revenue is high. 
Table 39. Estimated revenue Income and regular expenditures 
in the Fourth Plan (Rs. in million) 
Year GDP 
Revenue Regular Revenue 
income expenditure surplus 
1969-70 7002 442 ( 6.3)* 232 210 
1970-71 7422 574 ( 7.7) 256 318 
1971-72 7867 747 ( 9.5) 283 464 
1972-73 8338 917 (11.0) 317 600 
1973-74 8838 1060 (12.0) 334 726 
1974-75 9367 1218 (13.0) 351 867 
Total 4958 1773 3185 
a 
The figures in parentheses are the percent of the GDP 
in the respective years. 
The surplus from the Government revenue available for 
development investment will come to Rs. 31^5 million. This 
leaves a Rap of Rs. 1576 million to meet the public sector in­
vestment of Rs. 4761 million. This deficit will have to be 
met throu)i:h external assistance and internal borrowings. Ex­
ternal assistance during the Third Plan was Rs. 1019 million 
in the form of grants. It is plausible to assume that external 
assistance would be available to the extent of Rs. 1576 mil­
lion, if the Government is determined to mobilize internal re­
sources. The external assistance share of the public sector 
investment in the Fourth Plan will be 33 percent as against 
90 percent in the First Plan, 7R percent in the Second Plan 
and 57 percent in the Third Plan. 
Doubts may be raised regarding the administrative capa­
bility of the Government to raise this amount of revenue. In 
absolute amounts the figure appears large, but in terms of per­
centage increase on a yearly basis it is not really high. 
There was, on the average, an increase of 21 percent per annum 
in Government revenue in the Third Plan. In the first year of 
the Fourth Plan the revenue will have to Increase by about 29 
percent, in the second year it will be 30 percent, in the 
third year it will be only 15 percent. Since the exlstin.% tax 
rates are low and there is enough scope to increase the reve­
nue by changing the existing tax structure in agriculture, 
trade, and direct taxes, the suggested estimates of revenue are 
not beyond the capacity of the economy. 
Secondly, questions may be raised as to the absorptive 
capacity of the economy to utilize large amounts of invest­
ments. The past trends show that there has been an increasingly 
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higher rate of investment. In the First Plan, the avera,?e in­
vestment per year was Rs, 60 million; in the Second Plan it 
increased to Rs. 200 million ; and in the Third Plan the aver­
age was Rs. 366 million. In the Fourth Plan the yearly aver­
age will come to Rs. 9 52 million. The development expendi­
ture In the last year of the Third Plan (1969-70) is esti­
mated at Rs. 608 million. Compared to this figure, the aver­
age of Rs. 952 million may not be beyond the absorptive ca­
pacity of the economy. The experience accumulated in the past 
fifteen years, the growing numbers of skilled manpower, the 
technological improvements, and the groundwork laid in the 
development of infrastructures will facilitate the absorptive 
capacity. 
The Preliminary Draft Outline of the Fourth Plan (52) 
published by the Government has tentatively fixed the target 
of growth for the Fourth Plan at 4 percent per annum. There 
are no total development investment estimates. However, it is 
indicated that the total investment in the Fourth Plan may not 
be much higher than in the Third Plan. The public sector in­
vestment may stay around Rs. 2000 million and the share of 
domestic financing may be to the extent of 26 percent, with 
the remaining 'Jh percent coming from external sources (52 p. 
43). It also suggests that the Fourth Plan "should aim at 
creatine conditions required for a higher rate of growth in 
the future" (52 p. 35). To achieve this, the Draft Plan 
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recommends earmarking a substantial proportion of the total 
outlay for expansion and improvement of infrastructure fa­
cilities. The agricultural sector is accorded top priority 
for the reason, among other things, that it has a low capital 
coefficient and short gestation period, which may compensate 
to a large extent for the low rate of growth from investment 
in transportation and other overhead facilities. 
If a 4 percent rate of growth is accepted, then the 
lonçr-terin target of growth imist be discarded and Nepal must 
be contented with the lower rate of per capita income of about 
1.7 percent annually, which is about the same as that of the 
Third Plan target. To achieve this rate of growth, the total 
investment would come to about Es. 4851 million, assuming the 
average marginal capital output ratio of 3.3. It will not be 
possible to lower the ratio, if the objective of creating con­
ditions for a higher rate of future growth is to be achieved. 
The public sector Investment in the agricultural sector will 
be essentially of a capital nature (e.g. irrigation, land im­
provement, research, and training). It is not possible to 
have a low capital coefficient even in agriculture when there 
is a lack of basic overhead facilities. 
The analysis of the past performance and the considera­
tion of the capacity of the economy to save and invest indi­
cate that it is possible for Nepal to operate and execute 
a development plan three times larger than the Third Plan In 
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1970-71 and 197^-7^ and achieve a rate of growth of 6 percent 
per annuTn, The estimates presented are, of course, not so 
much a prediction of what will necessarily occur as they are 
an effort to show what must happen (and is possible) if Nepal 
plans to achieve a sustained growth in the economy. The es­
sential ingredient to make this happen lies in the political 
leadership and depends on how effective, willing, and able the 
leaders are to take the action necessary to achieve the tar­
geted growth. It also depends on whether or not those who have 
the effective will and knowledge also have the power to effect 
such actions. Professor Malenbaum observes, on the basis of 
the recent experience in developing countries, that". . . it 
seems unlikely that the economic case - however logical - will 
in itself prompt action; it is political factor which must take 
the lead" (65 p. 57). The choice is the continuation of pov­
erty or making a dynamic, really strong effort to develop the 
economy. 
Modifications for Agricultural Development 
The experiences of the past development efforts have 
demonstrated that the pace of development in agriculture sets 
the limit for the development and growth of the economy in 
Nepal. Agricultural production can be enhanced, it was shown, 
if conditions necessary for increased production are provided. 
The farmers responded enthusiastically to improved farm 
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practices. In the areas with facilities for higher produc­
tion, the farmers used high-yieldInp; seeds and fertilizers. 
The total increase in aç:gregate production was not very sig­
nificant only because many areas lack the necessary conditions 
for Increased production. 
The districts where agrarian structures were Improved 
have experienced tremendous boosts in production. This has 
made abundantly clear the fact that Improvement in the exist-
inff: agrarian structures Is a necessary condition for increas-
Ins; production. The creation of conditions necessary for sus­
tained srrowth in ap;riculture is therefore basic to the ap­
proach in the Fourth Plan, for the success of the Fourth Plan 
depends heavily on the performance of agriculture. 
The production target The targets estimated for the 
Fourth Plan suggest that the agricultural sector will have to 
contribute 6o percent of the total GDP. This means that the 
GDP from this sector will be Rs. 5620 million in 197^-75 s a 
23.5 Increase over the 1969-70 level. There will be a 4.7 per­
cent increase In aggregate production or 2.4 percent per capita 
Increase annually. The agricultural sector also includes for­
estry. However, in want of necessary information, estimates 
are not presented for this subsector. The production targets 
for various activities In agriculture, necessary for achieving 
the targeted rate of growth, are presented in Table 40 and 
Table '1-1. 
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The total food grain production target is increased 
from 15 percent in the Third Plan to 18.1 percent in the 
Fourth Plan. Among the crops, the paddy production target is 
increased substantially to 15 percent in the Fourth Plan as 
against 7.5 percent in the Third Plan. This is due to the 
fact that there is great potential left for increasins; paddy 
production by increased irrigation facilities. If the new 
high-yieldin% varieties of paddy are proven successful in 
Nepal, there will be a tremendous scope for further increase. 
Corn is also increased from 7.5 percent to 13.2 percent in 
the Fourth Plan. There was little effort made during the 
Third Plan to introduce better seeds both in paddy and corn. 
The Fourth Plan will have to devote greater attention to these 
traditional crops. The target for wheat is reduced to 77.0 
percent in the Fourth Plan as compared to the Third Plan. The 
Third Plan target for wheat and barley production was 179.5 
percent and the achievement is estimated at a 90.0 percent in­
crease over 196^-65 production. The lower target for wheat 
protiuction in the Fourth Plan is due to the fact that, unlike 
in paddy where irrigation water can be trained relatively easUy 
from monsoon rains, irrigation is becoming a limiting factor 
for winter crops. The area under wheat had substantially in­
creased during the Third Plan wherever irrigation facilities 
existed. 
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The Third Plan target In cash crops was a 73 percent in­
crease over 196'|'-65 and the achievement is estimated at about 
36 percent. This target was obviously unrealistic. In addi­
tion, some of the factories such as sugar factories, envis­
aged in the Plan did not get started. The Fourth Plan target 
for cash crops is 4^'.0 percent. Experience indicates that it 
may not be possible to go higher than this. Other crops such 
as potato and pulses were not included in the Third Plan; they 
are included in the Fourth Plan. 
Tea is another cash crop which has so far remained al­
most neglected. Even the production figures are not reported. 
The manufactured tea production in I96B-69 was estimated at 
20,000 Kg. under the management of the Tea Development Corpora 
at ion established in 196.5. The tea estates in Ilam and 
Soktim which were planted around I865 were prosperous and were 
producing good quality, high-flavored tea until the 1930*8. 
Now Nepal imports tea worth Rs. 800 to 9OO million annually 
from India. The flavorful and high quality tea produced in 
eastern Nepal may have a good demand in Europe and the U.S.A. 
There was practically no progress in livestock and 
horticulture production during the Third Plan, The Plan did 
not fix production targets in these activities. Since Nepal 
is endowed with varying types of climate and also has diffi­
cult terrain, livestock and horticulture production demand 
greater attention during the Fourth Plan. 
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Table ^t-0. Crop production targets for the Fourth Plan 
Expected 
Crops production Target Percent of 
1969-70 1974-75 change 
(in .000 metric tons) 
Cereal grains 
Paddy 2353 2706 15.0 
Corn 915 1036 13.2 
Wheat 260 460 77.0 
Barley 30 33 11.0 
Millets and others 120 120 — 
Total 3678 4355 18.1 
Cash crops 
Surrar cane 200,0 310.0 55.0 
Jute 40.0 50.0 25.0 
Oilseeds 58.0 70.0 20.7 
Tobacco 7.5 10.0 33.3 
Tea - -
Total 305.5 440.0 44.00 
Other crops 
Potato 320 384 20.0 
Pulses 72 87 20.8 
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Table 4l. Meat, fish and fruit production targets for the 
Fourth Plan 
Expected 
Items production Target Percent of 
1969-70 1974-75 change 
(metric tons) 
Fruits 266,000 277,000 4.0 
Meat^ 54,000 71.000 32.0 
Fish 560 1,040 86.0 
Milk 583.000 717.000 23.0 
Meat includes buffalo beef (4o%), pork (15^) » mutton 
(24.6%), poultry (13%), yak {7 Afo). 
The additional production in fruits (tropical and tem­
perate fruits) is projected mainly on the basis of the trees 
planted during the Third Plan. The production from horticul­
tural crops (tree fruits) planted in the Fourth Plan will be 
available only in the Fifth Plan period. To sustain the 
ffirowth in horticultural production, 10,000 hectares of addi­
tional land will have to be planted with fruit trees. Infor­
mation is not available to project vegetable production. 
The production target for meat is estimated on the basis 
of the existing slaughtering animals (810,000) and the pro­
jected supply of animals available for slaughtering. In 
241 
1974-75» 1.4 million animals (buffalos, 270; hogs, 205; and. 
sheep and goats, 665 thousand) and 7 million poultry will be 
required to meet the target of meat production for the Fourth 
Plan. Nepal presently imports about 16O thousand head of ani­
mals (mostly sheep, goats and buffalos). However, it may not 
be possible (by 1974-75) to reduce the import substantially 
and at the same time increase meat consumption by 32 percent 
during the Fourth Plan and thus raise the annual per capita 
consumption from 5.1 Kg, in 1969-70 to 5.6 Kg, 
In fish production, nearly 375 metric tons is estimated 
to be produced from the public sector commercial fish farms 
established in the latter part of the Third Plan, Lake and 
pond fish production is estimated to increase from 4l0 metric 
tons in 1969-70 to H15 metric tons in 197^-75. There are no 
reliable estimates for river fish; this production may be 
about 250 metric tons in 197^-75. To meet the target of fish 
production, nearly 5OO million fish fingerlings will have to 
be made available by 1974-75 for distribution from the govern­
ment and private fish-breeding farms, as against the estimated 
distribution of 100 million fingerlings in 1969-70. 
Presently more than 60 percent of the milk is consumed 
in the form of milk products (mainly as ghee - a clarified 
butterfat). The estimated milk production in 1969-70, if con­
sumed as fresh milk, would provide 53 liters per capita per 
annum. This will be raised to 58 liters by 197^-75 if the 
production target is increased by 23 percent is increased by 
PJl'2 
in 197^-75 over that of 1969-70, To achieve this, the herds 
of milk animals, 650 and 85O thousand buffalos and cows in 
1969-70, should be raised to 76O of 950 thousand buffalos and 
cows respectively by 197^-75» in addition to yaks, sheep and 
coats as milk animals (estimates are not available to make 
projections), or milk yield per animal should be raised to the 
extent of targeted additional milk production by better breed­
ing, feeding and management. 
Requirement of major inputs The development outlay 
for the agricultural sector in the Fourth Plan was estimated 
at Rs. 2138 million. The share of public sector outlay is Rs. 
1275 million. The breakdown of public sector within the agri­
cultural sector by major components will be: Agriculture, Rs. 
82S million ; Irrigation, Rs, 320 million; and Forestry, Rs, 
130 million. The investment from the private and panchayat 
sectors is envisaged to come mostly for operating types of ex­
penditures and less for capital nature investment. The public 
sector will therefore provide funds for overhead investment -
research, extension, training, and capital investment - irri­
gation, water control, land reclamation, aforestation, forest 
fire-line construction and forest surveys. 
Amone the major inputs considered for the Fourth Plan are 
1) additional land to be brought under irrigation; 2) new land 
to be cultivated; 3) use of chemical fertilizers; 4) use of im­
proved seeds; and 5) measures for insect and disease control 
(Table 42) 
Table 42. Estimates of major inputs for the Fourth Plan 
Items 1970-71 1971-72 1972-73 1973-7^ 1974-75 Total 
Additional area to be 
irrigated (ha) 30,000 40,000 53.000 40,000 45,000 208,000 
New land (ha) 4,500 5,500 5.500 5,000 4,500 25,000 
Fertilizers (N:P:K; 
2:1:1) (m.t.) 6,800 8,000 10,500 l6,000 24,000 
Improved seeds use (ha) 250,000 375.000 525,000 700,000 750,000 
Insect and disease 
control (ha) 30 ,,000 45,000 70,000 105,000 231,000 
ro 
-Gr 
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IrrlRation will have io be t:he major factor in increas­
ing: production in the Fourth Plan. Water is already becoming: 
a critical factor for Jtrultiple cropping and for the use of 
chemical fertilizers and improved seeds. The Third Plan had 
set a target of providing water for an additional 0,221 mil­
lion hectares of land - the achievement is estimated to bè 
0.130 million hectares. The total area under irrigation in 
1969-70 is estimated at 0.208 million hectares. It is pro­
posed to bring under irrigation 0,208 million 
hectares of additional land, thus making the total area under 
irrigation in Nepal by 1974-75 0,4l6 million hectares, which 
would be about 40 percent of the total cultivated area. The 
proposed target for irrigation for the Fourth Plan is less 
than that in the Third Plan. Experience shows that in the 
absence of the proper survey, feasibility and economic studies, 
the irrigation program in the Third Plan suffered a great 
deal. These problems still persist. Besides, most of the 
minor irrigation projects undertaken during the Third Plan 
will have outgrown their life-period. It is assumed that 
these projects will be kept at work by proper repair and main­
tenance. The share of contribution from irrigation to the 
additional production during the Fourth Plan will come to 
31 percent, about the same as the Third Plan target. 
In the area of reclamation of waste land and marginal 
forest land, the target of 25,000 hectares of land is phased 
2k s 
out on the basis of the experience of the Third Plan. Ex­
cepting the squatters, only about 12,000 hectares of land 
are estimated to have been brought under cultivation during 
the Third Plan through an organized resettlement program by 
the Government and by individuals. Apart from bringing addi­
tional land under resettlement, the Fourth Plan will have to 
accomplish a great deal in solving the problems of unauthor­
ized settlers, who are estimated to have occupied more than 
1 
20,000 hectares of land and settled unscientifically. This 
program is estimated to contribute 8 percent to the additional 
production. 
It is also envisao:ed that along with bringin.c^ the new 
land under cultivation and providing proper facilities for 
those squatters who may get authorization to settle, multiple 
cropping will contribute about 6 percent to additional pro­
duction during the Fourth Plan. Nearly 0.170 million hectares 
of additional area need to be brought under mltiple cropping. 
The Third Plan put a heavy emphasis on the use of chemi­
cal fertilizers. It envisaged raising fertilizer use from its 
almost zero level to providing R Kg. nutrients per hectare on 
the national a^cregate level. The achievement was 2.5 Kg. 
Ï 
Replying to a supplementary question in the National 
Panchayat, the Minister for Forestry stated that "some RO 
thousand people in about 300 places had settled unscientif­
ically, occupying about 30,000 bighas (20,^00 hectares) of 
land." (The Rising Nepal, August 7, 1969). 
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nutrients per hectare. The use of chemical lertilizers was 
expected to contribute 33 percent to the additional production 
durin.^ the Third Plan. The Fourth Plan target is to use 
24,000 metric tons of chemical fertilizers in terms of plant 
nutrients by 1974-75. Assumino; the present general rate of 
application (30 N: 15 l^KgO Kjr/ha) , 0.4 million hectares 
of land will use chemical fertilizers in 1974-75. Fertilizer 
use will contribute about 28 percent to the planned addi­
tional production. The use of chemical fertilizers, on the 
national average, will come to 12 Kg, per hectare in 197^-75. 
In 197^-75, 0.75 million hectares of cropped area is 
planned for the use of improved (high-yielding) seeds - paddy 
0.251 corn 0.16, wheat 0.20, and others, 0.l4 million hectares. 
This is expected to contribute about 24 percent to additional 
production in the Fourth Plan. Nearly 30 percent of the 
cropped area will have used improved seeds. The Third Plan 
envisaged the use of improved seeds on 0.80 million hectares, 
and the achievement is estimated at about 0.I6 hectares. The 
use of better seeds was expected to contribute 33 percent to 
additional production. 
Insect and disease damages in Nepal are estimated at 12-
15 percent. In addition to plant and crop damages, damage in 
storage may amount to 5 - 6 percent. There were no signifi­
cant measures taken to facilitate crop protection measures in 
the Third Plan, although the Plan set a target of using plant 
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protection measures 0.15 million hectares of land. Crop pro­
tect iotect ion measures will be provided for 0.231 million 
hectares by 1974-75• It may be as hard to save a quintal of 
crops from pests as to grow another quintal for the farmer in 
the absence of protective measures. And it may be much easier 
for the Government to provide crop protection than to provide, 
for example, improved seeds. Crop protection measures are ex­
pected to contribute about 3 percent to the additional pro­
duction by éliminâtinp: damage from field and storage pests. 
Diversification in agriculture Little is known about 
the possibility of diversification in agriculture except for 
the broad regional patterns determined by altitude and the 
a%ro-climatic conditions. Some information may be in-. 
ferred from studying the existing agricultural patterns. On 
the basis of altitude and agro-climatic conditions, the re­
gions may be broadly categorized as: l) the mountain region 
between the altitudes of 2,700 to 4,700 meters above sea level 
with villages at an average altitude of 3,600 to 3»900 meters, 
where yak and sheep raising is the main agricultural activity; 
2) the lower mountain region between the altitudes of 2,100 to 
2,700 meters, characterized by rhododendron and pine forest, 
where along with livestock, potato, buckwheat, and barley are 
grown; 3) the hill region between 1,200 to 2,100 meters alti­
tude, containing some of the fertile valleys, with mixed agri­
culture - livestock, horticulture, potato, corn, wheat, millet 
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and rice cultivation; 4) the lower hill region between the 
altitudes of 600 and 1,200 meters with several valleys and. 
river "basins where crop fanning (rice, corn, wheat, potato, 
sugar cane) and fruit-grovrinc; are practiced; and 5) the Tarai 
reorion between the altitude of 125 to 600 meters (inner Tarai), 
a fertile plain area which has tropical agriculture. 
No possible modification in the existing pattern of ag­
riculture can be planned in the absence of sufficient infor­
mation about the regions. Efforts should be confined primari­
ly to collecting information about the area. It may be pos­
sible to alter the cropping pattern and the animal husbandry 
practices if frost and drought resistance and short-duration 
crops are evolved and more productive breeds of animals are 
found that will adapt to the conditions in the upper regions. 
There may be, however, scope to diversify the cropping 
patterns in the lower regions (especially in the Tarai). The 
development Plans have mentioned "the need for diversification." 
The Third Plan laid emphasis on switching to cash crops (sugar 
cane, jute, tobacco) from the tradionally almost monoculture-
pattern of rice growing in the Tarai, It was planned to in­
crease the production of these crops by 73 percent during the 
Plan period. The achievement was about percent. In rice, 
the Plan envisaged increasing production by 7-5 percent during 
the Plan; the achievement came to about 7.0 percent. 
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Information is not sufficient for examining the compar­
ative advantages of growinp: different crops. The preliminary 
1 
findings of a recent study have raised doubts as to whether 
sugar cane can compete with monsoon rice and winter wheat. 
This may have been the reason for farmers * reluctance to grow 
su^ar cane in the Birganj sugar-factory are until they were 
attracted by subsidies and the Government's raising the price 
of sugar cane nearly double that of previous years. The case 
may be similar with jute. 
The crops that provide import substitutes, save convert­
ible foreign exchange, and earn such exchange by export need 
to be evaluated differently. It may be wiser to devote more 
attention to examining the nature and extent of diversification 
of cropping patterns during the Fourth Plan rather than empha­
sizing diversification on a large scale. 
Development in the Hills The development efforts car­
ried on during the past fifteen years have been concentrated 
mostly in the Kathmandu Valley and the Tarai; the Hills have 
remained almost neglected so far. As noted earlier, two-thirds 
of the total people live in the Hills, This indicates that the 
Ï 
The Economic Analysis and Planning Division of the Min­
istry of Food and Agriculture had performed the first round of 
study to examine the comparative advantages of growing sugar 
cane over rice plus wheat in Bara and Parsa in early 1969. The 
study is not yet complete. 
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development efforts carried on so far have favored only about 
one-third of the total population and have caused a great re­
gional imbalance. 
No doubt, agricultural development programs are difficult 
in the rugged mountain terrain, but they can be made success­
ful by assigning the land to its appropriate use. The lack of 
infrastructures in the Hills is obviously the bottleneck for 
development and, therefore, priority must be accorded to de­
veloping infrastructures in the Hills, Nevertheless, it would 
be futile to neglect the Hills now and wait for facilities to 
initiate the development work. 
The question, the Hills versus the Tarai in development 
priority, is an irrelevant question. It would be foolish, for 
example, to try to develop jute farms in the Hills and apple 
orchards in the Tarai. Both are needed and Nepal has the po­
tential to develop both. It is true that the return on the 
investment in the Tarai can be obtained in a generally shorter 
period of time than in the Hills. This does not, however, 
justify neglecting two-thirds of the area of the country, nor 
will it be prudent to think that" one-third of the area could 
contain the entire population. It is not necessarily true that 
the Hills cannot provide a living comparable to that of other 
areas. People have lived there for centuries. Living in the 
Hills has now become more difficult than before for the simple 
reason that the population has f?:one on Increasing without a 
corresponding increase in production. 
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The lack of loiowledge about the physical environment, 
the soil and the biological types adaptable to the environ­
ment is a factor that has limited development in the Hills. 
The agricultural experiment stations are mostly located in 
the Tarai. Information is not available to deal with the prob­
lems of hill-farming and high-altitude agriculture. This is 
one of the main shortcomings in the development of agriculture 
in the Hills. Many of the research findings that may be 
adaptable to the Tarai agriculture can be obtained from the 
experiences .gained in the research farms across the Gangetic 
plains in India and Pakistan. There is little work done in 
hicrh-altitude agriculture (livestock) elsewhere to draw on for 
information that may be suitable for the Nepalese Himalays, 
Since Nepal has most of its land in high altitudes, efforts 
must be made to develop research facilities In this area. 
Several experiment stations were opened in the past fif­
teen years. Except for obtaining budget approval, the Central 
Departments seem hardly to care to know about the performance 
in these stations (Chapter IV). It is not so important how 
many experiment stations are opened and budgets earmarked for 
them as it is to know what they are required to do and what 
they are doincî. 
It would be a wiser and more productive use of resources 
to establish well managed experiment stations only in the major 
ecological regions of agricultural importance, with a supporting 
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network of substations at different altitudes for verification 
and testing, to determine what Rermplasin, skill and farming 
methods would work in the Hills. These stations should be 
able to create a viable base for research in various branches 
of aocriculture - food and pasture crops, animal husbandry, 
horticulture and medicinal herbs. The present tendency of 
scattering experiment stations all over the administrative 
district units should be abandoned. Of utmost importance dur-
incr; the Fourth Plan is completing a natural resources survey 
in the Hills regarding land capability - soils, hydrological 
and natural vegetation. 
The mountains and hills which are now apparently consid­
ered a liability and a poor choice for investment, may turn 
out to be assets, not only in an esthetic sense (and to pro­
mote the tourism industry) but also in economic terms. Re­
search findings in the United States report that "It is possi­
ble to feed seven times as many people on crops consumed di­
rectly as it is on crops first consumed by livestock and con­
verted into meat, milk and aggs" (82 p. 42). Considering the 
comparative advantage the Tarai has in crop production, it 
may be comparatively uneconomic to produce meat and milk in 
the Tarai. The highlands in the Hills have barren stretches 
of grassland, unsuitable for food crop production (by so far 
known methods) and vast areas of stony and poor soil and there 
has not as yet been a truly productive use of this land. It 
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may be thus more economic to shift and concentrate livestock 
production (meat, milk and wool) to the Hills. Similarly, all 
the marginal forest land suitable for agriculture in the Tarai, 
instead of being developed as productive forest, could be 
converted into crop land and the land in the steep slopes and 
difficult terrain could be used for forest, thus developing 
watershed areas for the river basins and helping to prevent 
soil erosion in addition to producing forest product. 
The major areas of concern in the Fourth Plan to develop 
the Hills should be, therefore, to concentrate on research and 
surveys. The development in transport should have priority for 
opening up the best potential agricultural areas. There are 
areas in the Hills which can be profitably used for food-crop 
production by promoting the use of modern inputs, providing 
transport facilities. There are several valleys and river 
basins that may be developed further for profitable crop farm­
ing. 
Modificacions in the Agrarian Structures 
The analyses of agricultural performance in past years 
have shown that the defects and maladjustments in the agrarian 
structures impeded the growth in this sector and that wherever 
such defects were corrected substantial growth took place. The 
asrrarian structures identified as the success and failure ele­
ments wree related to three conditions examined in the preceding 
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chapters: incentive, knowledge,and capital. The analyses 
have made it clear that modifications in agrarian structures 
to remedy the defects are essential if agriculture is to 
achieve the targets of growth envisaged for the Fourth Plan. 
The agrarian structures that require modifications in 
the present context are: l) tenurial system - rent, size and 
nature of landholding; 2) marketing structures; 3) agricul­
tural research and agricultural extension; 4) credit and in­
vestment. 
In the context of developing peasant agriculture in 
countries such as Nepal, Japan's experience in modifying the 
agrarian structures is a case to consider. The development 
of Japanese peasant agriculture began mainly with three kinds 
of improvement in the agrarian structures: 1) land tenure re­
forms (70 pp. 9^-95; 2) land improvement, including better iri-
gation and drainage facilities (^4 pp. 99, 180) ; 3) superior 
seeds, increased inputs of manures and fertilizers, and better 
methods of cultivation (81, 55). 
Japan emphasized ownership of land for the majority of 
tenants through the abolition of absentee ownership. The 
rent was set low - one-fourth of the produce, and there was 
genuine security of tenancy provided. The land was valued ar­
bitrarily at a low price and repayment terms were made easy to 
facilitate the tenant's becoming the owner. These reforms led 
to the redistribution of property, income, political power and 
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social status in favor of those who actually tilled the land. 
These reforms thus provided incentives for increased produc­
tion in af^riculture. The basic proposition in these reforms 
was that"half-measures or attempts to satisfy both parties 
l_ landlords and tenants_7 could not bring about conditions 
under which those who cultivate the land would enjoy the 
fruit of their labor"(70 t". 95). Before the reform, $4 per­
cent of Japan's land had been owner-operated; after the re­
form it was 92 percent (70 p. 98). 
The Government played an important role as an investor 
in irrigation, land improvement and flood control throughout 
the lonfc period of investment. The Government also induced 
the landlords to invest substantially in land. 
Along with the technological advance in providing better 
seeds and better farm practices, the prices of rice rose pari 
passu, with the general price level providing incentive to 
improve practices of cultivation. Most of the landowners lived 
in the farming areas and many of them frequently acted as 
leaders in introducing new methods. Local and central Govern­
ments established experiment stations and extension services 
and provided technical and general education through the or­
ganization and support of the school system. 
Population growth was low. During 1878-1917, labor pro­
ductivity increased annually by 2 - 6 percent. The total 
population increased by 0.8 to 1.3 percent and per capita real 
income increased by 2 percent per annum (81 pp. 50-65). 
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The Japanese experiences indicate that the transition 
from a subsistence to a cash economy can be achieved if the 
incentive factor is strong enousrh to stimulate labor beyond 
the point where subsistence needs are satisfied. 
As determined earlier Nepalese agriculture is character­
ized by low yields but high rents, a low level of technology, 
a low level of income, small and scattered holdings, ineffi­
cient marketing and credit facilities, poorly managed re­
search and extension services, and little investment in land. 
It will require massive structural changes before agriculture 
can become a viable base for the growth of the economy. 
Tenurial modifications The policy of making the ac­
tual tiller ultimately the direct owner of the land is basic 
to the improvement of the tenancy structure. This may, however, 
require some time before it can be effectively Implemented -
to enable the transfer of absentee landlords to other occupa­
tions. Meanwhile, the provisions of the Lands Act, allowing 
the tenant permanent inheritable tenancy rights need rein­
forcement in their Implementation. 
The lack of up-to-date land records with clear identifi­
cations of land tracts has been a serious handicap in provid­
ing genuine security of tenancy. In the absence of these rec­
ords, the tenant is left without formal rights. Even in the 
areas where cadastal surveys were completed and the tenants 
were provided with tenancy certificates, evictions have taken 
place. The exist In?!; procédure or deciding', the case of evic­
tion in the rerrular court puts bhe tenant, in most cases, in 
a disadvantageous position due to his Ignorance, the time 
and money involved. This has encouraged the landlords to de­
clare the tenant an agricultural laborer. Informal and dis­
guised tenancy is crowing. During the initial period of im­
plementation of the land reform procrram (1965-196?) , the Land 
Reform Officer was authorized to deal with cases of eviction 
or any other malpractices concerning the tenancy. This ar­
rangement was more easily accessible to the tenant; the deci­
sion was quicker; and the cases of eviction were very few. 
Apparently it was too early to transfer eviction cases to the 
regular courts. There is a need to revert to the old arrange 
ment and to continue it for some years - until tenants get 
fairly settled. 
The rate of rent which is fixed at 50 percent of the 
principal produce is not only high but is also unscientific. 
In the first place, the 50 percent rate of rent precludes the 
use of purchaser! inputs such as fertilizers since the tenant 
has to bear-all the cost. Secondly, the fixation of rent on 
a principal crop will tend to make the tenant try his best on 
the second best crop and nef;;lect the principal crop. This 
will put a damper on increasing the output of the most profit 
able crop. This has already happened, A wise tenant would 
put his extra effort and resources into wheat, which is a 
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second crop, rather than into rice, of which he has to part 
with half. Unless the present rental system is modified, 
there will be little prospect for increasing production. 
The rent should be reduced to one-third of the level of 
the produce, fixed once and for all at an absolute amount. 
This is justifiable for both the owner who provides only the 
land, and the tenant who provides all the costs. Once the 
rent is fixed at an absolute amount, the tenant will have a 
better incentive for investing more in farming. With the 
provision of permanent tenancy, he will also be encouraged to 
make capital investments in land, as the capitalized value of 
the investment may eventually accrue to him. 
Under this modified rental system, with the present prac 
tices of farming, the tenant will p;ain, on an average, Rs. 200 
per hectare extra income. Then the Government would be per­
fectly justified to tax the tenant a minimum of Rs. 50 per 
hectare, in addition to whatever general land revenue increase 
the Government may decide on for all the land. The landlord 
now pays Rs. 75 per hectare as land revenue. Any further in­
crease in land revenue may be shifted to the tenant. If the 
tenant is taxed Rs. 50 per hectare, the total revenue would 
amount to about Rs. 24.8 million per annum, plus the general 
land revenue increases. 
The size and nature of holdings are important in decid­
ing the application of improved farm practices. To secure 
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positive increases in apiricultural production, the applica­
tion of improved knowledge and increased capital investment 
on a wide scale is necessary. These conditions are easier to 
obtain where land is worked and. managed in fairly large units 
than in the form of fragmented holdings. To keep pace with 
the expected chanp;e in the national development and. to make 
agriculture a Rrowins^ proposition along with the other sec­
tors of the economy, changes are necessary in the present size 
of holdings and the nature of discrete holdings. 
To a considerable extent the present Lands Act has helped 
in reducing the large size of holdings by fixing a ceiling on 
holdings, notwithstanding some of the cases where false and 
malefide entries have been made in several individual's names. 
There is an Inherent danger in the size of holdings getting 
decreased and the number of contiguous holdings per family in­
creased as the customary laws of Nepal allow equal distribu­
tion of parental land among the heirs. These laws of inheri­
tance will p^ain further influence once a system of land tenure 
and land use has been established. To arrest the deterioration 
in the nature and size of holding, the process of change would 
involve remedial as well as preventative measures. Through 
remedial measures, the size of holdings and the parcels of land 
are brought to a desirable level. The preventative measures 
would help maintain the level adjusted by the action of remedial 
measures. The •present land policy of Nepal will only help 
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remedy the formation of lar^c holdings. The breaking up of 
a larpie holding': has a built-in process that tends to make 
farm size too small and uneconomic and fragment and excessive­
ly subdivide the land, if measures are not incorporated in 
legislation to prevent such a process. The Lands Act of Nepal 
lacks such measures. 
It is essential, therefore, that changes be made in the 
present land policy and the Lands Act. The following lines 
of action with reference to improving and maintaining the 
economic size of holdings and preventing the fragmentation 
of holdings are suggested. 
1. Legislation should be enacted to prevent subdivision 
and fragmentation of holdinpçs beyond a floor limit of one hec­
tare, (This will vary according to the regions. In the Hills, 
considering the present state of agriculture and employment, 
the floor limit on holding could be 0,25 hectares.) If the 
distribution of land among the heirs leads to an irrational 
size of holdings and fragments, they may be required to sell 
the land to one of the heirs and if the buyer is unable to fi­
nance such purchase, a lonc-term credit,should be made avail­
able through the Agricultural Development Bank. Alternately, 
an heir could be asked to draw dividends on the share of his 
property or an usufructuary mortgage could be arranged for a 
definite period of time. 
This measure would helps a) curb capital rationing and 
prevent the farmer who stays on the farm from paying a high 
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fixed, cost; b) deter the speculative dealings on land; c) in­
duce the people to look for other opportunities rather than 
to stick to a small piece of land; and d) filter out those 
who may not be really capable in farming but stay there because 
they inherited the land free. 
(It will no doubt be difficult to apply this as a sweep-
in# measure. This can be started with those who already are 
engafzed in other occupations than farming, but still maintain 
the ri%ht to divide the land as heirs) 
2. Consolidation of holding may be effected by provid­
ing exclusive rights of purchase to the immediate cultivator 
of an adjoining plot when the land is offered for sale. This 
should include the prohibition of fractional sales of farm 
land beyond a certain size, ss noted above. 
The ranp,-e between the minimum and maximum price of land 
should be fixed by the Government on the basis of the pro­
ductivity of land. This will prevent the prices of land going 
too hiRh or too low. Land prices have been increasing enor­
mously in the past few years and thus much of the pros­
pective farmers' capital gets tied-in to the land, with lit­
tle money left for further improvements. 
3. Consolidation as well as increasing the size of hold­
ings to economic units may be enhanced by lifting the present 
restrictions imposed on the tenant (as ceiling on tenancy hold­
ings of 2.67 hectares) and by allowing him to cultivate land 
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up to the ceiling limit allowed for owners (17 hectares), with 
priority given to the assumption of additional land, when such 
land is available, to those who are cultivating the adjacent 
plots. This will enable the tenants to try to rise above the 
bare minimum of subsistence by making more efficient use of 
resources - which the existing law has prevented him from do-
inc. 
4. Consolidation and increase in the size of holding 
for more commercialization of agriculture may be ushered in 
by allowing the owner-cultivator to purchase land beyond the 
present ceiling limit up to a maximum of 40 hectares - while 
maintaining the present celling of 1? hectares as a rule -
only if such land is adjacent to the land he is cultivating. 
Restrictions may be set to allow him to hold his entire 
land, excepting homestead, in more than three parcels within 
a radius of 4- kilometers. This will, while encouraging con­
solidation, motivate the capable and enterprising people to 
join agriculture as a coimnercial venture. 
The ^<-0-hectare size of holding Is recommended for mak­
ing efficient use of farm machinery. The estimates in Nepal 
indicate that a tractor of 28-35 HP would require 40 hectares 
of land for its efficient use. The restriction on occupying 
farm land In more than three places will iscourage the pres­
ent practice of holding farm land in several places and making 
money from speculation rather than from farming. 
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These measures, while providing better opportunities 
for increased production, will not disturb social stability, 
nor will they adversely affect the distribution of property. 
The recom-iended increase in size will be only for those who 
have the capital and ability to work as farmers. Such people, 
presently, will be a few, and they need to be encouraged if 
aiTriculture is to play its proper role in the economic develop­
ment of Nepal. This will not create an unemployment problem 
when the present ceiling is maintained as a general rule. 
These are evolutionary measures and the process has built-in 
™ards that go on loosening along with the pace of the general 
economic development. 
Market structures The targets for the Fourth Plan 
and the development activities for agriculture outlined above 
are based upon the premise that there will be more use of 
better factors of production. This can occur when producers 
invest more capital and effort as required and they are more 
likely to do so if they expect to benefit. Improved tenancy 
system provides incentives for additional efforts. If the bet­
ter part of the additional benefit gained from an improved ten­
ancy situation goes to the traders and/or to the consumers, it 
alone is not sufficient to bring forth much effort. 
There has been little effort made toward building up ef­
ficiently functioning internal markets. The absence of trans­
port and communication facilities in most parts of the country 
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has also hampered the development in internal markets. This 
situation is gradually chancin#. The food shortage in India 
had created a brisk demand and a ready market for any kind 
or quality of rice. Nepal had, in a sense, a sellers' market 
for its food grain. This is now changing toward a selective 
buyers' market with the increase in food Rrain production in 
the Indian states across Nepal's border. The internal market 
is expanding as some of the interior areas are connected by 
roads. There are "new products" coming into the market, 
A small increase (from 15,000 to 20,000 metric tons) in 
wheat production, for instance, in the Kathmandu Valley in 
1967-68 caused anxiety among the producers. Until recently 
the production of wheat was small enough for home consumption 
on the farm. The Kathmandu Valley being primarily a rice-
consuming area, little market existed for wheat grain. Unlike 
in rice where there is a fairly competitive market and many 
buyers and small traders traveling from village to village buy-
infr rice for bigcer traders, there were no small traders to 
collect wheat for them from the villages. 
At present, consumption of wheat is increasing but the 
demand is for fine flour from the bakery in Kathinand.ù, The de­
mand is met partly from imports of fine flour from Australia 
and India as there is only one flour mill in Kathmandu that 
produces the desired flour. 
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The price of wheat in Bhaktpur was reduced from fis. 110 
per quintal in 1966-67 to Hs. per quintal in 1967-68 (49) 
while the cost of production increased from Rs. 66 to Rs. 73. 
The cooperative societies played a substantial role during 
1966-67 in the collection of wheat. Some of the societies 
bought and stored the wheat at Hs. 125 per quintal. The 
prices later fell to Rs. 102 per quintal; the members (mostly 
the directors, chairmen and managers) made substantial profits 
althoupçh most of the societies were declared bankrupt. 
These illustrations fairly represent the types of mar­
keting problems with which the Fourth Plan will have to deal. 
The approach will be fourfold as follows: 
1. To facilitate the creation of conditions neces­
sary for reasonably stable prices at a remunerative level. 
Timely market information and the knowledge about the 
market structures are prerequisites for creating such condi­
tions. This is required both for the internal and external 
markets. This facility should be established during the 
Fourth Plan. It may be premature and the facilities inadequate 
for the Government to enter into a price stabilization by 
procurement-policy during the Fourth Plan, 
2. To find satisfactory outlets for products. 
To find satisfactory outlets, Nepal should prepare 
itself to enter into the world market. So far this kind of 
problem has not arisen for India is the world's larr^est 
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importer of rice and Nepal's principal export is rice. Al­
though it is unlikely that India may be able to stop import­
ing rice in the immediate future, it is also unlikely that 
Nepal can benefit much by remaining always a passive seller. 
Apart from the problems of transit facilities, the 
grading, standardization and quality control of a product 
must be effectively carried out before making an effort to 
find a market. These facilities do not exist in Nepal. The 
production, utilization, processing and milling, and market­
ing of rice involves the largest amount of private invest­
ment in Nepal and is one of the basic industries. There are 
no grades, standards or quality dontrol in rice, except for 
the categorization of rice into coarse or fine types. And 
there are probably more than 500 varieties of rice grown in 
the country. One of the major problems is to cut back these 
varieties to a manageable number for efficient milling and 
quality control. While this will be the problem to be solved 
first by market research, efforts should be made in the Fourth 
Plan to provide facilities for grading, standardization and 
quality control and legislation for their maintenance. 
3. To, stimulate the development of an efficient market­
ing system. 
Theoretically coinpe.ti tive markets would tend to create 
an efficient marketing system, dince the underlying assump­
tion in such consideration, such as perfect market with perfect 
26? 
knowledge are not found to exist, more so in case of Nepal, 
the public sector has a role to play in its development. 
Often this locic has been stretched too far and the tra­
ditional organizations have been replaced by new cooperatives 
and Government agencies have been created for bringing about 
efficiency in the distribution system. However, experience 
with cooperatives and public sector enterprises such as the 
Food Hana^ement Corporation, the Timber Corporation and The 
Salt Tradin,e Corporation indicates that creation of such agen­
cies alone does not ensure efficiency in the market inn; system. 
Therefore, it would be unwise to ignore the private sector in 
the distribution system. The public sector participation will 
be necessary to lead the private sector to an efficient market-
insT system since Nepal is in its initial phase of develop­
ment and many imperfections exist. This necessity will have 
to be fulfilled by making the public sector a supplementary 
mechanism in providing guiding controls rather than as a sup­
planting device. Ultimately it is the private sector that 
will have to play the major role in marketing. 
Along with the development of market information and 
knowledge about the market structures, the public sector role 
should be directed toward promoting participation of the pri­
vate sector in the storage and processing aspects of marketing, 
by providing credit and, if necessary, by making feasibility 
studies and studies and surveys without charge. During the 
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Third Plan, the Nepal Industrial Development Corporation pro­
vided this service to some extent, but little work was done 
on storage problems. 
4. To facilitate the supply of agricultural inputs at 
reasonable prices where and when needed. 
There has been so far little use of purchased inputs 
in agriculture. The problem of supply of inputs has not 
been seriously felt. Now that farmers have begun using pur­
chased inputs - fertilizers, high-yielding seeds, pesticides, 
and equipment - and, as envisaged in the Fourth Plan,there 
will be a large volume of fertilizer, seeds, pesticides and 
equipment to handle, efficient distribution of these inputs 
will become a critical factor in promoting the use of better 
inputs and in achieving the targeted rate of growth. The 
policy decision regarding the supply of inputs will have, there­
fore, serious implications on the process of development itself. 
The role of the private sector in the distribution of 
agricultural inputs has been insignificant. The private sec­
tor may not be interested in carrying on business if there is 
little or no chance for profit. On the other hand, if it is 
allowed a larger margin of profit and the price is too high, 
the farmer may not be interested in buying. 
The use of chemical fertilizer was initiated in Nepal 
in 195^- by importing 100 metric tons of ammonium sulphate 
through private dealers. In 1963-64, the public sector entered 
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into fertilizer distribution when National Trading Limited 
Imported 2,000 metric tons of ammonium sulphate from the 
Soviet Union. In 1965-66, the .Agricultural Supply Corporation 
was established in the public sector and was authorized to 
function as the whole dealer and the sole importer of ferti­
lizer into Nepal. Notwithstanding its primary role as the 
wholesale dealer, the Corporation has been forced to enter 
into the retail business now and then, wherever the private 
dealers and the cooperatives did not come forward. On the 
whole, the private dealers' role in the distribution of ferti­
lizer has been insignificant except in the Kathmandu Valley 
where nearly 50 percent of the total fertilizer distribution 
is channeled through private dealers. 
Apparent reasons for the lack of enthusiasm in the pri­
vate sector for entering into the distribution of agricultural 
inputs are that the margin of profit is low (e.g. 5-6 percent 
commission on the sale of fertilizer) and the volume of trans­
action is small. The experience in the Kathmandu Valley in­
dicates that if the volume of transaction is sufficiently 
large and if there is a large number of competing traders, 
even a 5-6 percent profit margin is enough to attract the pri­
vate sector. Such a situation does not exist in other parts 
of the country. The only possibility of attracting the private 
dealer at present seems to be to provide a margin of profit suf 
ficiently larce to make for competition among the traders. 
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There seem to be three possible alternatives- for hand­
ling the distribution of agricultural inputs: 1) the Agri­
cultural Supply Corporation can function as a wholesale deal­
er and leave the retailing entirely to the private sector; 
2) the private sector can carry the entire business - import, 
wholesale and retailing; 3) The Agricultural Supply Corpora­
tion can enter the retailing business, along with its present 
function of wholesale dealership. 
The Importance of promoting the use of new inputs is 
that its use will pay more than its cost. The cost also in­
cludes the distribution charge, whether the distributing ser­
vice is provided by the private sector or the public sector. 
The private sector is generally more efficient to manage the 
distribution and thus can sell the goods at a cheaper rate 
than the public sector. There are other services such as edu­
cation, training, health, and public administration where the 
public sector has a direct major role to play and the private 
sector is not likely to make more direct contributions. It 
will not be, therefore, profitable and wise for the Agricul­
tural Supply Corporation to enter into the retail distribution 
of Inputs. 
However, there are some functions in the distribution 
process where public participation will be necessary, for in­
stance, the handling of foreign exchange components in the 
procurement of inputs. It is likely that the foreign exchange 
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released for importing fertilizer, for instance, would be 
used by the private sector in importing something else, such 
as liquors, cigarettes, nylons and other consumer goods where 
the margin of profit will be larger than in fertilizer. It 
is also likely that the foreign exchange (convertible ex­
change) would be sold to Indian merchants or goods be de­
livered in India, as has happened in the past. It may, there­
fore be necessary for the, public sector to engage in import 
until the private sector can be entrusted to do this job. 
The only alternative left is to continue with the Agri­
cultural Supply Corporation as a wholesaler dealer and en­
courage the private sector to carry the retailing job in the 
supply of inputs. Since it will not be possible to increase 
the volume of transaction immediately in all places, the prof­
it margin has to be more than 5-6 percent. There are possi­
bilities of increasing the profit margin. The price of in­
puts, especially fertilizer, the farmer buys in the Tarai has 
to be at par with the price the Indian farmer pays the inputs 
in India, If it is made cheaper than in India the inputs 
may be sold in India and thus cause a drain on foreign ex­
change. Since Nepal buys fertilizer in the world market - and 
will have to continue until it can manufacture its own, the 
purchase price could be comparable to the price in other coun­
tries. 
The profit margin presently is low mainly due to the 
hiRh overhead incurred by the Agricultural Supply Corporation. 
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Once the volume of transactions is increased and the corpor­
ation is made responsible only for the wholesale job and af­
ter some measures are taken to reduce the overhead by Increas­
ing; the efficiency in the operation of the Corporation, the 
overhead should be reduced. This will provide margin to al­
low for larger profits. 
The profit margin allowed for the retailer may be fixed 
at a graduated-scale, determined by the volume of transaction -
the larger the volume of transaction, the higher the possible 
rate of commission. The profit margin or the rate of commis­
sion may be fixed at the maximum possible upper limit to the 
extent that the Agricultural Supply Corporation can be managed 
at a no-loss-no-profit basis to create competition among the 
retailers. 
High-yielding seed is another important purchased input 
that requires an efficient distribution system. The Agricul­
tural Supply Corporation was entrusted with the procurement 
and distribution of these seeds during the Third Plan. The 
distribution program did not go well partly due to the failure 
of technical supervision from the Research Department^. An 
organization of registered seed growers and a seed inspection 
program as envisaged in the Third Plan were not implemented, 
due mainly to the lack of close cooperation among research, 
extension and distributing agencies. 
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There does not seem to "be any other possible alternative 
than orpranlzin.o: registered private seed growers and providing 
them with proper technical supervision and inspection from 
the Research and Extension Departments. Alternately, the job 
of technical .supervision and inspection could be carried by 
the A,":ricultural Supply Corporation. Since a Research Depart­
ment with qualified staff already exists, and extension person­
nel are in the field, it would add unecessarily to the over­
head cost of Corporation. The Corporation also would not have 
adequate competency to carry out such inspection. The Corpora­
tion should continue as a stop-gap measure in the seed business 
and, at the same time, with adequate supervision from the Gov­
ernment technical departments promote the private certified 
seed growers. 
The distribution of pesticides and equipment is presently 
carried on by both the private dealers and the Agricultural Sup­
ply Corporation. No change seems required in the distribution 
of these inputs. The Corporation may have to continue for some 
years in this job by providing services in the area where pri­
vate dealers are well established. Here, too, the responsibil­
ity of the Corporation will be that of a wholesale dealer, but 
unlike in fertilizer, the Corporation will function side by 
side with the private dealers to provide encourapcement as well 
as a contrnlliniT device if the private sector falters. 
The role of the Ap:ricultural Supply Corporation should be 
primarily to 'facilitate the smooth functioning of the 
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private sector in the distribution of agricultural inputs and 
intervene only if the private sector falters or misbehaves. 
Research and extension The output from agricultural 
research has not yet been significantly discernible in Nepal, 
This was in part due to the time required in providing for 
the research establishments and the trained research staff. 
Research facilities are now fairly well established - funds, 
trained personnel and research equipment are available. In 
1969-70, two Ph.D., forty-two H". S. (or M.Sc) and fifty-eight 
B. S.(or B. Sc.) agricultural technicians were in payroll for 
research. About Rs. 12.41 million (in a total population of 
10.92 million) were earmarked for agricultural research de­
partments. This compares fairly well with budgets in other de­
veloping countries, Nepal will have spent Rs. I.l4 ($0,112) 
percapita for agricultural research in I969-7O. Per farmer, 
this would come to about $3,20, The Government research bud­
get cost per farmer in other countries in I965 was India, 0.05; 
Japan, 0.69; Philippines, 0,27; Mexico, 0,35; and the USA 45,90 
dollars (82 p. 73). In the case of Nepal, however, more than 
60 percent of the above-mentioned budget would have been spent 
on the establishment of research facilities rather than on cur­
rent expenses. 
Now that the facilities are available, a concerted effort 
is required to make these facilities bear fruits with maximum 
effectiveness in the Fourth Plan. So far, only the Department 
of Agricultural Education and Research has made some efforts 
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to promote research activities in a systematic manner, espe­
cially during the last two years, although the research proj­
ects undertaken do not seem always to have moved by the "adap­
tive" type of research as envisaged..( 51). Other departments --
livestock, horticulture and fisheries - exist, by and large, 
only in name as far as research activities are concerned. Spe^ 
cial efforts will have to be made during the Fourth Plan to 
orient these Departments toward research, especially in live­
stock, including pasture and forage crops and horticulture, as 
these activities have to make major contributions in the de­
velopment of the Hills. 
The importance of research in increasing productivity 
no longer needs any elaboration. The importance of policy 
guidelines regarding the type of research activity, coordina­
tion and proper planning of research, however, is yet to be 
realized and put Into practice. 
The fmiding principle to an approach to the research 
policy in Nepal would be to concentrate research efforts on 
pro^crams that find solutions to the most pressing problems of 
the farmer with an immediate application in view. This ap­
proach is often called "practical experimentation," e.g. vari­
etal trials to find the suitability to adapt to the local con­
dition and field experiments on chemical sprays on insects 
(without much study of insect physiology life-cycle of in-
sectc). 
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There is no central organization to provide guidelines, 
coordination, and planning of research activities. The need 
has become more important since research activities have been 
growing and the number of departments has been increasing. 
The present practice of scattering research stations or experi­
ment farms in many places and providing separate centers for 
each branch of agriculture side-by^-side under the control and 
management of different agencies should be abandoned and the 
existing different research units should be amalgamated and 
managed under one research organization. The existing Central 
Coordination Committee in the Ministry of Pood and Agriculture, 
which was organized to provide general policy guidelines and 
to bring coordination among the activities of various agen­
cies related to development programs, should be reorganized in 
such a manner that it can function effectively as a central 
research organization. The main function of such an organi­
zation would be 1) to provide policy guidelines for the selec­
tion of research activities; 2) to coordinate the various 
fields of research in agriculture, livestock, horticulture and 
fisheries; 3) to identify the areas of importance and priority 
in planning research activity; and to periodically evaluate 
the program and its performance. To make research more objec­
tive, purposeful, and problem-solving and less academic, 
greater coordination is required between research and exten­
sion than presently exists. 
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The Fourth Plan should concentrate on establishing ag­
ricultural research stations in some of the major ecological 
regions of the country and these stations should be entrusted 
with the work of research in various branches of agriculture 
on a region-wide•basis, working as teams rather than inde­
pendently of each other. 
The first step would be to identify and delineate the 
major ecological areas in the country. If the findings of 
ecological identifications support the existing four stations 
(e.g, Biratnagar, Jiri, Parwanipur, Pokhara) they can be re­
organized as regional stations. One new station for high-
altitude agriculture might be established in Jumla, depending, 
among other things, upon the planned priority area for road 
construction. The rest of the existing research stations, ex­
periment farms, and centers need to be reexamined. If found 
useful, they should be entrusted with the jobs of testing cen­
ters and/or multiplication farms under the direct supervision 
of the regional research stations. 
The existing central farm at Khumal in the Kathmandu Val­
ley could function as the central agricultural research station 
for Nepal It has almost all the facilities needed to function 
as a central station in all the branches of agriculture and 
livestock. The nearby Godavari Fish Farm, the Kirtipur Horti­
culture Station, and the Veterinary Laboratory at Tripureshwar 
could be brought under the management of the central research 
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station at Khuinal, which in turn would be under the supervi­
sion of the central research organization or coordination 
committee of the Ministry. 
If this approach is accepted, a reorganization of the 
present departments in the Ministry of Pood and Agriculture is 
required. It is a waste of resources - men, money and material 
- and bad management for a country like Nepal to have five 
departments in agriculture. Two central departments, one for 
research and training and the other for extension, serving all 
the branches of agriculture, can serve the same purpose. The 
reorganization will be more economic and purposeful for coor­
dination in research, teaching and extension. For proper co­
ordination between research and extension(that is, between 
the Department of Acticultural Research and Education, and the 
Department of Agricultural Extension) extension-personnel will 
have to be posted to each regional research station to function 
as extension advisors, while at the same time supervising the 
extension activities entrusted to the District Agricultural 
[extension Officers in the respective regions. 
An economic approach to research or a consciously planned 
effort concerning production problems of economic importance 
is vital to the research policy, for the basic purpose of ag­
ricultural research is to bring economic dividends to the 
farmer. Planning a national research program and allocation 
of resources for research and education will require, therefore. 
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an interdisciplinary analysis of physical, biological, eco­
nomic, and social factors and a close coordination between ag­
ricultural scientists and agricultural economists. This link 
in research activities.has been missing in Nepal. 
It has been missing because the agricultural economists 
have been preoccupied with administrative work in the Ministry 
and the research aspect of agricultural economics has been 
relegated to a secondary position. The Third Plan program in 
agricultural economics and statistics was to "study and analyze 
land use, crop production, livestock use, weather conditions, 
prices of agricultural products, marketing systems, the vil­
lage economy, cultivation and techniques. Grading of agricul­
tural products and quality control will also be started" (31 
p. 66). Except for a few case studies, nothing substantial 
has been accomplished so far in the area of agricultural eco­
nomics. The lack of information about agriculture has forced 
planning in agriculture almost into the realm of guesswork. 
The time has come now to separate the functions, of eco­
nomic analysis and planning from those of research In agri­
cultural economics. The planning agency will be pressed most 
of the time with the immediate problems of planning, program­
ming, budgeting, evaluation, and coordination of various de­
velopment activities. There will be little time left for se­
rious thinking about the main research activities and research 
problems to perform them with the required vigor. Earlier, it 
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had not been possible to separate these functions due mainly 
to the lack of trained staff. However, the number of trained 
staff has now increased to a point where these functions can 
be carried out separately. 
The present Economic Analysis and Planning Division 
(formerly the Agricultural Economics Division) would continue 
with the functions of planning, programming, budgeting, co­
ordinating and evaluating programs in the Ministry. The func­
tions of research and survey and the collecting of informa­
tion would be carried out by a separate division - the Agri­
cultural Econonomics Division - to be placed in the Department 
of Agricultural Research and Education, to which the College 
of Agriculture is also attached. The agricultural economies 
in the division would do both the research and teaching. The 
Economic Analysis and Planning Division and the Agricultural 
Economics Division in consultation with each other would de­
termine the priority areas for research in agricultural eco­
nomics, in line with the guidelines provided by the proposed 
Central Research Coordination Committee. 
Credit and Investment The failure of the cooperative 
system has created a serious bottleneck in the programs for 
agricultural development. Because agricultural growth is 
contingent upon the performance of the small farmers who make 
up the bulk of the population, there Is considerable emphasis 
being put on the use of purchased inputs by these farmers 
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during the Fourth Plan. Since it would not be possible for 
the small farmers on subsistence to finance the use of these 
inputs on their own, the provision of credit becomes one of 
the limiting factors in raising the productivity and income of 
these farmers. 
There are two organizations at the center to finance ag­
ricultural credit, namely, the Agricultural Development Bank 
and the Land Reform Savings Corporation, although virtually 
none exists at the village level, where the credits are to be 
made available. This has been a delinquent area in the agricul­
tural development program. There is no need for two central 
organizations at this stage. It would be wise to amalgamate 
these organizations, reduce the overhead cost of financing ag­
riculture credit, and concentrate on establishing a viable 
credit system at the village level during the Fourth Plan. 
It may be argued that the savings collected under the 
Compulsory Savings Scheme from the farmers are specifically 
meant to be plowed back into the agricultural sector and the 
Government has guaranteed to repay the farmer. Therefore it 
is not possible to entrust the savings to the Agricultural 
Development Bank which carries a limited liability. However, 
the fact stands that both the Bank and the Corporation are in 
the public sector. The Government and the Nepal fiastra Bank 
(the Central Bank) finance most of the resources of the Bank. 
If the Bank goes out of business, the Government loses money. 
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(The same can be said concerning the Corporation.) If the 
Corporation has a better chance of survival, then there is 
no need for the existence of the Agricultural Development Bank 
and the Corporation could take over all the financing of agri­
cultural credit. Both have the same objective and function; 
to finance the agricultural sector. All the same, if pre­
ferred , the savings collected could be maintained under a sep­
arate account in the Agricultural Development Bank, to be spent 
to support the types of financing specified by the Government, 
Whatever the choice, there is clearly no need at this stage for 
two separate central agencies to finance agricultural credit. 
The program for credit provisions at the village level 
does not seem to have any other alternative than entrusting 
the job to the Agricultural Development Bank,inasmuch as there 
does not appear a chance for the revival of the cooperatives, 
at least during the Fourth Plan. There are still a large num­
ber of delinquent cooperatives, A few more years may be needed 
before a clean start can be made, if a second attempt to form 
cooperatives is desired. 
The program of credit at the village level will have to 
be undertaken jointly by the Bank and the agricultural exten­
sion personnel. While the Bank would manage the credit in a, 
group of villages as an operational unit (depending on the ex­
pected volume of transaction) by providing managerial service, 
a council of village representatives would form the board of 
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directors for the loan policy. However, it would be left up to 
the discretion of the manager, guided by certain procedures, 
whether to approve or reject a loan. It would also be the re­
sponsibility of the manager to see that the loans are recovered 
on time. 
The loans would be advanced on the recommendation of the 
District Agricultural Extension Officer or his assistant in 
the village. It would be his responsibility to supervise the 
use of the credit. He would also see that the provisions of 
supply are there and correctly used, and that there is pro­
vision for and recovery of credit. It may be argued that if 
the extension worker functions as a credit man, the farmers 
may have a psychological fear of approaching him or to listen­
ing to his advice on adapting to improved practices. Granted 
that this is true (which is unlikely), if the technical advice 
is offered without provisions for putting it into practice, 
the advice serves no purpose. On the contrary, if the exten­
sion worker takes the job of supervising the credit, the in­
puts can be tied up with credit, the program can be implemented 
effectively, and the chances will be that more credit will be 
recovered on time. 
The cost of credit service may be high for the Bank even 
on a no-profit-no-loss basis, especially during the initial 
years of operation, since the volume of transaction may be 
small, the organizations many. The Government should bear part 
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of the expense to the extent that the cost of operation at 
the village level should break even. This provision could al­
leviate the usual tendency of the Bank to avoid, small loans 
and concentrate on ti%%er types, which provide security in 
property, and thereby ignore the main borrower: the small 
farmer. 
The criteria for advancing the loans should be the antic­
ipated increase in production and income, which the extension 
worker will advise the Bank, rather than the credit-worthy per­
son or collateral , More caution is required, for stricter super­
vision than hitherto followed.. 
Management of village credit by the Bank is not suggested 
for the entire country. At first, the Bank would handle mainly 
the short-term productive loan, only in a few selected areas -
where there is good potential for the use of purchased inputs. 
Meanwhile in the areas where cooperatives are doing well, they 
would be encouraged, if necessary,by providing the services of 
a trained manager. Thirdly, It may be a worthwhile experiment 
to start licensing a few private money lenders in the villages 
where the Bank would not be entering and where viable coopera­
tives do not exist, and in even some pilaces allowing llbensed 
money lenders to operate in addition to the operation of the 
Bank. The Sank should finance these money lenders if they need 
external financing. The Bank would also supervise their opera­
tion and could cancel the license and/or penalize them if they 
misbehave. 
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If the experiment of licensed private money lender suc­
ceeds or the cooperatives should become useful, the Bank 
could withdraw its villa%e-level operation gradually, but con­
tinue to function as a watchdog - ready to intervine in the 
operation by entering into the business. During the period 
of experimentation, which may cover the Fourth Plan, the cost 
of servicing the credit should be considered as an overhead 
cost in agricultural development. The basic assumption in 
these recommendations is that efforts will be made to make the 
Acticultural Development Bank more efficient than it is and it 
is easier to make the effort in the Bank than in other areas. 
If this assumption does not hold true, probably there is no 
other way out for the small farmer than to revert to waiting 
and bein? complacent in his despair and lack of power. 
The increased allocations for the agricultural credit 
proCTam and other development services would not by themselves 
increase capital formation in agriculture. They would improve 
the quality of the resources and are, of course, important in 
increasing the productivity of resources already devoted to 
agriculture. For sustained growth, on the other hand, invest­
ments to exploit the natural resources as well as investments 
to make up for the deficiencies in these resources will be 
necessary. These investments would improve the productive 
structure of the land itself. It is essential, therefore, to 
provide a net added investment in agriculture, such as through 
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lon%-term investment programs in irrigation, drainage, ter­
racing and other measures of land improvement. The major ac­
tivity of long-term investments in agriculture during the 
Fourth Plan should be concentrated on irrigation and soil con­
servation, as these are becoming critical factors in the sus­
tained increase in agriculture. While the Government should 
Invest in major overhead items such as irrigation and feasi­
bility studies of surface and underp;round water resources, 
the panchayat and private sectors should be encouraged in the 
repair and maintenance of the Irrigation projects undertaken 
during the Third Plan and in the construction of feeder chan­
nels in the new projects. There are instances of water wasted, 
drilled wells capped, and inadequate care taken of existing 
capital, presumably due to the lack of effective incentives 
and organization structures. Rural labor can make a substan­
tial contribution in non-monetized investments in agriculture, 
providing the institutional base is improved. 
The magnitude and the structure of the agricultural de­
velopment envisaged for the Fourth Plan as a factor contribut­
ing to the overall growth of the national economy is based on 
predictions that require a host of action roles. These roles 
include making greater efforts in the search for the problem-
solving public administration and bringing more cohesiveness 
in the implementation of programs. 
287 
The difficulties involved and some of the bold assump­
tions held in making these predictions are recognized. They 
depend on many factors - some visualized, some anticipated, 
and many more unknown. Accuracy in such a prediction can be 
increased only when the stock of knowledge is improved. 
In the a,Q:ricultural development of the countries like 
Nepal, technological change or availability of capital, though 
important, is not the only base of the process in change. 
Much depends on the structures and institutions which demand 
massive changes. A marginal change in these structures would 
not provide an effective base for the process of development. 
These do not lend to accurate prediction as these are en­
tangled in the configuration of forces - political, social 
and economic. 
The process of development can be kept moving, there­
fore, only with constant attention to the problems that may 
be encountered in the process of implementation. This will 
require continuing evaluations of performance in the districts 
to identify obstacles, to devise means,of overcoming them, 
and to make revisions in the programs wherever necessary. This 
will facilitate improving both the diagnostic and remedial 
mechanisms for subsequent development planning. 
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CHAPTER VII. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Summary 
This study is an analysis of the performance of Nepal's 
efforts at development planning with emphasis on the agricul­
tural sector. Its main objective is to analyze the progress 
made in the area of economic development during the past fif­
teen years and the role played by agriculture in economic de­
velopment of Nepal. The progress is examined in terms of the 
targets, objectives and policies and programs that have 
proved successful or have retarded growth. Remedial actions 
are suggested to strengthen the success elements and to lessen 
the failure elements in improving future development policy 
for Nepal and to suggest an outline framework toward develop­
ing the Fourth Plan based on the experience gained from the 
performance of the earlier Plans, 
The present structures of the economy in general and the 
agricultural sector in particular are analyzed. The inter­
relationships of the agricultural sector with the rest of the 
economy are examined. The contributions of the agricultural 
sector with the rest of the economy are examined. The contri­
butions of the agricultural sector to the national growth are 
empirically examined for the period of I96O-I968, 
The study is guided by two sets of hypotheses. One set 
states that the current tempo of economic activity in Nepal 
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is insufficient to meet the economic development objectives 
of Nepal, The other set states that the poor performance in 
the agricultural sector has held back the rate of growth in 
the national economy. 
In analyzing the performance of development and in ap­
praising the problems faced in the development of agriculture 
vis-a-vis the national economic development, a conceptual 
framework of development with agriculture as a core component 
is developed. The role of agriculture in the development sys­
tem is identified and appraised by following the conceptual 
framework of "means-end-continuum," The analytical framework 
of the study is constructed under the delimiting phase, the 
diagnostic phase and the remedial phase of analyses. 
The examination of the progress made shows that the rate 
of growth in the economy has fallen short of the Plan target 
by nearly 50 percent. The slow rate of growth in the agri­
cultural sector held back the general growth rate. In aggre­
gate, the agricultural sector is the largest contributor with 
86 percent of the total labor force engaged in the agriculture 
sector and 6.5 percent of the total GDP generated from this 
sector. And, yet the contribution of this sector to the per­
centage increase in growth is about 45 percent. 
Reasons foip the failure of the agricultural sector to 
achieve its targets are identified with the defects in the 
agrarian structures - tenurial defects (high rents, unsecured 
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tenancy, fragmented and small holdings); defects in market 
structures; the lack of new knowledge (insufficient research 
organization and the failure to reorient research activities 
toward the pressing needs of the farmer); an ineffective ex­
tension service to disseminate information regarding improved 
farm practices; and the failure to develop an effective credit 
system at the village level. 
Defects in the agrarian structures are related to incen­
tive, knowledge and capital. The district with improved agrar­
ian structures that offered better incentives, knowledge and 
capital performed well above the rest of the districts that 
lacked such facilities. The fact that agrarian structures play 
an important role in increasing the productivity in agricul­
ture is further demonstrated by the examination of the case 
studies performed in selected districts. 
The factors related to incentive, knowledge and capital 
have such interrelationships that absence of one factor hinders 
the productive effectiveness of the others. For instance, the 
incentive provided by an improved tenancy system cannot make 
significant contributions in terms of increased productivity 
if other factors such as improved seeds and fertilizers are 
not available, or if funds are not available to buy them, or if 
the prices are too high. 
Agricultural development, though a strategic element in 
the process, would not be able to move without support from 
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other sectors of the economy. This Is made particularly clear 
from the examination of performance and problems of develop­
ment in the Hills, where the lack of infrastructure has iso­
lated the area from the general program of development. An 
examination of the problems in the Hills also show that the 
problems of development are heterogeneous in nature, not only 
within the country but also within the regions as determined 
by topography, climatic differences and population. The so­
lutions to the problems in various regions would, therefore, 
vary in their nature. Thus information imist be gathered 
through in-depth studies of the particular region. 
In addition to the lack of transport and comiminlcatlon 
and the defects in agrarian structures, the pressure of popu­
lation has made the development in the Hills all the more dif­
ficult. The number of unemployed has exceeded the capacity of 
the present agricultural sector in the region and there seems 
hardly any opportunity left to absorb the additions to popula­
tion, Efforts to reduce the growth in population would be as 
important as the efforts to increase the productivity In agri­
culture. It is also ne'cessary for development in other sectors 
to be expanded at a rate sufficient to absorb the increasing 
outflow of labor from agriculture. 
Some of the problems faced by Nepal in its quest for de­
velopment and some of the failures encountered bear similarity 
with such experiences of India and Pakistan. In examining 
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India's experience in development, Professor Me11or points 
out some major areas of errors in agricultural development 
policy as; 1) the lack of effective organization to produce 
a flow of highly profitable innovation suited to the particu­
lar condition; 2) the failure to view agricultural development 
as a process in which one must be constantly looking for new 
limitinfT factors; 3) too formal planning process and excessive 
centralization; and 4) excessive emphasis on the public sector 
and too little emphasis on stimulating the private sector 
(68 pp. 363-373). Falcon and Gotsch find similar kinds of 
problem in Pakistan's experience (12 pp. 269-315)• 
The problems faced by Nepal, especially those of basic 
nature, are identified In the present study in relation to the 
development in Nepal in terras of (l) the low growth rate of 
the economy, (2) the increasing rate of population, (3) the 
slow-movin.'x arrriculture aggravated with the defects in the 
atrrarian structures, (4) inadequate transport and communication 
facilities and (5) the regional imbalance in the development. 
All of these factors have strong Implications for future de­
velopment policy in Nepal, 
The low rate of growth in the economy during the Third 
Plan implies that if stronger efforts are not made in subse­
quent Plans, the long-term target of doubling the national in­
come by I9BO will not be achieved. And if the long-term devel­
opment target is to be sustained, aggregate growth rate in the 
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economy will have to be 6 percent per annum and the rate of 
population growth could not exceed 2,3 percent. 
The possibilities of achieving 6 percent annual growth 
rate during the Fourth Plan (1970-75) are examined in terms 
of investment requirements, sectoral contribution and invest­
ment, the possibility of domestic resource mobilization, plaus­
ible external assistance, and the absorptive capacity of the 
economy to save and invest. 
The agricultural sector's contribution to the GDP would 
be 60 percent, against 65 percent in the Third Plan. Of the 
total labor force in 197^-75, nearly 79 percent would be in 
the agricultural sector, as compared to about 86 percent by 
the end of the Third Plan. The aggregate growth rate in this 
sector will have to be 4.7 percent. The agricultural sector 
has a major role to play in achieving the targets in the Fourth 
Plan. 
The indications are that it is possible to achieve the 
targeted rate of growth of 6 percent annually during the Fourth 
Plan, providing the necessary measures are taken. These meas­
ures are outlined in the following section. 
Recommendations 
An examination of the performance of the National Plan 
indicates that it should be possible to raise the aggregate 
rate of annual growth to a 6 percent level during the period 
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of 1970-71 to 197^-75» providing remedial actions are direct­
ed toward (l) lessening the failure elements characterized as 
"structural traps" and (2) strengthening the success elements. 
To facilitate the higher rate of growth, the recommended meas­
ures are grouped into three categories as follows*. 
1. Recommendations for remedial actions permitted by 
the present knowledge of the economy; 
2. Recommendations for improving the performance in 
the economy through continuous evaluation process of the pro­
gram and performance ; 
3. Recommendations for generating knowledge to fill 
the gaps in existing information as a basis for future plan­
ning. 
Recommendations for remedial action The lower than 
expected rate of growth in the Third Plan has made it neces-
s ary that the size of investment in the Fourth Plan be tripled 
if the targeted long-term rate of growth is to be achieved. 
It will, therefore, require more vigorous efforts in the mo­
bilization of domestic resources. The possibility for such 
mobilization exists, as there is potential in the general tax 
structure including land revenue in terms of its productivity 
potential, 
1, The proportion of revenue to the GDP, which is esti­
mated at:6.3 percent in I969-70, will have to be raised to 
13.0 percent by 197^-75 to meet the public sector domestic 
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financing of Rs. 318^ million out of the total public sector 
development expenditure of Rs. 4761 million estimated for the 
Fourth Flan. The balance of Rs. 1576 million will have to be 
financed through external assistance and internal borrowings. 
Assuming that Rs. 1576 million would be available from external 
assistance, the share of external financing for development 
would be 33 percent as against the 57 percent in the Third 
Plan. The present share of agricultural revenue to the total 
revenue will be required to be raised to $0 percent by 197^-
75 from its present level of 25 percent. 
Consistent with the provisions of incentives, the adop­
tion of improved technology and operating capital, the target­
ed public revenue within the agricultural sector can be gen­
erated substantially through land taxes. Such taxes could be 
derived from (a) absentee owners and from (b) graduated land 
taxes above a miniimim size and value consistent with the size 
of holding varied by region and enterprises. To implement this 
recommendation, improvements in assessment, collection and en­
forcement procedures are required. This, in turn will require 
improvements in land measurement and description, title regis­
tration and land records. 
In providinp- the basis for obtaining and using the tar­
geted external financing, there is urgent need for project plan­
ning. The project plans will have to meet the tests of the 
World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and other aiding 
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agencies. The criteria for such assistance will require that 
the investment be related to the productivity to be gener­
ated by the investment in terms of specific products. Within 
this evaluation, it must be demonstrated that the capital is 
required, that it will generate productivity increases, and 
that Nepal will be able to repay the loan as a result of this 
productivity enhancement, 
2. Further specific changes within an:rarlan structures 
are su^%ested which include (a) improvement in land records, 
titles, transfer procedures as indicated earlier (greater speed 
and efficiency is required in the cadastal survey currently in 
progress in Nepal to accomplish a purposeful and complete sur­
vey of the land, without which agrarian reforms cannot be made 
effective); (b) reduction of rent to an average of one-third of 
the product, fixed in absolute amount from the present level 
of one-half of the product; (c) consolidation of fragmented 
holdings by fixing a minimum limit of holdings; (d) allowing 
exclusive rights of purchase to the farmer cultivating the 
adjacent land when such land is offered for sale; (e) amending 
the present Lands Act to allow tenants to cultivate the land 
up to the ereneral celling limit of 1? hectares allowed for 
owner-operators ; (f) allowing capable owner-operators to cul­
tivate up to 4o hectares as a special case where mechanization 
is possible. These minimum and maximum limits would be varied 
by enterprises and regions consistent with realizing the 
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productivity potential. Such variations have been effected 
in southern Italy, in the Philippines and in Taiwan. 
More importantly, these changes are required in order 
to remove the difficulties constantly faced by cultivators 
in the improvement and development of ap;ricultural resources. 
This is consistent with the reasoning presented earlier in 
providing incentives, knowledge and capital. 
Also such adjustments in land structures are constitu­
ent component of basis for obtaining and utilizing the resourc­
es, both internal and external, 
3« Improvements in the marketing system are suggested 
(a) to insure reasonable prices of products; (b) to facili­
tate the development of alternate outlets for products; and 
(c) to improve storage, processing and delivery of products. 
There is no regular channel established for market in­
formation and price situation, nor are there legislative or 
administrative mechanisms for grading, standardization, and 
quality control of products. Unless these are set up, farm­
ers would not have incentives to produce the amount, kind and 
quality of products demanded both for internal and external 
markets. 
As a first step toward creating an efficient marketing ' 
system, establishment of regular channels for internal and ex­
ternal market information, legislative and enforcement mech­
anisms for grading, standardization and quality control of 
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products are suggested. As a part of market information, dif­
ferential prices by kind and quality of products should be 
announced in refining the incentives for farmers. 
Inasmuch as there is an open border and most of the ag­
ricultural products are marketed in India, the prices in Nepal 
may have to move in conjunction with the prices in India until 
Nepal is able to enter the international, market. Regular and 
up-to-date information on market situations in India and other 
neiehborin# countries will be necessary for adjusting price 
policies in Nepal. 
The private sector should be stimulated to participate 
in processing, storage, and delivery of the products. Apart 
from the inadequate facilities for processing and storage, 
the existing facilities are not efficiently run, and the wast­
age, for instance, in rice milling, is estimated at 10-15 
percent higher than in modern milling systems. There is an 
immediate need for minimizing the cost and wastage in storage, 
processing and delivery of the products. 
The production, utilization, milling,'storage and market 
ing of rice involves the largest amount of private investment 
in Nepal. In the total export of agricultural commodities 
rice represents 60 percent. The rice millers are operating 
the equipment designed thirty to fifty years ago. The need 
for modernizing rice milling has been most urgent. With in­
creased production in wheat and the increased demand for good 
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quality flour (which is met by imports of fine flour from 
Australia and India although there is a surplus of wheat 
crains in Nepal), the need for establishing flour mills has 
become apparent. 
Alonp- with the problem of marketing farm products, the 
distribution of apçricultural inputs is becoming a critical fac­
tor. This problem is likely to be more serious during the 
Fourth Plan as there are large volumes of fertilizers, seeds, 
pesticides and equipment envisaged to be used by the farmers. 
The distribution of inputs, it is suggested, should be handled 
by both the private sector and the public sector. In the case 
of fertilizers, the Agricultural Supply Corporation would con­
tinue functioning as a wholesaler and importer of fertilizers; 
the retailing would be done entirely by the private sector. 
Becistered, certified seed growers could be organized to multi­
ply tested seeds. Distribution would be carried by the private 
sector, in general, and in places where such facilities do not 
exist, the Corporation would function as a wholesale dealer. 
Pesticides would be distributed mostly through the private sec­
tor and the Corporation would provide the service of wholesale 
dealer in the areas where private dealers are not available. 
The distribution of equipment should be carried by the private 
sector in a similar manner. 
The provision of agricultural credit is becoming an 
acute one, especially after the freezing of agricultural loans 
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by the Government. There is no provision as such for land 
credit. The provision for long-term land credit is necessary 
to meet the objectives of agrarian reforms, making the tenant 
the ovmer of the land. The Agricultural Development Bank 
should also finance the tenants to purchase the land on long-
term loans (extended up to 20 years) in such a manner that 
the farmer is able to repay the loan while improving the liv­
ing standards of his family. The criteria for advancing the 
loans should be based on the productivity of the land and its 
ability to repay the debt, 
Special efforts are reqyired to develop an efficient cred­
it system at the village level for the short-term loans, since 
the existing channel of cooperatives has proved a failure. It 
is suggested organizing provisions for credit in the villages: 
(a) through the Agricultural Development Bank in selected po­
tential areas; (b) by strengthening the cooperatives wherever 
economically viable societies exist; and (c) by licensing pri­
vate money lenders on an experimental basis under the super­
vision of the Agricultural Development Bank. 
5. In providing the farmers with the improved knowledge, 
two sources will be relied upon: (a) the extension service, 
which would help farmers to plan their farm operations with the 
up-to-date and relevant technology; (b) credit agencies, which 
would insist upon the use of the improved knowledge as^ a con­
dition for loan and these loans would be made available mostly 
in kind at the time and place of need. 
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Recommendations for continuous evaluation process of 
Plan performance Since the development plans are formu­
lated on the basis of certain expected changes in the polit­
ical, economic and social factors, and are only a general 
framework designed under the existing limited knowledge, con­
tinuous evaluations of their performance is a prerequisite for 
success. Reorientation and strengthening of evaluation ma­
chinery in the executive ministries and planning agencies are 
suîîgested as of significant importance, both for successful 
implementation of the plan and for the forimilation of future 
plans, 
The detailed programs for the Fourth Plan should include 
targets by districts to facilitate implementation as well as 
evaluation of performance at the district level, à continuous 
process of evaluation will help identify the area of failures 
and successes of the programs and policies, providing a circu­
lar feedback in the planning process. 
Such evaluations could be molded after the district case 
studies developed in/this thesis. The studies could be under­
taken at two levels: (a) a miniimim level of reporting should 
be established annually for all the districts; (b) in-depth 
studies and analyses should be undertaken in sample districts 
representative of the Tarai, Hills and Valley Regions. 
Through this continuous monitoring and analysis of plans 
at the district level, performance defects and weaknesses can 
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be determined and remedied annually within the Plan period 
without awaitinpc the end of the period. Thus failures and de­
ficiencies realized at the end of previous Plans can be iden­
tified and remedied prior to the conclusion of the period. 
Recommendations for future research As emphasized 
throughout this study, planning is hampered seriously by the 
lack of relevant data. The urgent need for timely research 
has become apparent. In processing to remedy data deficien­
cies as the necessary foundation for improving the planning 
process Including the implementation, the needs for certain 
high-priority studies have been apparent. These include (l) 
input-output studies by enterprises and by regions; (2) project­
ing demands for products by quality and kind; (3) employment 
opportunities in various sectors; regional analysis for de­
velopment potential and for examining agriculture in relation 
to other forms of economic activity; and (5) structural studies 
related to marketing (both product and factor), land taxes, 
tenancy, and tenure forms, 
1, Input-output studies by enterprises and by regions 
are required for evaluating the potentials for development, 
for translating them into programs, and for establishing 
criteria for choosinfc an alternate program. These studies are 
also a basis for determining the size of holding, credit and ex­
tension outlook. They would be carried on as coordinated re­
search activities between the physical scientists and economists. 
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2. Demand projection studies for products by kind, qual­
ity, and grades for internal consumption as well as export are 
required in developing the production targets, As a part of 
internal demand study, price studies related to the price-
elasticity of demand for products in urban and rural areas for 
various projected income levels need to be determined. As 
a first step, household consumption surveys in both rural and 
urban areas will have to be performed. 
3. Studies on the nature and magnitude of employment 
opportunities in the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors 
together with the demand and supply conditions approximated 
above would be essential in light of the projected population 
increase and the large number of underemployed 
that exists in the agricultural sector. This finding will 
also suggest guidelines for the birth control policy. Studies 
on employment are also important for the fact that while large 
numbers of underemployed and unemployed exist in Nepal, there 
is also a substantial number of Indian laborers working in 
Nepal, 
4. Regional studies for development potential have be­
come necessary, due to the growing imbalance between the Hills 
and other areas of the country. These studies are also impor­
tant for both examining the relation of agriculture to other 
forms of economic activity and examining the need and poten­
tial for developing diversification within agriculture. Ex­
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tensive surveys of the Hills for determining the production 
potential, employment problem, and areas of priority by 
regions and by activity are suggested for in the initial years 
of the Fourth Plan. These will also help determine the areas 
of priority for transport development. 
5. Structural studies, such as empirical analyses of 
cost of marketing of major crops - rice, corn, wheat - and of 
individual components in the marketing system are needed 
to indicate the type of improvements required in 
efficient marketing system. Price variations by season and 
from region to region will have to be analyzed to determine 
the costs of processing, transportation and storage to estab­
lish a public policy toward insuring a reasonable level of 
prices. 
Studies on the distribution of inputs and credit are 
badly needed to Indicate the most suitable types of distri­
bution systems, and credit institutions. The performance of 
the suggested distribution agencies and the credit agencies 
should be studied and evaluated in terms of cost and effi­
ciency, to help provide policy guidelines in developing an 
efficient distribution system and credit agency. 
The suggested increase in research activities will re­
quire proper planning, coordination and supervision to make 
them effective and oriented toward fulfilling the most press­
ing; needs. It is sugpiested establishing a central research 
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committee in the Ministry to carry out the outlined functions. 
Further areas of research and their priority in terms 
of urgency would be indicated by the results of the continu­
ous evaluation process outlined in the previous section, 
which will help make research relevant to the needs of plan­
ning and to the implementation of plans. 
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Table 4], Income and regular^,expenditures of HMG/Nepal 
1952-53 to 1909-70 (Rs in million)° 
Fiscal y Surplus + 
Year Expenditure Deficit -
1952-53 38.74 57.40 - 18.66 
1953-54 38.61 39.92 - 1.31 
1954-55 37.15 37.89 - 0.74 
1955-56 51.65 50.78 + 0.87 
1956-57 66.70 66.4o + 0.30 
1957-58 70.79 83.86 - 13.07 
195R-59 76.46 79.80 - 3.34 
1959-60 86.60 86.10 + 0.50 
1960-61 97.40 110.10 - 12.70 
1961-62 105.40 103.50 + 1.90 
1962-63 129.70 124.40 + 5.30 
1963-64 157.93 ^ 114.31 + 43.62 
1964-65 192.34 117.94 + 74,90 
1965-66 216.50 147.33 + 69.17 
1966-67 256.66 170.59 + 86.07 
1967-68 325.98 180.79 +145.19 
1968-69° 400.19 201.50 +198.69 
1969-70^ 442.26 232.75 +209.51 
a 
Data for 1952-53 to 1955-56 are from 40 pp. 100,104; 
for 1956-67 to 1962-63, 26 p. 174; for 1963-64 to 1966-
67, 76 pp. 50-51 ; and for I967-68 to 1969-70, 47 Appen­
dix A, See also 74,75. 
b 
The income-expenditure figures appear different in dif­
ferent publications. The above figures are taken from 
the latest and as far as possible from the original source. 
"^Revised estimates 
^Budget estimates. 
^able 4^^; Income and development expenditure^ of HHG by major activities 1956-57 to 
1969-70 (Rs. in million) 
Income Expenditure 
Fiscal HKG In- c c _ f 
year revenue ternal External Total Agric. Trang- in-^ Others Total 
surplus Loan Grant Loan port dust 
1956-57 0.30 - . 59. 4s - 59.75 2.81 3 .95 1.52 6.43 14.71 
1957-58 nil - 21. 48 - 21.48 3.33 3 .16 1.44 4.46 12.39 
1958-59 nil - 35. 05 - 35.05 7.81 12 .37 2.28 10.23 32.69 
1959-60 0.50 - 89. 11 - 89.61 7.97 44 . 60 3.56 22.80 78.93 
1960-61 nil - 131. 80 - 131.80 11.70 44 .17 1.55 18.26 75.68 
1961-62 1.90 - 69. 60 1.00 72.51 16.89 57 .56 4.39 31.16 110.00 
1962-63 5.30 - 83. 70 11.60 100.60 22.38 28 .91 20.78 46.21 118.28 
1963-64 43.62 13.10 165. 90 11.40 234.02 28.60 77 .13 53.06 55.25 214.04 
1964-65 74.90 7.50 182. 50 4.90 270.10 47.34 117 .79 35.21 82.94 283.28 
^ (40, 26, 76, 47. See also 74,75). 
b 
As explained in thé text there is no clear definition of "development expendi­
ture." For instance, expense of re-balloting is also included under develop­
ment expenditures. Actual foreign grants may be larger than shown above, as 
in some years such grants were spent outside the HMG budget and technical as­
sistants and commodity purchases are not always invluded in the HhG budget. 
c 
Include agriculture, forestry, irrigation and rural development. 
^Include transport, communication and power. 
^Include industry, commerce and tourism. 
Include health, education, survey, statistics publicity and nob included else­
where. 
-Table 44 (Continued) 
Income Expenditure 
Fiscal HMG In-
revenue ternal External Total Agric. Trans- In- Others Total 
year surplus loan Grant Loan port dust 
1965-66 69. 17 7. 50 175. 30 3. 30 255.27 64. 30 122.14 28. 26 66. 08 280. 78 
1966—67 B6. 07 0. 70 142. 20 3. 70 232.67 75. 71 116.08 21. 92 54. 53 268. 24 
1967-68 145. 19 10. 00 158. 11 313.30 60. 27 129.93 18. 90 72. 10 281. 20 
1968-69^ 198. 69 19. 60 214. 24 432.53 71. 18 188.30 50. 88 81. 86 392. 22 
1969-70^ 209. 51 20. 00 329. 27 12. 52 571.30 121. 07 326.92 41. 64 118. 57 608. 20 
g 
Revised estimates. 
h 
Budget estimates. 
Table ^5. Government revenues by major sources 1952-53 to 1969-70^ (Rs, in million) 
Fiscal 
year 
Customs 
excise 
Land 
revenue 
Forest ^ Trading , Department Taxes° others^ Total 
1952-53 12.37 15.62 4.06 2.25 1.12 3.31 38.74 
1953-54 10.72 15.86 4.66 2.67 1.42 3.28 38.61 
1954-55 8.43 14.26 5.79 2.76 1.40 4.51 37.15 
1955-56 14.13 16.74 6.29 2.07 1.62 9.80 51.65 
1956-57 14.55 15.15 7.37 2.17 1.83 25.63 66.70 
I957-5R 21.32 17.55 7.86 3.18 2.25 18.63 70.79 
1959-59 30.18 17.75 8.25 3.40 2.76 14.12 76.46 
1959-60 32.15 16.22 11.63 4.54 2.03 20.03 86.60 
1960-61 39.83 20.98 15.53 4.48 2.36 14.22 97.40 
1961-62 46.33 28.20 11.78 4.18 3.10 11.81 105.40 
^(40, 26, 76, 47. See also 74, 75).  
b 
Include 
c 
transport and coimmanication revenues. 
Include income from income tax, sales tax, entertainment tax, house rent tax 
contract tax, urban property tax and other direct taxes. 
d 
Include registration, interest and dividend, civil administration and miscel­
laneous (passport, royalty and presents). Also for the years 1952-53 to 
1956-57 and 1959-60 to 1962-63 sales proceeds from foodgrains undertaken by 
the government are also included, presumably to match income and expenditure. 
It does make much sense in our analysis. Information was not available to 
separate the amount. 
Table 45 (Continued) 
Fiscal 
year 
Customs 
excise 
Land 
revenue 
Forest Trading Department Taxes Others Total 
1962-63 49.79 52.94 9.80 5.20 3.65 8.32 129.70 
1963-64 69.49 40.00 16.44 8.31 5.48 18.21 157.93 
1964-65 97.19 43.16 20.87 8.96 7.41 14.75 192.34 
1965-66 113.58 44.52 19.40 8.64 16.37 13.99 216.50 
1966-67 l4l.71 56.67 16.53 3.89 24.84 13.02 256,66 
1967-68 151.21 83.29 21.82 4.98 44.25 20.43 325.98 
1968-69® 200.60 86.00 20.08 7.26 64.50 21.75 400.19 
1969-70^ 224.32 86.50 20.37 12.64 69.30 29.13 442.26 
e 
Revised estimates. 
f 
Budget estimates. 
Table 46. Nepal's income and expenditure of convertible foreign exchange by major 
items and convertible foreign exchange reserves 1956-57 to 1969-70^ 
(Rs. in million) 
Income^ Exp end i tur e ° 
In— In— 
Fiscal visible Hdse. Dipl. For. visible Mdse. Dipl. 
year exports 1) 
exports 
2) 
mission aid 
3) 
0
 
CO imports 
1) 
imports mission i'iisc. 
2) 
Reserves 
1956-57 
e 
-
- 3.40 8.76 - - - - 0.36 
1957-58 0.49 — 0.32 2.28 0.19 - - 0.26 0.99 11.40 
1958-59" 0.4:R - 0.18 6.90 0.17 - - 0.76 1.95 18.43 
1959-60 0.89 0.27 1.68 20.74 0.19 - 0.36 1.87 H
 
0
 
41.75 
1960-61 15.06 4.95 1.26 1.23 2.05 - 9.21 4.08 1.66 52.18 
1961-62 21.94 6.90 1.25 14.45 2.99 0.30 10.39 7.37 3.26 76.36 
a 
(76 pp. 58-60; 47.Appendix). 
b 
Income; 1) Invisible exports Include pensions and salaries (Gorkha soldiers' 
remittances), tourism and interest; 2) Merchandise exports are visible ex­
ports; 3) Foreign aid includes foreign assistance received in controvertible 
currency only; 4) Miscellaneous includes export bonus as well. 
c 
Expenditure: l) Invisible imports also include loan repayments; 2) Miscel­
laneous includes export bonus as well. 
d 
Reserves are the convertible foreign exchange holdings of the Rastra Bank, 
excluding gold bullion arid coind, and Indian and other nonconvertible dur-
rencies. 
e 
Denotes less than Rs. 10,000. 
Table ^6 (Continued) 
. Income^ Expenditure° 
Fiscal — In= — 
year visible 
expgyts 
Mdse, 
expoyts 
Dipl, 
mission 
For. 
misc. 
41 
visible 
imports 
Mdse, 
imports 
Dipl. 
mission I'iisc. Reserves 
1962-63 28,12 2.38 1.17 6.69 16.69 0.45 12. 76 5.16 10.03 103.12 
1963-64 29.18 3.87 1.89 7.48 18.46 0.83 13.59 5.20 5.85 145.14 
I96I+-65 31.62 10.87 2,23 7.39 18.18 1.07 25.53 5.71 7.53 178.21 
1965-66 29.82 30.20 1.92 5.41 30.68 1.26 18.56 6.69 15.15 231.31 
1966-67^ 41.26 57.49 1.45 8.04 14.24 1.88 51.18 8.16 10.40 287.35 
1967-68 66. 4o 95.00 4.40 37.60 19.60 2.70 26,40 11.20 82.30 402.84 
1968-69^ 72.90 133.80 6.50 1.50 34.10 6.40 17.80 13.70 70.50 na^ 
1969-70^ 79.00 100,00 7.00 10.00 20.00 3.90 132.20 . 16.80 82.30 na 
f 
Nepalese currency was devalued by 2'+. 78 percent in December 196?. After de­
valuation: US #1.00 = Rs. 10.10, 
g 
Revised budget estimates, 
h 
na - not available at the time of writing, 
i 
Budget estimates. 
1 
Table 4?. Production of inajor crops in Nepal 196I-62 to 1968-69 (in 1,000 metric 
tons) 
Crops 1961-62 1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69 
Cereal crops 
Paddy 2102 2108 2109 2201 2207 2007 2217 2321 
Corn 843 842 849 854 856 824 875 899 
Wheat 111 111 112 123 147 159 190 227 
Barley- 26 27 27 29 28 28 26 29 
Millets and others 62 77 79 63 120^ 129 112 111 
Total 3144 3165 3176 3270 3358 3138 3420 3587 
Potato 275 272 280 285 277 300 315 290 
Pulses 66 66 62 64 64 69 68 72 
a . .. 
HMG/Nepal, 1969(45, 46). 
b 
From 1965-66 onward other cereals such as buckwheat were also included, 
hence the higher fisrure. 
Table ^-7 (Continued) 
Crops 1961-62 1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69 
Cash crops 
Sugar cane 139. 0 161, .0 203. 0 126, .0 192, .0 147, .0 167, .4 188 .0 
Jute 34. ,0 33. . 6 35. 0 39. ,0 38, .7 37. 0 39. 5 33 .0 
c 
Tobacco 6. ,0 4. 8 4. 8 8. ,6 7. 3 5. 2 5. ,4 6 .3 
Oilseeds 48. ,0 70. ,0 70. 0 51. ,0 51. ,4 55. , 6 56. ,0 57 .0 
ish crops total 227. ,0 269, 4 312. 8 224. ,6 
O
N
 C
O
 CM 
,4 244. ,8 26R. 3 284 .3 
In reporting the production of tobacco, for some years production was report­
ed in green or partly dry leaves weight; for other years it was in dry leaves. 
These are adjusted for "dry" leaf weights as far as information was avail­
able. Tobacco production figures presented above do not tally with earlier 
released figures up to 1965-66. 
Table . Abstract from the National Food Balance Sheet - Nepal ( I968-69) ( 87) 
Q Pro- Vitamin 
Items Caput/day Calo- tein Ca Fe ^ C 
gm. ries c^m. arm. g;m. lu 
1 ^2 
mgr. ma;. mg. 
1 Cereals 501.0 1763 36.2 56.3 4.90 - 0.^57 O.173 
2 Potato and 
starchy foods 67.7 5^ 0.9 5.8 0.^•0 - 0.461 0.175 7.60 
3 Butter fat 
and oils 9«0 69 — — — 68.0 — — — 
N) 4 Pulses 12.2 k-2 2.9 17.7 0.95 36.6 0.068 0.021 0.6I ^
5 Meat, poultry 
and fish 20.0 24 2.6 1.2 O.3O - 0.009 O.OI8 
a 
1 Cereals include rice (unpolished), wheat, maize and millets. 
2 Starchy foods Include crops such as yam and sweet potato. 
3 Pulses include blackgram (nearly 6O.O percent of the total pulses), 
green^ram, lentils, pigreonpear,, horsegram, and beans. 
4 Butter fat includes butter, and ghee. 
5 Fish estimates are included in meat and poultry. 
Table 48 (Continued) 
Vitamin 
a Pro-
Items Caput/day Gale- tein Ca Fe 
gm. ries gm. gm. gra. 
A 
lU 
3l 
mg. 
^2 
rag. 
C 
mg. 
6 Milk and milk 
products 40.0 
7 Eggs _ 2.5 
8 Sugar 8.0 
9 Vegetables 30.0 
10 Fruits 25.6 
a 
29 1.8 49,0 
4 0.3 1.2 
24 - 1.4 
? - 47.0 
15 0.2 
0.06 40.3 0.012 0.037 0.31 
0.05 20.0 0.002 0.006 
0.08 — — — — 
0.75 1400.0 0.020 0.050 24.90 
0.10 29.0 0.020 0.020 5.10 
6 Milk products include buttermilk and cheese. 
7 Eggs include poultry and duck eggs. 
Egg conversion: one dozen eggs = 0 « 5 Kg. 
8 Gur and raw liquid sugar also given in terras of fine sugar. 
9 Vegetables include green and yellow. 
10-Fruits include mainly tropical and citrus. 
Data for change in stock were not available and are assumed nil. 
Export and import figures for 1968-69 were not ready, export-import 
figures of I965-66 are projected through 1968-69. 
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